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Introduction
“The twin pillars of neoclassical finance are efficient markets and, closely re-
lated, the theory of asset pricing and, most notably, no arbitrage and risk
neutral pricing.” — Stephen A. Ross1
The above quote underscores the importance of the paradigm of (capital) market effi-
ciency in financial economics. Since the 1960s and, in particular, since the publication of
probably the most prominent article on the topic, Fama (1970), market efficiency has been
the area of tremendous research efforts. In the three decades since the term was coined
by Eugene F. Fama, the efficient market hypothesis has become the central proposition in
financial economics, and, as such, widely accepted by academic scholars. Fama (1970)’s
statement that “a securities market is efficient if security prices at any time fully reflect
all available information” is probably the most classical definition of market efficiency and
serves as the centerpiece of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).2
In recent years, in light of several instances where the EMH seemingly failed, such
as the “Internet bubble” at the turn of the century and the recent financial crisis that
originated in 2007 with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, the concept of
market efficiency has been increasingly challenged by academics. Moreover, a number of
financial economists have started to believe that stock prices/returns are (to some ex-
tent) predictable based on historical prices as well as fundamental variables, such as the
dividend yield or the book-to-market ratio. Another challenge for market efficiency with
regard to the time-series characteristics of stock prices/returns is posed by several stud-
ies that suggest that stock returns do not follow a random walk but are mean-reverting
(see, for instance, Poterba and Summers (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1988), and Lo and
MacKinlay (1999)). It remains an open question whether these time-series properties are
compatible with an efficient market. At the same time, advocates of market efficiency
have refuted these challenges and claimed that markets are far more efficient than as-
serted by the critics of the EMH.3 Malkiel (2005), p. 2, explains that “if prices were often
irrational and if market returns were as predictable as some critics of the efficient market
1 Ross (2002), p. 129.
2 Fama (1970), p. 383.
3 Malkiel (2003) provides a nice overview article on the EMH and its critics.
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hypothesis believe, than surely actively managed investment funds should easily be able
to outdistance a passive index fund that simply buys and holds the market portfolio.”
However, according to Malkiel (2005), the fact that empirical studies over the last three
decades fail to support the ability of institutional investors to outperform the market
portfolio can be seen as a strong indication that market efficiency holds.4
Fama (1970) and Fama (1991) argue that market efficiency can only be tested jointly
with some equilibrium model for security prices, a statement that has become known as
the joint hypothesis problem. That is, a formalization of the process of price discovery—or,
in other words, of the statement that prices “fully reflect” all available information—is
required. Following Fama (1970), the concept of market efficiency—i.e., the statement
that in an efficient market securities prices at any time fully reflect all information available
to market participants—can be formalized as follows:
E(Si,t+1|It) = [1 + E(Ri,t+1|It)]Si,t, (1)
where E is the expected value operator, and Ri,t+1 denotes the expected one-period return
of security i from time t to t+ 1, Si,t the price of security i at time t, and Si,t+1 its price
at time t + 1; Ri,t+1 is defined as Ri,t+1 =
Si,t+1−Si,t
Si,t
, and It is the information set which
is fully reflected in the security price at time t. E(Ri,t+1) is obtained from the expected
return model under consideration.
Define the excess market value, vi,t+1, as
vi,t+1 = Si,t+1 − E(Si,t+1|It). (2)
Under the assumptions that the market equilibrium can be determined in terms of the
expected return and that the expected return is based on the information set It,
E(vi,t+1|It) = 0. (3)
Consequently, trading rules which are based on information in It are not able to system-
atically generate returns larger than E(Ri,t+1)—in other words, they are not able to earn
excess returns.
Analogously, let excess return be defined as
γi,t+1 = Ri,t+1 − E(Ri,t+1|It), (4)
4 For details, see Malkiel (2005)’s article on the performance of professional investors over the period
from 1970 through 2003.
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then
E(γi,t+1|It) = 0. (5)
That is, the excess return, defined as the difference of the actual return observed at time
t+ 1, Ri,t+1, and the expected return projected at time t based on information in It, has
an expected value of zero.
Denoting a trading strategy under which, at time t, an investor invests an amount
ζi(It) in each of the n available assets, as
ζ(It) = [ζ1(It), ζ2(It), ..., ζn(It)], (6)
the excess market value of such a trading strategy at time t+ 1, Vt+1, is computed as
Vt+1 =
n∑
i=1
ζi(It)[Ri,t+1 − E(Ri,t+1|It)︸ ︷︷ ︸
γi,t+1
]. (7)
According to equation (5), the expected value of the excess market value, Vt+1, is equal
to,
E(Vt+1) =
n∑
i=1
ζi(It)E([Ri,t+1 − E(Ri,t+1|It)])︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E(γi,t+1|It)
= 0. (8)
To sum up, in an efficient market, the expected excess return on any trading/investment
strategy—and hence the excess market value of any strategy— is equal to zero.
Depending on the type of information in set, It, Fama (1970) considers three categories
of market efficiency:
• weak form efficiency—It contains all historical prices/returns
• semi-strong form efficiency—It contains any publicly available information
• strong efficiency—It contains all information, public and private
The different categories of market-efficiency and their corresponding definitions of the
information set, It, have different practical implications. Under the weak EMH, an in-
vestor cannot earn excess returns based on past prices/returns, i.e., systematic excess
returns from technical trading are ruled out. In a more recent study, Fama (1991) slightly
revises his categorization, and the first category now comprises all tests for return pre-
dictability; that is, the concept of weak EMH also includes tests for the predictive ability
of variables, such as the dividend yield, the book-to-market ratio, and interest rates, for
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future stock returns, as well as tests for cross-sectional return predictability. Thus, if the
weak EMH holds, an investor should not be able to earn excess returns based on such
predictive models. The semi-strong EMH encompasses all tests/event-studies regarding
the adjustment of prices to new information, and posits that new information is instan-
taneously reflected in stock prices (see Fama (1991)). This implies that active portfolio
management is not able to beat the market, unless portfolio managers have private in-
formation. According to Fama (1991), the third category is now entitled tests for private
information. Specifically, the concept of strong form market efficiency implies that an
investor cannot earn excess returns even if she possesses private information not yet avail-
able to other market participants. In this case, market participants cannot expect to beat
the market, and only passive portfolio management makes sense. In summary, “if the
EMH holds, the market truly knows best” (Shleifer (2000), p. 1).
The ongoing debate about capital market efficiency contains a vast array of studies
on both sides, i.e., work by EMH advocates and its critics. The latter, documenting that
deviations from market efficiency are observable over long horizons, formed a new strand
of literature, the field of behavioral finance. This thesis contributes to the literature on
the efficiency of financial markets. The findings of the following three self-contained chap-
ters underscore the challenge in definitively answering the question of whether markets
are efficient or not, and the importance of differentiating between the various forms of the
EMH as markets may be efficient according to the weaker form but not according to the
stronger form. While Chapter 2 provides evidence that markets are efficient according
to weak form efficiency in that market timing fails, Chapter 1 raises some doubts about
the weak form EMH by documenting that information is not reflected simultaneously in
parallel markets; Chapter 3 investigates market anomalies in relation to the semi-strong
form EMH, and challenges its claim by showing that publicly available information is
not immediately incorporated into stock prices. The main chapters of this thesis, each of
which notationally self-contained, are based on three studies of different aspects of market
efficiency.
Chapter 1 investigates the process of price discovery in spot and futures markets.5
According to the efficient market hypothesis, new information should be reflected instan-
taneously in (all) prices, and, therefore, simultaneously in all securities traded in parallel
markets.6 In that sense, securities on parallel markets should contribute equally to the
process of price discovery, and it should not be possible to predict future returns in one
market by past returns in the other market. Yet, due to institutional differences, such
as the magnitude of transaction costs, markets may differ in the speed of information
5 This chapter is based on Schlusche (2009).
6 See Fama (1965) and Fama (1970).
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dissemination. We therefore investigate whether one of the parallel markets incorporates
new information faster and, consequently, contributes more to the process of price discov-
ery. Specifically, we examine the contribution of two derivative products of the German
blue chip index DAX: Exchange traded funds and index futures. In order to eliminate
noise caused by differences in the microstructure of the markets, we use transaction data
only from electronic-trading markets. We apply a linear vector error correction model
for our estimations and we use the common factor weights, first proposed by Schwarz
and Szakmary (1994), to quantify the contribution of each market to the process of price
discovery. Our results indicate that, while both markets do contribute to price formation,
the futures market clearly leads in the process of price discovery. Hence, the weak form
of market efficiency cannot be (fully) supported in this case. Furthermore, we show that
volatility, and not liquidity, as would be conjectured by the transaction-costs hypothesis,
is the driving factor for relative price leadership between the two markets.
Chapter 2 aims to quantify possible data-snooping biases in the market-timing lit-
erature and to test whether the considered market-timing rules are truly superior to a
buy-and-hold strategy.7 Market-timing rules build on empirical findings of the ability of
certain fundamental and sentiment indicators to predict future stock returns. The litera-
ture has identified many useful indicators, such as the earnings-to-price ratio (Campbell
and Shiller (1988b), Campbell and Shiller (1998)), the dividend yield (Shiller (1984), Fama
and French (1988)), the dividend-payout ratio (Lamont (1998)), the maturity spread and
the credit spread (Campbell (1987), Fama and French (1989)), and the gilt-equity yield
ratio (Clare, Thomas, and Wickens (1994), Brooks and Persand (2001)). In an efficient
market in the weak sense, however, return predictability based on past information should
fail. Based on the predictive ability of certain indicators, a variety of market-timing rules
have been investigated and found successful in the market-timing literature.8 However,
the studies on market-timing performance lack appropriate corrections for data-snooping
biases, and the profitability of seemingly outperforming market-timing rules might there-
fore be due to biases in statistical inference rather than truly superior performance. We
reassess the profitability of market-timing rules when controlling for data-snooping biases.
On the one hand, a rejection of the null hypothesis that the best market-timing rules are
not able to beat a buy-and-hold strategy would indicate that the stock market is not
efficient in the weak form—unless risk premia are varying over time.9 On the other hand,
if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, market efficiency cannot be denied. We find
that, even though individual market-timing rules show significant outperformance when
7 This chapter is based on joint work with Andreas Neuhierl (Neuhierl and Schlusche (2010)).
8 The studies in the field of market timing are numerous and include, for instance, Breen, Glosten, and
Jagannathan (1989), Prather and Bertin (1997), Prather and Bertin (1998), Copeland and Copeland
(1999), Shen (2003), Fisher and Statman (2006a), and Fisher and Statman (2006b).
9 For details on time-varying risk premia, see Section 2.7.5.
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considered in isolation, these results do not remain significant after correcting for data
snooping; this finding provides evidence in favor of market efficiency in that investment
strategies based on historical information do not generate (risk-adjusted) excess returns.
Chapter 3 deals with the semi-strong form of market efficiency.10 In a market that
is efficient in the semi-strong sense, investors cannot earn excess returns based on any
public information—or, as Shleifer (2000), p. 6, puts it, “[...] as soon as information
becomes public, it is immediately incorporated into prices, and hence an investor cannot
gain by using this information to predict returns.” Event studies on the impact of news
releases, e.g., earnings announcements or news on a company’s investment decision, have
shown well-know regularities, such as the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). If
markets were efficient in the semi-strong form sense, any news should be incorporated
into prices instantaneously. Previous literature in the field of event studies typically finds
that news are reflected in stock prices within a day of the announcement.11 A number of
studies, however, documents anomalies, e.g., the PEAD, which cannot be reconciled with
market efficiency. Having obtained a comprehensive dataset of corporate press releases
issued between April 2006 and August 2009, we classify it into various news categories and
then analyze the corresponding stock price reactions. In addition to confirming earlier
findings regarding the market reaction to financial news, we document strong responses,
along with prolonged drift patterns, to news about corporate strategy, customers and
partners, products and services, management changes, as well as legal developments.
We show that return volatility increases and liquidity typically decreases following most
news announcements. Furthermore, we find that the market response to certain types of
news changed during the period of the financial crisis. For example, news that are likely
to result in higher and less volatile future cash flows (i.e., announcements of corporate
reorganization, new customers and partners, new products, FDA and European drug
approvals, as well as legal settlements) led to more positive price reactions; announced
plans to raise funds through equity or debt offerings were perceived less negatively; and
the market reaction to announcements of share repurchases became even more positive
than during the pre-crisis period.
10 This chapter is based on Neuhierl, Scherbina, and Schlusche (2010).
11 Fama (1991) provides a summary of the implications of the findings from event studies on market
efficiency.
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Chapter 1
Price Formation in Spot and Futures
Markets: Exchange Traded Funds
vs. Index Futures
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a move in financial markets towards the trading of identi-
cal or closely related assets in parallel markets. For instance, futures contracts have been
introduced for the indices, such as the US-based Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA),
the S&P 500, as well as the German index DAX 30. More recently, a new market segment,
the so-called exchange traded funds (ETFs), has drawn considerable attention. ETFs are
closely related to mutual funds in that they hold portfolios of financial assets. However,
unlike mutual funds, ETFs are traded or priced continuously during exchange trading
sessions, similarly to stocks. The arrival of basket securities, such as financial futures and
ETFs, facilitates market participation of uninformed traders and allows inexpensive index
arbitrage (e.g., Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993)).
According to the efficient market hypothesis, new information should be impounded
simultaneously in all markets. Yet, due to institutional differences, such as the magnitude
of transaction costs, markets may differ in the speed of information dissemination. It is
therefore an interesting research question to investigate which market incorporates new
information faster and consequently contributes more to the process of price discovery.
This question has drawn considerable attention in the financial literature. Due to the fact
that indices and its derivative products are cointegrated, the model commonly used to
investigate price formation in financial markets is some version of the vector error correc-
tion model (VECM) introduced by Hasbrouck (1995). Cointegration theory suggests that
price differences between markets do not diverge infinitely. Rather, there exists a long-
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term relationship between prices in parallel markets. The VECM directly links changes
in futures and spot prices to deviations from the long-run relation. The VECM specifi-
cation stipulates that prices may deviate from their common long-run relation. However,
arbitrage forces ensure that prices converge to their theoretically stipulated relation. One
difficulty when estimating the VECM using spot and futures prices is the fact that the
cointegration relation, which is induced by the cost-of-carry relation between the two mar-
kets, is time-varying. One possible solution is demeaning of the log price series for each
trading day. This approach, which removes any average daily level difference between the
spot and futures price series while leaving intraday returns unaffected, was introduced
by Dwyer, Locke, and Yu (1996) and adopted by Theissen (2005), among others. In our
analysis, we follow a different approach, applied by a variety of authors, such as Martens,
Kofman, and Vorst (1998) and Tse (2001). Using a pre-specified cointegrating vector,
we take the cost-of-carry relationship directly into account and base our analysis on dis-
counted futures prices.
Despite all methodological differences, the majority of studies have shown that the
futures market leads the index market in price discovery. Stoll and Whaley (1990) and
Chan (1992) for the S&P 500 index, and Tse (1999), Tse (2001), and Tse, Bandyopad-
hyay, and Shen (2006) for the DJIA index report the dominance of the futures market in
price discovery. For the German market, Booth, So, and Tse (1999), who consider the
DAX index, index futures and index options in their investigation on price leadership in
the German market, show that index futures dominate in the process of price formation.
Similarly, Theissen (2005) finds that the futures market leads the spot market in terms
of relative contribution to price discovery.
The empirical investigations have so far focused mainly on the index itself and the
corresponding futures market. Despite the tremendous growth in ETF trading, few stud-
ies have been conducted on the relative price discovery of ETFs and index futures. Since
the majority of previous studies have reported a leadership of the futures market relative
to the index, the examination of whether the ETF market, in turn, leads the futures
market in price discovery is the logical next step. Given their lower transaction costs and
absence of short-sale restrictions, ETF markets may potentially incorporate new informa-
tion faster than cash indices. Hence, the price leadership of the futures market, relative
to the spot market, might be weakened in the new setting where the ETF market is con-
sidered in place of the index itself. Hasbrouck (2003) analyzes price leadership among the
three S&P 500 index derivatives, the ETF, the electronically-traded small-denomination
futures contract “E-mini,” and the regular floor-traded futures contract. His main finding
states that the “E-mini” leads the process of price discovery by contributing roughly 90%
to price formation. However, his results are based on ETF data obtained from Amex,
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which uses floor-trading. Since electronic trading offers the advantages of lower trad-
ing costs and trader anonymity, the results of Hasbrouck (2003) may shift in favor of
the ETF market. Tse, Bandyopadhyay, and Shen (2006) address this issue by including
electronically-traded ETFs from ArcaEx, a computer-mediated trading system, in their
examination of the price leadership of the DJIA index and its derivatives (ETFs, floor-
traded futures contracts, and electronically-traded “E-mini futures”). In this setting, the
authors find that the ETFs make a significant contribution to the process of price discov-
ery.
Our goal is to examine the relative contribution to price discovery of the ETF market
and the futures market in Germany, two derivative products of the German blue chip
index DAX. We estimate the VECM using DaxEx (ETF) prices and DAX futures prices
adjusted for the cost-of-carry. The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is
twofold: First, even though previous papers have investigated price discovery in the Ger-
man market, none of them has thus far included the increasingly important ETFs in their
analysis. For instance, Gru¨nbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994), Kempf and Korn
(1998), and Theissen (2005) analyze the lead-lag relationship for the German spot and
futures market, but do not consider the market for ETFs. Hence, our paper is the first
empirical investigation of price discovery with respect to the ETF market and the futures
market in Germany. Our results indicate that the futures market leads in the process of
price discovery. Second, we extend the literature on price leadership in spot and futures
markets by investigating which factors drive the price leadership of the futures market
and potentially lead to a shift in price formation in favor of the ETF market. Precisely,
we analyze whether liquidity and/or volatility affect relative price formation. Our results
show that when volatility is high the contribution of the ETF market to the process of
price discovery increases. Liquidity turns out to have no impact on price leadership.
In order to quantify the contribution of the two markets to the process of price discov-
ery, we use the so-called common factor weights (CFW), first introduced by Schwarz and
Szakmary (1994). This intuitive measure can be simply calculated from the coefficients
of the VECM. In order to eliminate undesirable effects on the results due to differences in
the microstructure of the markets, our analysis is based on data from electronic-trading
markets. This procedure closely follows Tse, Bandyopadhyay, and Shen (2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the relevant
economic and econometric models and discusses the measure we use in our study to
assess the contributions to price discovery. Section 1.3 provides some details about the
ETF market and the product itself. Section 1.4 describes the data used in our analysis
and presents some descriptive statistics, as well as the results of the stationarity tests.
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Section 1.5 documents the empirical results, and in Section 1.6 the determinants for price
leadership are analyzed. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 The Economic Model
The relation between spot and futures prices is described by the cost-of-carry model.
Under the no-arbitrage condition, i.e., a situation where a futures contract is priced at
its “fair value,” which rules out arbitrage opportunities between the spot and the futures
market, the model takes the following form:
Ft,T = Ste
(rt,T−κt,T )(T−t), (1.1)
where Ft,T is the price of a futures contract expiring at time T , St is the spot price, rt,T is
the risk-free interest rate on an investment for the time period (t,T), and κt,T is the ex-
pected dividend yield on the underlying asset.1 Any deviation from the relation described
by equation (1.1) creates arbitrage opportunities. If, for instance, Ft > Ste
(rt,T−κt,T )(T−t),
arbitrageurs can earn a profit by taking a long position in the index, i.e., by buying the
stocks in the index and shorting the futures contract. For Ft < Ste
(rt,T−κt,T )(T−t), the
reverse arbitrage strategy should be executed.
Following the cost-of-carry relation, we define the pricing error as
zt = p
S
t − (ft − (rt,T − κt,T )(T − t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡pFt
), (1.2)
where ft = ln(Ft) and p
S
t = ln(St);
2 hence, zt may be considered the percentage change of
mispricing. Values of the pricing error different from zero indicate arbitrage opportunities,
given that we assume zero transaction costs associated with index arbitrage. Since it takes
time for arbitrageurs to take appropriate positions in the spot and the futures markets,
this arbitrage opportunity has to be lagged by d periods of time, where d is the delay
inherent in the arbitrage process. Hence, arbitrage activity takes place when the following
inequality holds:
zt−d 6= 0. (1.3)
1 Henceforth, for convenience we drop subscript T , indicating the expiration day of the futures con-
tract.
2 Note that pFt denotes the log futures prices adjusted for the cost-of-carry.
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When arbitrageurs enter into the market, the next observations of the pricing error move
fast towards zero.
1.2.2 The Econometric Model
In this section, we provide motivation and details of an econometric model for describing
arbitrage activity and investigating whether the spot market or the futures market leads
the process of price discovery.
Previous empirical literature (e.g., Martens, Kofman, and Vorst (1998) and Dwyer,
Locke, and Yu (1996)) has concluded that spot indices and futures have unit roots, i.e.,
are non-stationary, whereas the respective pricing error, as defined above, is stationary.
This, in turn, implies that spot and futures prices adjusted for the cost-of-carry are coin-
tegrated with a coefficient of unity. As such, the relation between these time series can be
characterized by an error correction representation (see Engle and Granger (1987)).3 Such
an error correction model directly links changes in futures and spot prices to deviations
from the arbitrage relation, i.e., the pricing error. The error correction specification stipu-
lates that prices undergo some short-term disruption, i.e., they deviate from the long-run
relation (1.1). However, since prices possess the same long-run properties, this implies
that they adjust due to arbitrage trading aimed at exploiting mispricing.
We follow other studies in this field, such as Dwyer, Locke, and Yu (1996) and Theissen
(2005), and model current futures and spot returns by lagged futures and spot returns and
by deviations from the cost-of-carry relation in the previous period, zt−1 = pSt−1 − pFt−1.4
Formally, the linear vector error correction model works as follows:
∆pSt = α
S +
k∑
i=1
γ11i∆p
S
t−i +
k∑
i=1
γ12i∆p
F
t−i + δ
S(pSt−1 − pFt−1) + uSt , (1.4)
∆pFt = α
F +
k∑
i=1
γ21i∆p
S
t−i +
k∑
i=1
γ22i∆p
F
t−i + δ
F (pSt−1 − pFt−1) + uFt ,
3 See Brenner and Kroner (1995) for a summary of various applications of cointegration relations in
financial research.
4 Since in our study we use transaction prices rather than quotes, the time in our framework is
transaction time rather than continuous clock time. Therefore, the time index t refers to observations
in transaction time.
11
where ∆pt are logarithmic futures (F ) and spot (S) returns and superscripts S and F
identify coefficients relating to the respective markets.5
Following Martens, Kofman, and Vorst (1998) and Tse (2001), we use a pre-specified
cointegrating vector which enters the model as the error correction term zt−1, defined by
equation (1.2).6 This procedure takes the cost-of-carry relation explicitly into account
and at the same time captures the time-variability of the cointegration relation.7
The coefficients on the error correction term, δS and δF , indicate which market dom-
inates the process of price formation and how the system adjusts to deviations from the
long-run equilibrium. If the futures market impounds information faster than the spot
market, δF should be insignificant whereas δS will be significantly negative, indicating
that the spot price exhibits adjustment tendencies. In other words, the futures market
reflects information first and thus does not show adjustment movements. If instead in-
formation disseminates in the spot market first, δS will be insignificant and δF will be
positive and significant.
1.2.3 Measure for the Contribution to Price Discovery: Com-
mon Factor Weights
In order to assess the contribution to price discovery of each market, we use the common
factor weights (CFW) of Schwarz and Szakmary (1994) who propose a measure that is
calculated by using the coefficients on the error correction term in model (1.4).8 The
5 These two equations stem from the general vector error correction model developed to investigate
the long-run and short-run relationships between price series that are cointegrated. This general
model can be specified as
∆pt = α+ Γ1∆pt−1 + Γ2∆pt−2 + . . .+ Γp∆pt−p + δ(β′pt−1 − µe) + ut, (1.5)
where Γi is the coefficient matrix of the ith lag in the returns of the price vector, α is the constant
term, δ is the error correction coefficient, β is the cointegration vector, and µe is the expected value
of the cointegration relation. In our case, the term µe is expected to be zero (µe = 0) and the
cointegration vector is supposed to be (1,−1).
6 Note that in the following analysis the expected dividend yield does not enter the cost-of-carry
relation, since we consider DAX derivative products and the calculation of the DAX as a performance
index is based on the presumption that dividends are reinvested.
7 Dwyer, Locke, and Yu (1996) and Theissen (2005), among others, follow a different approach to avoid
the problem arising due to the non-constant cointegration relation. In their empirical analyses, they
modify spot and futures time series by subtracting the daily mean from the logarithms of the spot
and the futures price series.
8 Hasbrouck (1995) suggests an alternative measure, the so-called information shares (IS), to quantify
the contribution of each market to the process of price discovery. In contrast to the common factor
weights which are solely based on the coefficients on the error correction term, the IS approach
of Hasbrouck (1995) relates the contribution of each market’s innovation to the total innovation
of the common efficient price. Since this approach may lead to ambiguous results, when the price
innovations are correlated across the two markets—e.g., due to a small number of transactions per
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relative magnitude of these coefficients quantifies the contribution of the two markets to
price discovery. Formal justifications, which are based on Gonzalo and Granger (1995),
are given, for instance, by Theissen (2002) and Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and Tse (2002).
Specifically, the common factor weights are obtained as follows:9
CFW S =
δF
δF − δS and CFW
F =
−δS
δF − δS . (1.7)
As mentioned in the previous section, the coefficients δS and δF indicate the way of
adjustment of the system to deviations from the cost-of-carry relation. The higher the
magnitude of δj (j = {S, F}), the slower the market impounds new information or, stated
differently, the more the market has to adjust toward the new equilibrium price. That is,
the market which leads the process of price formation does not follow but rather initiates
the deviation from the cost-of-carry relation. For instance, if the futures market impounds
information faster than the spot market, δS will be significant, indicating that the spot
price exhibits adjustment tendencies, and δF will be insignificant. If price discovery occurs
only in the futures market, CFW F = 1 ; conversely, if price discovery occurs exclusively
in the spot market, CFW F = 0. If both markets contribute equally to the process of
price discovery, CFW F = CFW S = 0.5.
The sum of the coefficients δj can be interpreted as the total adjustment of the system
to a shock in at least one market. The common factor weights quantify the part of the
total reaction attributed to a particular market. Simultaneous small/large values of the
error correction coefficients for both markets indicate slow/fast adjustment dynamics. In
the extreme case, where the coefficients δj are equal to zero, the supply of arbitrage ser-
vices is zero. In this case, spot and futures prices are independent random walks and, as
a result, not cointegrated. Standardizing the common factor weights, so that they sum
up to one, yields a measure to quantify the relative price leadership.
1.3 Exchange Traded Funds
In the past few years, a substantial growth in trading volume and product coverage oc-
curred in the ETF market showing the increasing popularity of those funds. Table 1.1
displays the increase in trading volume for the DaxEx, the most liquid ETF traded on
day—we decided to base our analysis on the common factor weights rather than the information
shares.
9 This is equivalent to
CFWS =
∣∣δF ∣∣
|δF |+ |δS | and CFW
F =
∣∣δS∣∣
|δF |+ |δS | , (1.6)
as long as the coefficients δF and δS have the correct signs, i.e., δF > 0 and δS < 0.
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XTF Xetra provided by Deutsche Boerse AG. ETFs cover a broad spectrum of investment
options across domestic and global markets, diverse market capitalization, and investment
styles. Thus, ETFs offer a great opportunity for diversification and therefore an inter-
esting investment alternative. Trading ETFs allows to trade a whole basket of stocks in
one transaction, a feature common with futures and certificates. For this reason, ETFs,
similarly to other basket securities (such as index futures), facilitate market participation
of uninformed traders, but simultaneously attract informed traders. We have been infor-
mally told that trades by institutional investors amount to 90-95% of the trading volume,
indicating that the ETF market is a valid counterpart for the index itself in terms of
information arrival. This fact, in conjunction with the previously mentioned advantages
of the ETF market over the index, provides a reason to conjecture that relative price
leadership between spot and futures markets may have shifted in favor of the spot market
(ETF market).
Table 1.1: Volume DaxEx
Year Volume in millions of EURO
2001 14, 541
2002 13, 654
2003 18, 851
2004 14, 897
2005 18, 570
2006 27, 965
2007 41, 173
In Germany, ETFs are traded on the electronic market XTF, provided by Deutsche
Boerse AG. In our study, we use data of the DaxEx (ISIN: DE0005933931) which rep-
resents one product on this market.10 The DaxEx is (now) issued by Barclays Global
Investors (Deutschland) AG and replicates the German blue chip index DAX.11 Hence, as
soon as the index composition or the relative weights of the DAX index are changed, the
ETF fund management is forced to change the composition of the DaxEx. For replication
purposes, it is allowed to solely use stocks of the index, certificates on the index, certifi-
cates on stocks of the index, forward contracts on the stocks of the index, and forward
contracts on the index. Among these alternatives, the stocks in the index have absolute
10 Due to a recent acquisition of INDEXCHANGE Investment AG through Barclays Bank PLC in
2007, the DaxEx was renamed and is now iShares DAX (DE). However, throughout this paper we
refer to the ETF as the DaxEx.
11 The DAX is a value-weighted index calculated from the prices of the 30 most liquid German stocks.
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priority. ETF managers are supposed to meet a required degree of duplication of 95%.12
The DaxEx is an ETF which retains its profits, that is all dividends of the stocks in its
portfolio are not distributed to the shareholders but are reinvested, as is the case for the
DAX index. This feature allows the fund to hold a very close replication of the underlying
index. Furthermore, administrative fees are deducted every day and a small fraction of the
assets are held in cash. These features cause the fund to slightly underperform the index.
The fund might also outperform the index, when markets are falling (this is referred to
as cashdrag).
1.4 Data
We use high-frequency observations of transaction prices for both the DaxEx and the
DAX futures (FDax). The starting point of our sample is the first trading day of July
2005 and the last data point is the final trading day of December 2005.
Futures contracts on the DAX are traded on EUREX exchange. These futures expire
on the third Friday of the months of March, June, September, and December. Hence,
our price series includes three expiration dates for futures contracts, the third Friday of
September 2005, the third Friday of December 2005 and the third Friday of March 2006.
All data are obtained from Deutsche Boerse AG.
Since the data include many more transaction prices for the FDax than for the DaxEx,
we have to eliminate some futures prices in order to synchronize the two price series. We
opt for an approach described in Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood (1995) where
for every transaction price of the DaxEx we identify the most recent transaction price of
the FDax and by this match the price series for our model.13 Therefore, in each pair of
transaction prices the observation of the FDax is usually slightly older (but never more
recent) than the matched observation of the DaxEx. Consequently, this synchronization
works clearly to the disadvantage of the futures market.
Another difficulty arises due to differences in the microstructure between the two mar-
kets, XTF (Deutsche Boerse’s ETF segment) for the DaxEx and EUREX for the FDax.
12 The degree of duplication (DG) is calculated by the following formula: DG = 100%−
∑n
i=1 |wIi−wFi |
2 ,
where wIi is the weight of stock i in the index in percent, w
F
i is the weight of stock i in the fund in
percent, and n is the number of stocks in the index.
13 There are, of course, alternative ways to synchronize the data. Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and
Wood (1995) provide a good comparison of alternative methods to synchronize transaction data.
Their study finds that the results for alternative synchronizations are quite similar. We also checked
for potential changes in the results due to variations of the synchronization method but the results
are similar and the conclusions remain the same.
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On XTF, there are three auctions for the DaxEx per trading day, but no such auction
takes place on EUREX for the FDax. Both markets are electronic continuous trading
markets, except for the three auction periods on XTF. Since differences in the market
structure could influence our estimations, we only consider prices of the simultaneous
continuous trading time of both markets and discard prices recorded during the auction
periods on XTF.14 Regular trading on XTF starts after the morning auction at 9.04 a.m.
and extends until 5.30 p.m., when the final auction is held. We therefore eliminate all
price data before 9.04 a.m. and from 5.30 p.m. onwards. We further discard all prices
within a five minute interval from the time of the intraday auction which takes place from
1.10 p.m. to 1.12 p.m.
As outlined earlier, a time-varying cointegration relation between futures and spot
prices is implied by the cost-of-carry relationship. In order to appropriately consider
the time-variation of this cointegrating relation, we calculate adjusted futures prices by
discounting the futures data series. As an approximation for the risk-free interest rate
we use Eonia (Euro OverNight Index Average).15 The daily risk-free interest rate is a
good approximation for the interest rate in the cost-of-carry relation for futures traded
on EUREX, since investors have to pay a collateral for their position.16 The amount of
the margin is calculated on a daily basis and the collaterals are invested at daily risk-free
interest rates.
Table 1.2 gives some descriptive statistics for the return series of the two markets. The
standard deviations (adjusted for autocorrelation) in both markets are nearly equal. Both
markets show negative skewness and excess kurtosis, with both being more pronounced
in the futures market. The return series show negative serial correlation, most likely due
to the bid-ask bounce. The autocorrelation is considerably lower in the futures market,
which may be due to the elimination of a significant number of DAX futures observations.
There are about 30,000 daily transactions in the futures market, which exceeds the num-
ber of daily transactions in the ETF market by a factor of more than 100.
An important prerequisite for estimating an error correction model is that the price
series are integrated of order one (I(1)), which means that the first differences have to
be integrated of order zero (I(0)). Another necessary condition for our estimation is that
the two series are cointegrated. Table 1.3 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and of the Phillips-Perron test for the level and the first difference of the series,
14 Previous papers, such as Gru¨nbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) and Kempf and Korn (1998),
analyze various spot and futures markets. Their attention is focused on possible implications of
different trading protocols for the process of price discovery.
15 Eonia was extracted from Thomson Financial Datastream.
16 For further information, visit www.eurexchange.com.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
DaxEx FDax
Return standard deviation 0.000550 0.000522
Skewness −0.819285 −0.873453
Kurtosis 213.3106 249.9899
First order serial correlation −0.078 −0.045
Avg. number of transactions per day 279.62 30,133.13
The table presents descriptive statistics for the DaxEx and the DAX futures returns series.
The returns are calculated using transaction prices. The return standard deviations are
corrected for autocorrelation. The numbers of transactions refer to daily averages.
respectively. The results of the two tests indicate clearly that both time series are I(1).
That is, for the levels the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is not rejected, whereas for
the first differences it is clearly rejected. Further tests indicate that the two price series
are cointegrated according to the cost-of carry relation.17
Table 1.3: Stationarity Tests
level first difference
ADF Phillips-Perron ADF Phillips-Perron
log(DaxEx) 0.5062 0.4565 0.0001 0.0001
log(FDax) 0.5304 0.5353 0.0001 0.0001
The table presents the p-values from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the
Phillips-Perron test applied to both the levels and the first differences of the time series.
1.5 Empirical Results
Model (1.4) is estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS). Both the Schwarz infor-
mation criterion (SIC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggest to include 16
lags. Table 1.4 thus shows the results of the estimation with k = 16 lags included. In order
to conserve space, we only report the coefficients on the first four lags. The results show
that the independent variables for the cash market have much more explanatory power
than the independent variables for the futures market, as indicated by an adjusted R2 of
0.058 in the spot market and 0.015 in the futures market.18 The returns of both markets
depend negatively on their own lagged returns, probably due to the bid-ask bounce, and
17 The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (p-value 0.0000) and of the Phillips-Perron test
(p-value 0.0001) applied to the difference between the adjusted futures time series and the DaxEx
time series suggest stationarity of the pricing error. The results of the Johansen tests (not shown
in the paper) clearly indicate that the adjusted futures time series and the DaxEx time series are
cointegrated.
18 Throughout the paper, we use the terms cash market and spot market interchangeably.
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positively on the lagged returns of the respective other market. Bi-directional causality
is indicated by the F -statistic. However, the t-statistics of the coefficients reveal that the
cash market depends much more on the lagged returns of the futures market than the
futures market on lagged returns of the spot market.
Table 1.4: Summary Results of the Vector Error Correction Model
DaxEx FDax
Constant 0.0018 −0.0006
(−5.68) (2.00)
DaxEx(-1) −0.4456 0.2032
(−33.80) (15.87)
DaxEx(-2) −0.3448 0.1554
(−23.31) (10.82)
DaxEx(-3) −0.2722 0.1206
(−17.41) (7.94)
DaxEx(-4) −0.2196 0.0902
(−13.66) (5.77)
FDax(-1) 0.423 −0.2275
(31.94) (−17.40)
FDax(-2) 0.341 −0.1634
(22.60) (−11.15)
FDax(-3) 0.2801 −0.1205
(17.58) (−7.79)
FDax(-4) 0.2168 −0.0957
(13.23) (−6.01)
Error correction term −0.0487 0.0165
(−5.69) (1.99)
Common factor weights 0.253 0.747
R2 0.058 0.015
F -statistic 67.76 17.04
Lags included 16 16
The table presents the results of the error correction model:
∆pSt = α
S +
k∑
i=1
γ11i∆p
S
t−i +
k∑
i=1
γ12i∆p
F
t−i + δ
S(pSt−1 − pFt−1) + uSt ,
∆pFt = α
F +
k∑
i=1
γ21i∆p
S
t−i +
k∑
i=1
γ22i∆p
F
t−i + δ
F (pSt−1 − pFt−1) + uFt ,
where pSt−1 denotes the lagged log price of the DaxEx, p
F
t−1 denotes the lagged log of the
adjusted futures price, and ∆pjt denotes the log returns for the two markets j = {S, F}. We
estimate the model using OLS, including 16 lags as suggested by both the SIC and the AIC
criterion, but report the coefficients for the first four lags only. The cointegration vector is
pre-specified as (1,−1). The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. The
last line reports the common factor weights for the DaxEx and the FDax, respectively.
The coefficient on the error correction term shows that the spot market responds
to the futures market, as indicated by a negative sign on the error correction term
18
(δS = −0.0487). The impact of the error correction term in the futures market is much
less significant than it is in the spot market (δF = 0.0165), though it has the expected
positive sign. While both markets contribute to the process of price discovery, the futures
market appears to dominate the process. According to the CFW, which are reported in
Table 1.4, the futures market clearly leads the process of price formation. It is assigned a
74.7% contribution to price formation, while the DaxEx contributes only the remainder of
25.3%. These results are consistent with the findings of Theissen (2005), who studies the
process of price formation of the DAX index itself and DAX futures. When interpreting
the results, one should keep in mind that the DaxEx prices are matched with the most
recent corresponding futures prices, which is to the disadvantage of the futures market.
Consequently, our results are even likely to understate the contribution of the futures
market to the process of price discovery.
1.6 Determinants of Price Leadership
In this section, we investigate which factors drive the price leadership of the futures mar-
ket. Specifically, we analyze to what extent liquidity and volatility affect relative price
formation. One would expect market liquidity to be a determining factor, since (informed)
traders prefer to trade in the market with the lowest transaction costs (or the highest liq-
uidity). The trading-costs hypothesis is supported, for instance, by Fleming, Ostdiek, and
Whaley (1996) in their analysis of relative price formation in stock, index futures, and
option markets and by Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarz (1999) who test for lead-lag return
relations across index futures markets and across cash markets. Both studies find that the
highest trading activity is found in the low-cost market and that the magnitude of trading
costs is the main determinant of price leadership. This, in turn, implies that measures for
price leadership, such as the common factor weights, are correlated with trading activity
(see, for instance, Theissen (2002)).
Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998) find that the overall trading volume of DAX futures
increases significantly just before contract expiration. This increase is particularly sig-
nificant in the last two weeks of a quarter year, which, in this case, is the time interval
between two contract expiration dates. This increase amounts to 70%, on average. Hence,
one might expect that during periods with low trading volume in the futures market the
price leadership of the FDax is weaker compared to periods just before expiration dates,
i.e., in the last two weeks of each quarter. In addition, Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998)
and Bamberg and Dorfleitner (2000) find that the overall trading volume is heavily con-
centrated on the nearby contract, i.e., the contract with the shortest time-to-expiration,
which is the only type of contract that we study in this paper. Hence, assuming the
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trading-costs hypothesis holds and using relative trading volume as a proxy for liquidity,
one would expect time-varying trading intensity in the nearby futures contract to trans-
late into time-varying price leadership of the futures market relative to the ETF market
(unless similar trading patterns are found in the ETF market as well).
In order to illustrate the time variation of the relative trading volume and of the CFW,
we plot the evolution of both measures on a daily basis.19 Figure 1.1 plots the daily rel-
ative trading volume of the two markets, defined as the ratio of the trading volume in
the futures market to the trading volume in the ETF market (thin line). We also show
the average relative trading volume over the entire sample period, represented by the
horizontal dashed line in Figure 1.1. The figure indicates that the relative trading volume
fluctuates heavily over time with sharp peaks around the expiration days of the futures
contracts. The CFW are calculated for each trading day separately and are plotted in
Figure 1.2.20 The figure indicates that also the CFW series is noticeably unstable over
time.
Figure 1.1: Relative Trading Volume
The figure shows the relative trading volume of the futures and the ETF market, defined as the ratio of
the trading volume in the futures market to the trading volume in the ETF market (thin line). The
horizontal dashed line represents the average relative trading volume over the entire sample period.
19 Note that the CFW are solely calculated from the coefficients on the error correction term in model
(1.4). Thus, we run stability tests for the coefficients, since instability of the coefficients implies
instability of the CFW. Test results of the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and
CUSUM of squares test (see Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975)), which are not shown in the paper,
reject the parameter stability hypothesis.
20 Since the coefficients on the error correction term do not have the expected sign for all trading days,
we use formula (1.6) to calculate the common factor weights.
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Figure 1.2: Common Factor Weights of the Futures Market
The figure shows the evolution of the common factor weights for the futures market. The common
factor weights are calculated according to formula (1.6).
In contrast to the findings by Theissen (2002), among others, that price leadership is
positively correlated with relative trading volume, Martens (1998) in his study of Bund
futures contracts traded on LIFFE (floor market) and DTB (screen market) shows that
not relative trading volume, but volatility is the driving force for relative price discovery.
Precisely, he finds that in periods with low volatility relative trading volume on LIFFE
increases, whereas the contribution to the process of price formation decreases. However,
in their analysis of price leadership in floor-based and screen-based trading systems in
several FX futures markets, Ates and Wang (2006) fail to find support for volatility as a
determinant of price discovery.
In Section 1.5, we have shown that the futures market clearly dominates the process
of price discovery for the entire sample period. We now examine to what extent liquidity
and/or volatility drive the price leadership of the futures market relative to the ETF
market. Specifically, we run the following regression with daily estimates for liquidity and
volatility as explanatory variables:
CFWFt = β0 + β1RTV
F
t + β2Volat + εt, (1.8)
where CFWFt denotes the common factor weight of the futures market on day t, RTV
F
t is
the daily relative trading volume of the two markets, defined as the ratio of the trading
volume in the futures market to the trading volume in the ETF market, and Volat denotes
the sum of the realized volatilities of the two markets (Volat = Vola
F
t + Vola
S
t ), which are
estimated for each trading day according to Hansen and Lunde (2005a) and Hansen and
Lunde (2005b). The estimation procedure for the realized volatilities requires the choice
of a sampling interval. Because of market microstructure noise, one should not use every
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tick for the estimation. In fact, the range between one and five minutes is often found
to be the optimal sampling frequency (see, for instance, Hansen and Lunde (2006)). We
choose a sampling interval of five minutes, which is rather on the upper end of the com-
monly used intervals, in order to minimize potential effects due to market microstructure
noise.21 In Appendix A.1, the estimation procedure of realized variances is described in
more detail.
We estimate several specifications of model (1.8) using OLS and present the results in
Table 1.5; the reported t-statistics are adjusted for time-series correlation using the Newey
and West (1987) methodology. It can be seen from the table that the coefficients β1 have
the expected sign in all specifications. The coefficients on the relative trading volume
are positive, but statistically insignificant in all specifications. However, the coefficients
on the measures of volatility are significant in all specifications, with the volatility of the
futures market being even more significant than the sum of the volatilities for the two
markets. As can be seen from specifications (3)-(5), including each variable separately
in the regression does not qualitatively change the findings. Our results show that, as
indicated by the negative coefficient on volatility, higher volatility in the markets causes
the price leadership of the futures market to decrease.
We now investigate to what extent the price leadership shifts to the ETF market
during high volatility periods. In order to shed more light on the contribution of the two
markets to price discovery conditional on volatility, we calculate their CFW during high
and low volatility periods. Similar to Martens (1998), we first classify trading days based
on the sum of the realized volatilities of the two markets, Volat, into “high volatility” and
“low volatility” days according to the following rule:
if Volat > quantile90th : day t is a high volatility day,
if Volat < quantile10th : day t is a low volatility day,
where quantilexth is the x
th quantile of the sample distribution of Volat. Following Martens
(1998), in addition to the quantiles, we also employ µ+σ and µ−σ as boundaries for high
volatility and low volatility days, where µ and σ are the mean and the standard deviation
of the sample distribution of Volat. Second, we estimate the error correction model (1.4)
for each volatility subsample separately and from the obtained coefficients calculate the
CFW for the two markets.22 The results for the coefficients on the error correction term
21 As a robustness check, we have also tried sampling intervals of one minute and ten minutes; the
results are similar and the conclusions remain the same.
22 Tsay (1998) shows that under certain assumptions the consistency of conditional least-squares pa-
rameter estimates and variance-covariance matrices holds.
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Table 1.5: Regression Analysis of Factors Affecting Price Leadership
Specification Intercept RTVFt Volat Vola
F
t Adj. R
2 F -statistic
(1) 0.7355∗∗∗ 0.0010 −0.6614∗∗∗ - 0.0245 2.6211
(8.62) (0.16) (-2.75)
(2) 0.7051∗∗∗ 0.0027 - −1.2198∗∗∗ 0.0456 4.0810
(11.19) (0.42) (-4.03)
(3) 0.5754∗∗∗ 0.0004 - - -0.0078 0.0027
(8.98) (0.06)
(4) 0.7436∗∗∗ - −0.6597∗∗∗ - 0.0320 5.2622
(11.63) (-2.77)
(5) 0.7258∗∗∗ - - −1.2000∗∗∗ 0.0519 8.0620
(16.81) (-4.10)
The table presents the results of the regression :
CFWFt = β0 + β1RTV
F
t + β2Volat + εt,
where CFWFt denotes the common factor weight of the futures market (calculated according to formula (1.6)),
RTVFt is the relative trading volume of the two markets, defined as the ratio of trading volume in the futures
market to the trading volume in the ETF market, and Volat denotes the sum of the realized volatilities of the two
markets (VolaFt and Vola
S
t ), which are estimated according to Hansen and Lunde (2005a) and Hansen and Lunde
(2005b). The t-statistics of the coefficients are adjusted for time-series correlation using the Newey and West (1987)
methodology and reported in parenthesis. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
and the CFW for high and low volatility periods are summarized in Table 1.6. We also
report the average trading volume (in millions of EURO), the average relative trading
volume, and the average number of contracts traded in the two markets conditional on
volatility. Panel A presents the results for the case when the 90th/10th quantiles serve as
boundaries for high/low volatility periods (specification I), whereas in Panel B the defini-
tion of high/low volatility periods is based on the thresholds µ+σ and µ−σ (specification
II).23 As can be seen from Panel A, for both the futures market and the ETF market,
trading volume and the number of contracts traded are higher in high-volatility than in
low-volatility periods. However, for the ETF market, the rate of increase is much lower
than for the futures market. For instance, trading volume in the ETF market during
high-volatility periods is almost three times higher than in low-volatility periods, whereas
in the futures market it is almost four times as high, leading to an increase in the relative
trading volume of the futures market. According to the trading-costs hypothesis, higher
(relative) trading volume should translate into a higher contribution to the process of
price discovery. However, the results for the CFW fail to support the hypothesis, but
show that the price leadership of the futures market decreases by 22.5% from low to high
23 We have also tried the 5th/95th quantiles as boundaries for low and high volatility periods; the
results are similar and the conclusions remain the same.
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volatility periods. The contribution of the ETF market rises from roughly 5.5% to almost
27%. Hence, in high volatility periods the contribution of the ETF market is higher than
its unconditional contribution (25.3%).
Table 1.6: Market Characteristics During High and Low Volatility Periods
Panel A: Quantiles
FDax DaxEx
high volatility low volatility high volatility low volatility
Trading volume 1,126 309 150 50
Relative trading volume 8.2632 7.0731 - -
Number of contracts 231,542 60,368 3,222,854 1,014,282
Error correction term 0.0262 -0.0006 -0.0717 -0.0105
Common factor weight 0.7326 0.9451 0.2674 0.0549
Panel B: Mean plus/minus standard deviation
FDax DaxEx
high volatility low volatility high volatility low volatility
Trading volume 1,126 285 150 46
Relative trading volume 8.2632 7.1681 - -
Number of contracts 231,542 55,026 3,222,854 940,830
Error correction term 0.0262 -0.0028 -0.0717 -0.0164
Common factor weight 0.7326 0.8545 0.2674 0.1455
The table presents the average trading volume (in millions of EURO), the average relative trading volume, the average number
of contracts, the coefficient on the error correction term, and the common factor weights of the futures market (FDax) and
the spot market (DaxEx) conditional on high/low volatility. The relative trading volume is defined as the ratio of the trading
volume in the futures market to the trading volume in the ETF market. The coefficients on the error correction term are
denoted by δF and δS in the error correction model (1.4). The common factor weights are calculated as specified in formula
(1.6). In Panel A, the 90th quantile and the 10th quantile serve as boundaries for high/low volatility periods as described in
the text. In Panel B, the mean plus/minus one standard deviation of the empirical distribution of the sum of the realized
volatilities are used to define high/low volatility periods.
As can be seen from Panel B, using µ + σ and µ − σ as boundaries for high/low
volatility periods does not qualitatively change the results.24 The decrease in the CFW
for the futures market from low to high volatility periods equals 14.3% and the drop is
obviously less pronounced than in the specification of Panel A. Compared to low volatility
periods, the relative trading volume increases by 15.3% and the increase is smaller than
in specification I.
In order to provide formal statistical evidence for these findings, we evaluate, for both
the DaxEx and the FDax, the null hypotheses that the average trading volume, the aver-
24 Note that the boundaries and hence the market characteristics for the high volatility period are the
same as in specification I.
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age relative trading volume, and the average CFW do not differ in high and low volatility
periods.25 More specifically, we test whether the increase in trading volume for both
markets, the increase in relative trading volume, and the decrease in the CFW of the
FDax—and therefore its lower contribution to the process of price discovery—from low
to high volatility periods are statistically significant. Table 1.7, Panel A reports the p-
values of the corresponding t-tests for the case when the 90th/10th quantiles are used as
boundaries for high/low volatility periods. The p-values presented in Panel B are from
tests based on the thresholds µ + σ and µ − σ as boundaries for high/low volatility pe-
riods. The results in Panel A show that for both the DaxEx and the FDax the increase
in trading volume from low to high volatility periods is significant (p-values are equal to
0.0000), whereas the increase in relative trading volume is insignificant. The p-value for
the decrease in the CFW from low to high volatility periods, which is significant at the
5% level, provides statistical evidence for the previous finding that the price leadership of
the futures market is lower when volatility is high, and vice versa. The results in Panel B,
where the thresholds µ+ σ and µ− σ define high/low volatility periods, are qualitatively
the same as the ones in Panel A. The only quantitative difference is that the decrease in
the CFW of the FDax is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 1.7: Statistical Test Results
Panel A: Quantiles
FDax DaxEx
Trading volume (p-value) 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
Relative trading volume (p-value) 0.2128 -
Common factor weight (p-value) 0.0154∗∗ -
Panel B: Mean plus/minus standard deviation
FDax DaxEx
Trading volume (p-value) 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗
Relative trading volume (p-value) 0.3403 -
Common factor weight (p-value) 0.0093∗∗∗ -
This table presents the results of the t-test for the null hypothesis that the average
trading volume, the average relative trading volume, and the average common factor
weights are equal for the high and low volatility samples. The tests in Panel A are
performed on samples which are constructed by using the 90th quantile and the 10th
quantile to define high/low volatility periods as described in the text. In Panel B,
the tests are performed on samples constructed by using boundaries specified by the
mean plus/minus one standard deviation of the empirical distribution of the sum of
the realized volatilities. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
25 The test for the change in the CFW is based on the statistical properties of the daily estimates of
the CFW on low and high volatility days, respectively.
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In summary, the results above show that volatility is the significant determinant of the
degree of price leadership of the futures market. As volatility increases, trading volume
and the number of contracts traded increase in both markets, and the relative trading
volume of the futures market rises. This, however, does not imply an increase in the price
leadership of the futures market. On the contrary, the contribution to price formation of
the ETF market rises substantially, indicating a shift in informational efficiency in favor
of the ETF market.
Since all our data are obtained from electronic-trading systems, but do not include
transactions from floor-trading systems, our results might be explained by a potential
shift of informational efficiency from floor-based to screen-based trading. In other words,
from low to high volatility periods the screen-based ETF market apparently “gains” a
substantial share of price discovery from the corresponding floor-based trading system.
Due to the fact that the FDax is traded exclusively electronically, this shift in informa-
tional efficiency cannot occur in the futures market. If this conjecture held true, these
results would be in contrast to Martens (1998) who finds that for the case of Bund futures
contracts the share in the process of price discovery of the screen-based trading system
decreases during high volatility periods.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the process of price discovery in spot and futures markets which are
linked by the cost-of-carry relationship. Our analysis assesses the contribution to price
formation of the ETF market and the futures market in Germany. This question is impor-
tant, since in recent years trading of basket securities, such as ETFs and futures contracts,
has gained popularity among financial market participants. In order to investigate the
process of price discovery in this new environment of electronically-traded basket securi-
ties, we estimate a vector error correction model using transaction data for the DaxEx
and the FDax. In order to quantify the contributions of the two markets to the process
of price discovery, we calculate the common factor weights for both markets. Our results
indicate a clear price leadership of the futures market over the ETF market, although our
chosen method for matching the two price series works to the disadvantage of the futures
market. These results are in line with the findings of Theissen (2005) who argues that
the futures market leads the cash index in terms of relative contribution to price discovery.
Furthermore, we extend similar studies on price leadership between spot and futures
markets, as we investigate which factors influence the process of price discovery. More
specifically, our paper is the first to analyze to what extent liquidity and volatility affect
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the process of price formation in spot (ETF) and futures markets. We find that volatility,
but not liquidity is the driving force in the process of price discovery. From low to high
volatility periods the share of price formation of the futures market decreases, whereas
trading volume increases relative to the ETF market.
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Chapter 2
Data Snooping and Market-Timing
Rule Performance
2.1 Introduction
It has always been an investor’s dream to time the market in order to earn excess returns.
The methodology of market timing seems to be quite simple: Remain invested in the stock
market when expected returns are high and switch to cash investments when the market
is expected to underperform. The timing of the switch is indicated by signals based on
fundamental or sentiment indicators. The potential of market-timing strategies to earn
extraordinary profits is documented, for instance, by Shilling (1992), who found that,
during the period from 1946 to 1991, investors could have increased their annual return
from 11.2% to 19.0% by avoiding exposure to the stock market during the 50 weakest
months and being long stocks the rest of the time. In contrast, missing the 50 strongest
months in the stock market would have reduced annual returns to only 4% per annum.
The problem, of course, is that successful market timing is a difficult, if not impossible,
task.
Market-timing rules usually build on empirical findings of the ability of certain indi-
cators to predict future stock market returns. The literature has identified many useful
indicators, such as the earnings-to-price ratio (Campbell and Shiller (1988b), Campbell
and Shiller (1998)), the dividend yield (Shiller (1984), Fama and French (1988)), the
dividend-payout ratio (Lamont (1998)), the maturity spread and the credit spread (Camp-
bell (1987), Fama and French (1989)), and the gilt-equity yield ratio (Clare, Thomas, and
Wickens (1994), Brooks and Persand (2001)).1 However, if capital markets are efficient,
market-timing rules should not be able to beat a benchmark, such as a buy-and-hold
1 The set of indicators to time the market can be found in Section 2.3, where we specify the market-
timing rules for our experiment. An overview of relevant literature on each indicator is given in the
corresponding subsections.
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strategy.2 In other words, publicly available information should not be useful for predict-
ing future stock market movements.
When assessing the profitability of market-timing rules, it is critical to account for pos-
sible biases in statistical inference due to data snooping.3 The danger of data-snooping
biases is especially acute whenever economic theory is vague about the functional form
of the relationship between economic variables. In such a situation, researchers can ap-
ply a variety of market-timing rules to the same data set and uncover a subset of rules
that turn out to be profitable even though they would not generate superior performance
out-of-sample. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) argue that data snooping might be the result of
survivorship bias. That is, many rules that have been investigated in the past but have
not generated profits superior to a benchmark are not published and are thus filtered out
over time. Hence, the superior power of profitable rules is not due to any merit of the
design of the rules. Because statistical inference that considers only the surviving rules
will be biased, it is important to account for the full set of initial rules. The so-called
“Reality Check” (RC), developed by White (2000), allows us to account for data-snooping
biases when testing for possible superior performance of certain rules. The basic idea of
this test is to draw statistical inference from an empirical distribution of a performance
measure, considering the full universe of models (in our case, market-timing rules) from
which the best rule is drawn. Hansen (2005) proposed the so-called test for superior pre-
dictive ability (SPA), which also allows for data-snooping correction and, under certain
conditions, increases the test power of White’s “Reality Check.”
There is by now a vast literature reporting a variety of market-timing rules. For
instance, Fisher and Statman (2006a) and Fisher and Statman (2006b) investigate the
profitability of market timing based on financial ratios. Shen (2003) finds that the spread
between the earnings-to-price ratio and a variety of prevailing interest rates can be used
to successfully time the market. Studies of the ability of various interest rates to time
the market include Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989), Prather and Bertin (1997),
and Prather and Bertin (1998). The performance of market-timing rules based on in-
dex volatility changes is investigated, for instance, by Copeland and Copeland (1999).
However, the studies on market-timing performance lack appropriate corrections for data-
snooping biases. The purpose of our paper is therefore to assess the profitability of a large
number of market-timing rules and to examine possible data-snooping biases. Our study
is in the spirit of Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999)’s and Hsu and Kuan (2005)’s
evaluations of the profitability of technical trading. They construct their rules based on
2 Throughout the paper, we use a simple buy-and-hold strategy as the benchmark.
3 The dangers of data snooping are highlighted, for instance, in Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Sullivan,
Timmermann, and White (1999), Ferson, Sarkissian, and Simin (2003), and Ang and Bekaert (2007).
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historical prices, but do not include information from indicators based on fundamentals
and investor sentiment. Both studies show that, in certain markets and during certain pe-
riods, technical trading is useful to beat a benchmark. However, Sullivan, Timmermann,
and White (1999) show that out-of-sample the superior performance of the best rules is no
longer significant. Hsu and Kuan (2005) find that the best technical-trading rules are only
capable of beating the benchmark in “young markets” such as the NASDAQ Composite
and the Russell 2000. Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (2001), in a similar experiment,
argue that calender rules do not show superior performance when adjustment for data-
snooping biases is made. In yet another study on the profitability of technical-trading
rules, Qi and Wu (2006) apply the RC methodology to examine the profitability of such
trading rules in the foreign-exchange market and find that the significant outperformance
of the best rules (when considered in isolation) is not robust to data-snooping effects.
Our paper is the first to quantify the possible data-snooping biases in the market-
timing literature and to test whether the considered market-timing rules are truly superior
to a buy-and-hold strategy. For this purpose, we use White (2000)’s RC methodology and
Hansen (2005)’s SPA. As opposed to the previously mentioned studies on data-snooping
biases in the context of technical trading, the rules in this paper are not constructed based
on historical prices, but are based on a set of fundamental and sentiment indicators. We
construct two sets of timing rules: a basic set of simple rules, each based on only one indi-
cator, and an extended set which also includes complex rules based on information from
various indicators.4 Each universe of market-timing rules includes both rules described
in the market-timing literature and rules that we construct ourselves based on indicators
that were previously found to predict stock market returns.5 For each rule, we employ
various parameterizations, which gives us a comprehensive universe of 6,792 simple rules.
The extended set comprises 8,768 rules.6 As performance measures, we use the average
return and the Sharpe ratio.
The results of our experiments suggest that, when considered in isolation, the perfor-
mance of certain market-timing rules from both sets may indeed be highly statistically
significant. However, once the effects of data snooping are appropriately accounted for,
the best market-timing rules from the basic set are no longer significant for any period.
For the full sample period and for the subperiod from 1995 to 2007, we find the same
insignificant result for the extended set of rules. Only for the subperiod from 1981 to 1994
4 Henceforth, we refer to these sets of rules as the basic set and the extended set.
5 However, we do not consider market-timing strategies that rely on sophisticated models rather than
on simple indicators. For instance, we do not include regression-based market-timing strategies as
in Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989) and Fuller and Kling (1994).
6 For the subperiod from 1995 to 2007, the sets of market-timing rules are even larger, since for this
time period we consider additional indicators based on data availability. Further details are found
in Section 2.3.
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does the outperformance of the best rule from the extended set remain significant. The
results are quite similar for both performance measures, and our findings are robust to
the impact of transaction costs and to allowing for short selling the index. Furthermore,
changing the benchmark to holding the risk-free rate instead of the index leaves the results
qualitatively unchanged.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 explains the testing procedures (RC and
SPA) used to correct for data-snooping biases. Section 2.3 discusses the intuition and
specification of the market-timing rules to be tested. Section 2.4 describes the data.
Section 2.5 shows the empirical results for the basic set of rules. Section 2.6 shows the
empirical results for the extended set of rules. Section 2.7 presents some robustness checks
on the results. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Testing Procedures: The “Reality Check” and
the SPA Test
The dangers of data snooping have long been recognized as a serious problem of empirical
studies in finance (see, for instance, Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Brock, Lakonishok, and
LeBaron (1992), and Ferson, Sarkissian, and Simin (2003)). As we are investigating a
large universe of market-timing rules, a robust methodology to avoid spurious statistical
inference due to data snooping is needed. We therefore employ the “Reality Check” (RC),
introduced by White (2000), and the test for superior predictive ability (SPA), introduced
by Hansen (2005). Both procedures allow for an intensive search for models while ensuring
that the results are robust and do not result from mere chance. Both procedures build
on the work of Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996). In this section, we briefly
outline both testing procedures and refer the reader to the original articles for rigorous
derivations.
The RC tests the null hypothesis that the best model does not have superior predictive
ability over a benchmark model, while taking into account the full set of models, against
the alternative that the best model does have superior predictive ability. The test is based
on the l × 1 performance statistic,
f¯ =
1
n
T∑
t=R
fˆ t+1, (2.1)
where l is the number of market-timing rules and n is the number of prediction periods
indexed from R through T , so that T = R + n− 1. fˆ t+1 = f(Zt, βˆt) is the performance
measure, where Zt is a matrix which contains a vector of dependent variables and a vector
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of predictor variables and βˆt is a vector of estimated parameters. It is assumed that these
parameters satisfy the conditions of Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996), so that
parameter uncertainty vanishes asymptotically. In our experiment, we consider various
parameterizations of each trading rule (βk, k = 1, ..., l). The parameterizations directly
produce returns, so there are no estimated parameters.
We use the returns generated from the l timing rules as a performance measure.7 For
a timing rule k, we follow Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) and specify fk,t+1 as
fk,t+1 = ln
[
1 +
St+1 − St
St
Xk(Zt,βk)
]
− ln
[
1 +
St+1 − St
St
X0(Zt,β0)
]
, k = 1, ..., l,
(2.2)
where Zt consists of the predictor variables (described in Section 2.3) and βk denotes
the different parameterizations of the timing rules; subscript 0 refers to the benchmark
model. St is the price of the S&P index at time t. Xk and X0 are “timing functions”
which take on the value 1 for “invest in the stock market” and 0 for “hold cash.” Based
on this performance statistic, we test whether there is a timing rule that delivers superior
performance over a simple buy-and-hold strategy, where X0 = 1 at all times. Formally,
the null hypothesis is:
H0 : max
k=1,...,l
{E(fk)} 6 0. (2.3)
If the null can be rejected, it has been established that a timing rule exists that outper-
forms the benchmark. It has been shown by White (2000) that, under weak assumptions
about the stationarity, dependence structure, and moments of fˆ t, the distribution of
the test statistic can be obtained by applying the stationary bootstrap of Politis and
Romano (1994) as follows. In step 1, for each timing rule k = 1, ..., l, we generate a
resample of {fk,t+1}t=Tt=R by drawing (geometrically distributed) blocks from the observed
return series, with mean block length 1/q.8 We shall denote the resampled series by
f ∗k,t+1,j, where subscript j indicates the j-th repetition of the bootstrap. We repeat the
process J times. In step 2, we calculate the mean of the bootstrapped return series,
f¯ ∗k,j = n
−1∑T
t=R f
∗
k,t+1,j, ∀ k = 1, ..., l. In step 3, we compute the following statistics:
VRC = max
k=1,...,l
{√nf¯k}, (2.4)
V ∗RC,j = max
k=1,...,l
{√n(f¯ ∗k,j − f¯k)}, j = 1, ..., J. (2.5)
7 We first outline the procedure for using raw returns, but we will also use the Sharpe ratio (SR) as
a performance measure.
8 The choice of the block length is discussed in more detail in Section 2.7.4.
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We then compare VRC with the quantiles of V
∗
RC,j. A p-value of the RC is computed as
pRC =
J∑
j=1
1{V ∗RC,j>VRC}
J
, (2.6)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. In our empirical analysis, we set J = 1000 and
choose a smoothing parameter of q = 0.5.9
Hansen (2005)’s SPA is very similar to the RC, yet it includes some refinements that
can improve the test power in most cases. The SPA makes use of the following studentized
test statistic:
VSPA = max
[
max
k=1,..,l
√
nf¯k
σˆk
, 0
]
, (2.7)
where σˆ2k is a consistent estimate of σ
2
k = var(
√
nf¯k). We employ the estimator given in
Hansen (2005), who also suggests invoking a different null distribution based on N(µˆ, Ωˆ),
where Ωˆ denotes a consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of f¯ and µˆ is
an estimate for E(f t). Hansen (2005) advocates the use of the following estimator:
µk = f¯k1{√n(f¯k/σˆk)6−
√
2 ln lnn}. (2.8)
By choosing this estimator, we make sure that irrelevant models do not asymptotically
influence the distribution of the test statistic. This can be shown by applying the law
of the iterated logarithm, which ensures that
√
nf¯k−µk
σk
stays within certain bounds with
probability 1 asymptotically.
The implementation of the SPA is also very similar to that of the RC. In step 1, for each
timing rule k = 1, ..., l, we generate a resample of {fk,t+1}t=Tt=R by drawing (geometrically
distributed) blocks from the observed return series. We shall denote the resampled series
{f ∗k,t+1,j}, where subscript j indicates the j-th repetition of the bootstrap. In step 2, we
calculate Z∗k,t+1,j = f
∗
k,t+1,j − f¯k1{√n(f¯k/σˆk)>−√2 ln lnn}, ∀ k = 1, ..., l, t = R, ..., T . In step 3,
we compute the following statistics:
VSPA = max
[
max
k=1,..,l
√
nf¯k
σˆk
, 0
]
, (2.9)
V ∗SPA,j = max
[
max
k=1,..,l
√
nZ¯∗k,j
σˆk
, 0
]
, j = 1, ..., J, (2.10)
where Z¯∗k,j = n
−1∑T
t=R Z
∗
k,t+1,j. We then compare VSPA with the quantiles of V
∗
SPA,j. A
p-value of the SPA is given by
9 Results of a sensitivity analysis for changes in the smoothing parameter are shown in Section 2.7.4.
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pSPA =
J∑
j=1
1{V ∗SPA,j>VSPA}
J
. (2.11)
Throughout the paper, we refer to this p-value as the consistent SPA p-value (SPA-c). In
addition, we calculate an inconsistent lower bound for the consistent SPA p-value, called
SPA-l, which Hansen (2005) computes by replacing Z¯∗k,j in equation (2.10) with Z¯
l∗
k,j, the
average of the bootstrapped series Z l∗k,t+1,j = f
∗
k,t+1,j −max
[
f¯k, 0
]
.
For both testing procedures, we use the Sharpe ratio, in addition to raw returns, as
a performance measure. If the Sharpe ratio is used as a performance measure, the null
hypothesis is:
H0 : max
k=1,..,l
{g(E(hk))} 6 g(E(h0)), (2.12)
where h is a 3× 1 vector given by
h1k,t+1 =
St+1 − St
St
Xk(Zt,βk), (2.13)
h2k,t+1 =
(
St+1 − St
St
Xk(Zt,βk)
)2
, (2.14)
h3k,t+1 = r
f
t+1; (2.15)
rft+1 is the risk-free interest rate at time t+ 1 and g(·) is given by
g(E(hk,t+1)) =
E(h1k,t+1)− E(rft+1)√
E(h2k,t+1)− (E(h1k,t+1))2
. (2.16)
The expectations are estimated by the sample mean. We then construct the relevant
statistic
f¯k = g(h¯k)− g(h¯0), (2.17)
where h¯k and h¯0 are arithmetic averages calculated over the sample period for trading
rule k and the buy-and-hold strategy. The application of the bootstrap procedure to the
difference of Sharpe ratios works similarly to the procedure described for the difference in
raw returns (for details, see Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999), p. 1653).
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2.3 Specification of Market-Timing Rules
In our investigation, we replicate the attempts of academics and the investment industry
to find profitable market-timing rules. For a meaningful assessment of data-snooping bi-
ases, we have to construct a sufficiently large set of market-timing rules from which rules
that have been applied or considered could possibly have been drawn. Sullivan, Timmer-
mann, and White (1999) and Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (2001) point out that
the selection of rules to be included in the analysis is especially important, since data-
snooping biases are only corrected for relative to the universe of rules investigated. In
particular, “the magnitude of data-snooping effects on the assessment of the performance
of the best trading rule is determined by the dependence between all the trading rules’
payoffs, so the design of the universe from which the trading rules are drawn is crucial to
the experiment” (Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999), p. 1654). When conducting
the data-snooping tests, two possible issues can arise. On the one hand, considering too
many “irrelevant” rules dilutes the power of the test and could render genuinely signifi-
cant rules insignificant (see Hansen (2005)).10 This is why we discard trading rules based
on new technology which has not been available for most of the sample period. On the
other hand, if too few market-timing rules are included, the data-snooping correction
would not account for the full set of rules from which effective rules conceivably could
have been drawn; our estimated p-values would therefore be biased towards zero. Lo
and MacKinlay (1990) refer to this as the “file-drawer” problem: Many rules that do not
generate superior returns do not get published and are therefore no longer considered.
It is therefore important not only to include the rules/parameterizations that have been
publicly reported, but also other rules/parameterizations that may have been considered,
since the successful rules are drawn from the entire set of successful and unsuccessful
rules. For those reasons, we find a balance and choose a fairly large variety of market-
timing rules and parameterizations that investors and academics may have considered.
In a first experiment, we consider a set of 6,792 simple market-timing rules, each based
on one indicator only (basic set). Our second universe of rules adds complex strategies
to the basic set and spans a universe of 8,768 market-timing rules (extended set). Even
though our sets of rules do not exhaust all the rules/parameterizations that have ever
been applied, our experiment covers a reasonably large universe of the most common and
most important trading rules and is by far the most comprehensive in the field of market
timing. In our subsample from 1995 to 2007, the number of rules increases to 8,280 for
the basic set and 10,256 for the extended set, since during this time period we include
additional indicators based on the availability of data. (See Section 2.4 for details on the
10 Yet, Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (2001), p. 259, also discuss the issue of including too many
“irrelevant” rules, but argue that a loss of power is rather unlikely.
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construction of indicators.)
In the following section, we describe the rules applied in our analysis. In order to trig-
ger switching signals, several threshold values of the indicators are considered. Thresholds
are either a historical value, such as the moving average or percentile (those are referred
to as standard thresholds) or a fixed number (see Section 2.4 for details). The general
assumption for all market-timing rules is that an investor is usually long the index but
tries to temporarily exit the market and switch to holding cash in bad times, those being
indicated by the timing indicators.
2.3.1 Rules Based on Financial Ratios
The indicators for market timing that have received the most attention in the literature
are the financial ratios: the dividend yield, the earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio, and the
book-to-market (B/M) ratio. Many investors assume that stock prices do not wander too
far from their normal levels relative to such fundamental values as earnings, dividends,
and book value, but revert back to their normal levels after periods of deviation. That
is, financial ratios are assumed to fluctuate within historical ranges and to be positively
related to expected returns. Return predictability by means of the book-to-market ra-
tio is investigated, for instance, by Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall
(1998). Shiller (1984), Campbell and Shiller (1988a), Campbell and Shiller (1988b), Fama
and French (1988), Fama and French (1989), and Campbell and Shiller (2001), among
others, argue that the dividend yield and the E/P ratio have predictive power. Based
on these findings, Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997) and Campbell and Viceira
(1999) discuss the extent to which the predictive powers of the dividend yield and the
E/P ratio are useful for timing the market. Fisher and Statman (2006a) and Fisher and
Statman (2006b) also investigate the success of market timing based on financial ratios
and find that the performance of buy-and-hold investors is usually higher than that of
various timing rules based on E/P ratios and dividend yields.
2.3.1.1 Earnings-to-Price Ratio (E/P Ratio)
As outlined above, it is reasonable to assume that the E/P ratio generally follows a ten-
dency of mean reversion; stock prices and the corresponding indicator of the fundamental
value (earnings) are not expected to wander too far off. Considering the E/P ratio as the
relative price of a stock, the economic rationale for using this ratio to time the market
is quite simple. Stocks with a low E/P ratio provide low earnings relative to their price
and are thus considered to be expensive. If the aggregate E/P ratio falls below a certain
threshold, the market is considered to be overvalued and investors therefore switch from
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holding the index to cash. The rule applied in our investigation is specified as follows:
When the E/P ratio falls below a certain threshold x, investors switch from being invested
in the index to holding cash. When the ratio rises above x, investors revert to holding
the index.
2.3.1.2 Dividend Yield
Market timing based on the dividend yield is quite similar to market timing by means of
the E/P ratio. Stability of the dividend yield in the sense of mean reversion implies that,
if stock prices are low relative to dividends, prices will increase in the future in order to
ensure that the dividend yield returns to its normal historical range. The rule for testing
the dividend yield is similar to the rule based on the E/P ratio: If the dividend yield is
above a specified threshold x, market timers are invested in the index. When the ratio
drops below the specified threshold, investors exit the index and hold cash.
2.3.1.3 Book-to-Market Ratio (B/M Ratio)
The third financial ratio used in our experiment is the B/M ratio. Like the two ratios
above, the B/M ratio indicates whether the market is underpriced or overpriced. Given
an overpriced market reflected by a low B/M ratio, future returns are assumed to be low
since the overpricing will be corrected in the future. Thus, as for the E/P ratio and the
dividend yield, market timers sell the index and switch to cash when the B/M ratio falls
below a certain threshold value x. An increase in the B/M ratio above x triggers the
reverse strategy.
2.3.2 Rules Based on Interest Rates
2.3.2.1 Short-Term Interest Rate and Discount Rate
The first macroeconomic indicators to be investigated as useful signals for market timing
are the short-term interest rate (Treasury bills) and the discount rate announced by the
U.S. Federal Reserve. Empirical studies find that falling short-term interest rates are
associated with economic expansion and thus predict high stock market returns (e.g.,
Fama (1981)). Using a simple regression model, Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989)
evaluate the ability of treasury bill rates to forecast stock market movements. More
recent studies, such as Ang and Bekaert (2007), support the superior forecasting power
of short-term interest rates compared to other variables. Prather and Bertin (1997) and
Prather and Bertin (1998) test a trading rule based on discount-rate announcements by
the U.S. Federal Reserve. Their strategy involves holding stocks when discount rates are
decreasing and switching to T-bills when discount rates increase. The trading rule based
on both short-term interest rates and discount rates entails exiting the market after the
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interest rates rise above a certain level x. A drop in the interest rates below the threshold
is a signal to switch back to the index.
2.3.2.2 Long-Term Interest Rate
Since Treasury bonds qualify as a direct alternative to stock investments, the interest
rate on such bonds should have even more predictive power for stock returns than the
interest rates described in the previous section. If the interest rate increases, we would
expect stock prices to go down, and vice versa. The trading rule based on the long-term
interest rate is the same as that for the short-term interest rate. A speculator will exit
the index and switch to holding cash if the interest rate rises above a certain threshold x;
the reverse strategy is triggered if the interest rate drops below x.
2.3.2.3 Maturity Spread
Rather than focusing on interest rates themselves, many economists have tried to predict
future real economic activity by using the maturity spread, defined as the spread between
yields on long-term and short-term bonds. The term structure of interest rates contains
useful information about expected real interest rates and expected inflation (e.g., Mishkin
(1990b)) and is a useful tool to predict economic growth and thus stock-market returns.11
Intuitively, economic growth and the return on stocks are linked, since stock market re-
turns are expected to be higher during economic expansion. Campbell (1987) and Fama
and French (1989), among others, show that the maturity spread is correlated with future
stock returns and thus useful for predicting subsequent stock market movements. The
theoretical underpinning for the indicator property of the maturity spread, as a proxy for
the term structure of interest rates, is given by the expectation theory, according to which
the relation between the short-term interest rate and the long-term interest rate depends
on the expected short-term interest rate. Tight monetary policy causes economic agents
to expect an increase in the short-term interest rate. The term structure of interest rates
flattens. Consequently, a change in the maturity spread is associated with a change in
the business cycle. In particular, a high maturity spread indicates economic growth and
a low spread indicates an economic downturn.
The usefulness of the term structure of interest rates for predicting economic develop-
ment was, for instance, examined by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Harvey (1997), and
Hamilton and Kim (2002). Estrella and Mishkin (1996) apply a probit model to assess the
indicator property of the maturity spread and find that it has superior power for predict-
ing recessions compared to other macroeconomic variables. Their model is extended by
11 Since there is a separate line of research on the relationship between expected inflation and stock
returns, we discuss the indicator property of the expected inflation component in the term structure
of interest rates separately in Section 2.3.4.
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Resnick and Shoesmith (2002), who find that the maturity spread can be used to forecast
downturns in the stock market. Under a rule based on the maturity spread, when the
current maturity spread falls below a threshold value x, an investor switches from the
index to cash, since the market is expected to yield lower returns than cash during these
periods. For values of the spread above the threshold, the investor invests in the index.
2.3.3 Rules Based on Investor Sentiment
2.3.3.1 Credit Spread
Sentiment indicators, such as the credit spread, measure the attitude of investors towards
the stock market. Fama and French (1989), among others, find the credit spread to be
the best predictor for future stock returns, besides the dividend yield and the maturity
spread.12 One widely used sentiment measure is the spread between the yields on BAA-
rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds, as applied, for instance, by Fama and French
(1989). A decrease in the credit spread indicates lower risk aversion on the part of
investors and therefore a good climate for the stock market. An increase in the spread
indicates higher risk aversion on the part of investors and therefore a poor climate for the
stock market. The rule to be tested is specified as follows: If the credit spread rises above
a certain threshold x, speculators switch from the index portfolio to cash holdings; if it
falls below x, speculators invest in the index.
2.3.3.2 Put/Call Ratio
Another implicit measure of investor sentiment is the put/call ratio, defined as the trading
volume of puts (or number of puts outstanding) relative to the trading volume of calls (or
number of calls outstanding). Often, the ratio is used as a contrarian indicator.13 That is,
when the put/call ratio is high (a high number of puts being traded relative to the number
of call options being traded), the market is highly pessimistic and a turnaround with an
increase in stock prices is expected. On the contrary, a low put/call ratio indicates that
the market is overly optimistic and is expected to adjust downwards. Thus, if the ratio
falls below a certain threshold x, a sell signal is triggered, while an increase in the ratio
above x is a trigger for buying the index.
12 Using sentiment indicators to predict future stock market movements falls into the literature which
tries to link business conditions and expected stock market returns (e.g., Campbell and Diebold
(2009)).
13 Even though Fisher and Statman (2000) do not explicitly consider the put/call ratio, they find that
sentiment indicators should trigger contrarian investment strategies.
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2.3.4 Rules Based on Expected Inflation
The negative relation between inflation and stock market returns has been extensively
studied. For instance, Fama and Schwert (1977), Fama (1981), Geske and Roll (1983),
Stulz (1986), and Kaul (1987) attempt to provide evidence for the stock-return/inflation
puzzle.14 In probably the most widely cited study on the abnormal relationship between
expected inflation and stock returns, Fama (1981) claims that the negative relationship
simply reflects the fact that anticipated real activity has opposite impacts on stock returns
and on expected inflation, but that the relationship is not causal. Extending the work of
Fama (1981), Geske and Roll (1983) and Kaul (1987) argue that the correlation between
inflation and stock returns is due to monetary policy changes, real economic conditions,
and monetization of budget deficits. As mentioned in Section 2.3.2.3, the maturity spread
contains information about the expected inflation rate. In particular, Fama (1990) and
Mishkin (1990a), among others, show that the term structures with maturities of more
than nine months are useful for predicting expected inflation. We thus rely on the yield
spread between the 1-year and the 2-year Treasury bonds as a measure for expected infla-
tion. Under a rule based on expected inflation, investors will switch from being invested
in the index to holding cash if the expected inflation rises above a certain threshold x.
This may seem nonintuitive, as high inflation would hurt an investor holding cash even
more; however, the downturn in the market is expected to be even larger, so that holding
cash is the lesser of the two evils.
2.3.5 Rules Based on Implied Volatility Index
According to conventional wisdom, investors should decrease their stock holdings in pe-
riods of high volatility, a negative relation between expected stock returns and volatility
having been widely documented. The theoretical underpinning for the risk-return rela-
tionship goes back to Merton (1980) and French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987). The
former argues that, under certain conditions, the market risk premium is positively corre-
lated with the variance of the market portfolio. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987)
find that, if there is an unexpected increase in market volatility, expected volatility is re-
vised upward for future periods. Hence, given that the market risk premium is positively
related to the expected volatility of the market portfolio, discount rates will increase and
in turn reduce stock prices. Thus, a negative relation between (unexpected) volatility
changes and returns is induced. The relation between market volatility and expected
returns has been subject to considerable research, such as French, Schwert, and Stam-
baugh (1987), Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989), Campbell and Hentschel (1992),
14 The observed negative relationship between stock market returns and different measures of expected
and unexpected inflation appears to contradict the so-called Fisher Hypothesis (Fisher (1930)),
according to which there should be a positive relationship between the expected inflation and nominal
asset returns; claims on real assets, such as stocks, should provide hedging against inflation.
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Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), and Whitelaw (1994). In the first theoretical
study on the relationship between conditional mean independence and the predictability
of asset-return signs as well as asset-return volatilities, Christoffersen and Diebold (2006)
show analytically that sign predictability follows from volatility dependence. The per-
formance of timing rules based on volatility changes has been investigated, for instance,
by Copeland and Copeland (1999), who test the feasibility of market timing based on
changes in the implied volatility index, VIX, and find profitable strategies which involve
various style and size strategies.15 Other studies, such as Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek
(2001), Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2003), and Johannes, Polson, and Stroud (2002),
applying more complex trading strategies than just switching between two asset classes,
find that “volatility timing” leads to significant economic benefits. In our paper, under
a volatility trading rule, an investor switches to cash if the VIX rises above a certain
threshold x. A buy signal is triggered if the volatility index drops below that threshold.
All volatility trading rules make use of implied volatility, which serves as a measure of the
expected volatility.
2.3.6 Modified Rules and Combined Indicators
2.3.6.1 Rules Based on the Bond-Equity Yield Ratio
In addition to the traditional financial ratios, described in Section 2.3.1, the so-called
bond-equity yield ratio (beyr) has become a popular indicator for future stock market
movements.16 Clare, Thomas, and Wickens (1994), Levin and Wright (1998), Harris and
Sanchez-Valle (2000), and Brooks and Persand (2001), among others, find that this aug-
mented financial ratio is a useful tool for predicting future stock returns and thus a useful
instrument for market timing. The bond-equity yield ratio is defined as the ratio of the
bond yield to the yield in the stock market, where the dividend yield and the earnings
yield (E/P ratio) are commonly used as proxies for the stock market yield. It is assumed
that beyr possesses a long-term level which reflects the long-run arbitrage relation between
the government bond market and the stock market. If beyr becomes high relative to its
long-term level, equity yields are considered to be low compared to yields on bonds. Stock
prices are therefore expected to fall in order to reestablish the long-run equilibrium. In
contrast, a low beyr indicates that equities are cheap compared to bonds and that equity
yields are expected to decrease in order to restore the long-term relationship. Under a
rule based on beyr, investors invest in the index if the ratio is below a certain threshold
15 The VIX is constructed to represent the implied volatility of a synthetic at-the-money option contract
on the S&P 500 index with a maturity of 30 days. It is constructed from eight S&P 500 index options
and uses a dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes model.
16 In the literature, the ratio is sometimes referred to as the gilt-equity yield ratio (geyr). See, for
instance, Clare, Thomas, and Wickens (1994).
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x. A rise in the ratio above x is a signal to sell the index and switch to cash.
Shen (2003) employs an indicator closely related to beyr. Instead of using the ratio
explained above, Shen (2003) uses the spread between the E/P ratio and interest rates to
construct market-timing strategies and finds that investors following such strategies can
beat a buy-and-hold strategy.17 Obviously, the spread contains the same information as
the ratio explained above. Hence, we do not include the spreads used by Shen (2003) in
our set of market-timing indicators, but rather the ratio of the 3-month Treasury bill rate
to the earnings/dividend yield as well as the ratio of the 10-year Treasury bond rate to
the earnings/dividend yield.
2.3.6.2 Rules Based on the Dividend Payout Ratio
Lamont (1998) suggests that, in addition to the dividend yield and the earnings yield,
the dividend payout ratio, defined as the ratio of dividends per share to earnings per
share, has predictive power for future stock market returns.18 In particular, he argues
that the dividend payout ratio should be positively correlated with future returns, since
high dividends typically forecast high returns whereas high earnings typically forecast
low returns. Lamont (1998) does not treat earnings and dividends as scaling variables
for prices, but rather uses the dividend payout ratio as an explanatory variable for future
stock returns. In our study, we identify buy (sell) signals when the dividend payout ratio
crosses a threshold x from below (above).
2.4 Data and Indicator Construction
In our experiment, we apply the market-timing rules to the S&P 500 index and base our
analysis on continuously compounded end-of-day returns. Our data for indicator con-
struction are taken from different sources and cover all trading days from January 1, 1980
through December 31, 2007, for a total of 7,305 observations. The year 1980 is used as the
observation window in order to compute percentiles and means for first signals. Hence, we
compute performance measures of all market-timing rules from the year 1981 onwards.19
Since data for the put/call ratio and the VIX are not available before 1994, we de-
cided to split the full sample into two subperiods of roughly equal length, 1981-1994 and
17 Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) employ the spread between the E/P ratio and interest rates as an
explanatory variable for future stock market returns, but do not explicitly assess its usefulness for
market-timing strategies.
18 However, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), using a different data set, find the payout ratio to be
statistically insignificant.
19 Throughout the paper, a time period from year A to year B starts on the first trading day of year
A and ends on the last trading day of year B.
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1995-2007. Rules based on the put/call ratio and on the VIX are only considered in the
latter subperiod. When considering subperiods, the years 1980 and 1994 are used as the
observation windows.
The put/call ratio is obtained from Bloomberg. All other time series in our paper are
extracted from Thomson Datastream. All time series are at a daily frequency. A detailed
description of the applied time series and their codes in the source databases is given in
Appendix B.1.
For indicator construction, the E/P ratio and the dividend yield can be directly ex-
tracted from Thomson Datastream, whereas the B/M ratio needs to be constructed. For
the years 1980 through 2005, we calculate the B/M ratio for the S&P 500 by dividing
the book value at the end of the previous month by the daily index price series. The
book values are calculated from the end-of-month B/M ratios for the S&P 500, which are
available on the MSCI Barra webpage.20 For the years 2006 and 2007, we calculated the
end-of-year book value for the index from the B/M ratios taken from the S&P webpage.21
The daily B/M ratio is then calculated by dividing the book value at the end of the pre-
vious year by the daily index price. For indicators based on interest rates, we apply the
yields of 3-month and 6-month Treasury bills as well as the discount rate announced by
the U.S. Federal Reserve as short-term interest rates. The set of long-term interest rates,
which are used as timing indicators, includes yields to maturity of 2-year, 3-year, 5-year,
10-year, and 30-year Treasury bonds. The maturity spread is calculated as the spread
between the 3-month Treasury bill yield and the 10-year Treasury bond yield. The yield
spread between the 1-year and the 2-year Treasury bonds serves as a proxy for expected
inflation. The credit spread is measured as the difference between the yields on a BAA-
rated corporate bond and a AAA-rated corporate bond. The bond-equity yield ratio can
be calculated in two ways, dividing the yield of the 3-month Treasury bill by the E/P
ratio or by the dividend yield. We use both. In addition, we replace the 3-month Trea-
sury bill yield by the 10-year Treasury bond yield when constructing beyr. The dividend
payout ratio is defined as the ratio of dividends per share to earnings per share whereas
the dividends and the earnings time series can be simply obtained from the dividend yield
and the E/P ratio, since the price series is given.
For each indicator in our analysis, we use several fixed numbers as well as the moving
average over the preceding 5, 10, 40, and 60 days and the 80th/20th, 90th/10th, and 95th/5th
20 End-of-month B/M ratios for the S&P 500 for the years 1980 through 2005 are available at http:
//www.barra.com/Research/Fundamentals.aspx.
21 End-of-year B/M ratios for the S&P 500 for the years 2006 and 2007 are available
at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_500/2,
3,2,2,0,0,0,0,0,5,7,0,0,0,6,0.html.
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percentiles over the preceding 250 days as threshold values x to obtain switching signals
as described in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.6.22 For indicators that trigger selling the index
when they reach high values, the 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles are used. The 5th, 10th,
and 20th percentiles are used for indicators that trigger switching to cash when they reach
low values. When choosing fixed threshold levels for each indicator, we select a fairly
large set of parameter values x that lie in the ranges investors and academics may have
considered over time. We also consider, for all thresholds, holding a certain position for a
period of c days, during which all other signals are ignored. We refer to this period as the
waiting period. Alternatively, a time-delay filter is implemented, which requires that a
buy/sell signal has to remain valid for d days before a transaction is made. For the waiting
period and the time-delay filter, we consider parameter values c = [1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30] and
d = [1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30]. In Appendix B.2, we provide the parameterizations for the basic
set of rules.
In our tests, we consider both the average return and the Sharpe ratio as performance
measures. In order to compute the Sharpe ratio according to formula (2.16), we calculate
the excess return of a specific rule as the difference between the return from the rule and
the risk-free interest rate. As a proxy for the risk-free interest rate we use the Federal
funds rate (reported per annum) and convert it into a daily rate according to the formula,
rdf =
ln(1 + raf )
250
, (2.18)
where rdf denotes the daily risk-free interest rate and r
a
f denotes the annual risk-free
interest rate. The denominator represents the number of trading days per annum.
2.5 Results for Simple Market-Timing Rules
In a first step, we identify the best-performing (simple) market-timing rules for the var-
ious sample periods. Table 2.1 reports the performance of the best performers and the
corresponding number of trades under both the mean return criterion (Panel A) and the
Sharpe ratio criterion (Panel B). The table also contains the mean return and the Sharpe
ratio of the benchmark. For the full sample, rules based on beyr turn out to be the best
performers under both performance criteria, though with different thresholds and differ-
ent waiting periods. For the first subperiod, exactly the same rule based on beyr is chosen
under both performance criteria. For the second subperiod, yet another beyr -based rule
is identified as the best rule under the mean return criterion, whereas the best performer
under the Sharpe ratio criterion is a rule based on the dividend yield with a threshold
x = 1.75 and a waiting period c = 10. Comparing the returns/Sharpe ratios of the best
22 Henceforth, moving averages and percentiles are referred to as standard thresholds.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Wealth of the Best Market-Timing Rule and the Buy-and-Hold
Strategy over the Full Sample
rules and the benchmark, it can be seen that the buy-and-hold strategy is outperformed
under both criteria in all periods. Excess returns of the best rules over the benchmark
lie between 2.93% (for the full sample) and 5.57% (for the first subperiod). The number
of trades of the best performers varies substantially. The particularly high number of
trades of the best rule in the first subperiod might indicate that, when transaction costs
are included, other market-timing rules with less frequent trading might be optimal.23
In order to illustrate the performance of the best market-timing rule, Figure 2.1 plots
its cumulative wealth for the full sample from 1981 to 2007, starting with an investment of
100 USD (thin black line). Figure 2.1 also includes the cumulative profits of the benchmark
(buy-and-hold) strategy (light gray line) and indicates that the cumulative profit of the
best-performing rule clearly dominates that of the benchmark strategy. Even though the
return earned by the best rule does not necessarily exceed that of the benchmark at all
times, an investor is uniformly better off in terms of cumulative wealth when following the
best market-timing rule. Such an investor would have accumulated 2, 217 USD over the
full sample period, whereas a buy-and-hold investor would have ended up with only 1, 081
USD. The cumulative profit of the best performer after one-way transaction costs of 50
basis points is indicated by the thick gray line. It can be seen that including transaction
costs does not qualitatively change the dominance of the best timing rule relative to the
benchmark strategy.24
23 In Section 2.7.3, we check for the robustness of the results when transaction costs are included.
24 A more detailed robustness check with respect to transaction costs is performed in Section 2.7.3.
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Table 2.2: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules in the Basic Set under the Mean
Return Criterion
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.030 0.598 0.030 0.569 0.361
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.035 0.275 0.035 0.257 0.169
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.073 0.885 0.073 0.884 0.742
This table presents the performance of the best market-timing rule under the mean return criterion. For each period, the
table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal p-values. SPA-c refers
to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA p-value. The nominal
p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing rule only, without
correcting for data-snooping biases.
2.5.1 Test Results under the Mean Return Criterion
Table 2.2 presents the test results for the performance of the best market-timing rule un-
der the mean return criterion. For each time period, the RC p-values, the SPA p-values,
and the corresponding nominal p-values are summarized; in the table, SPA-c refers to the
consistent SPA p-value of Hansen (2005) and SPA-l refers to the inconsistent lower bound
of the SPA-c p-value.25 The nominal p-values for the full sample and the two subperiods
are all well below 0.10, rejecting the null hypothesis of no outperformance of the best rules
relative to a buy-and-hold strategy. This result might not be entirely unexpected due to
the excess return of those rules relative to the benchmark. For the full sample and the first
subperiod, we find the outperformance to be significant at the 5% level; for the second
subperiod, the superior performance is signifiant at the 10% level. In sharp contrast, the
RC and the SPA-c p-values are very high for all periods and the null hypothesis is not
rejected at any conventional significance level. These findings show that, even though
market-timing rules might generate statistically significant excess returns relative to the
benchmark when evaluated in isolation, correcting for dependencies between rules leads
to insignificant p-values.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the effects of data snooping and the complexity of depen-
dencies across the set of market-timing rules even more clearly than they can already
be seen in Table 2.2. In Figure 2.2, we plot the number of the model against its average
annualized return, measured on the left y-axis and identified by the scattered points. Also
shown is the sequentially updated maximum average return (thin red line) from a certain
number of models (indicated on the x-axis), the corresponding RC p-value (measured on
25 In the following, we base our assessments on the RC p-value and the consistent SPA-c p-value. The
inconsistent lower bound for the consistent SPA p-value, SPA-l, is reported for information purposes.
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the right y-axis and represented by the solid blue line), and, for comparison, the bench-
mark return (horizontal green line).26 For the final assessment, only the numbers on the
far right of the graph (the terminal maximum mean return and the terminal RC p-value)
matter, since the order of models is arbitrary. Nevertheless, the figure gives a fascinating
picture of how the maximum mean return and the corresponding RC p-value evolve when
additional models are sequentially included. The maximum mean return increases quickly
to approximately 11%, well above the benchmark return, but rises no further after the
first 3,900 trading rules have been evaluated. The p-value, however, does not remain
constant, but increases gradually up to 0.74 after the same number of models have been
considered. It can be seen that, while the marginal trading rules do not improve on the
maximum mean return, the data-snooping adjusted p-value gradually increases, since the
effective span of market-timing rules widens. After superior market-timing rules are in-
cluded around model 3,900, the RC p-value drops to 0.52. From this point until all 6,792
rules are considered, the pattern is similar to that already described. Since no improve-
ments occur in the maximum performance statistic as the number of rules increases, the
RC p-value is subject to the same “dilution effect” as before and increases to a terminal
value of 0.60.
2.5.2 Test Results under the Sharpe Ratio Criterion
The test results for the best-performing rule under the Sharpe ratio criterion are sum-
marized in Table 2.3, which reports the RC and the SPA p-values for all sample periods,
as well as the corresponding nominal p-values. The results are qualitatively the same as
those under the mean return criterion. Nominal p-values close to zero for the full sample
period and the first subperiod suggest that, without taking data snooping into account,
the best rules significantly beat a buy-and-hold strategy at the 5% significance level. The
highest nominal p-value for the second subperiod, 0.09, is still significant at the 10%
level. For all periods, data-snooping adjusted p-values are even higher than under the
mean return criterion, indicating that the superior performance of the best rules is in-
significant for the full sample and for both subperiods. Thus, accounting for dependencies
between market-timing rules renders the significant performance of the best-performing
rule (when considered in isolation) insignificant. Once more, our findings illustrate the
effect of data snooping on statistical inference and emphasize the importance of using
appropriate methods to correct for data-snooping biases.
As before, we graphically illustrate the evolution of the economic and statistical per-
formance of the best-performing rule under the Sharpe ratio criterion for the full sample
period. As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the maximum Sharpe ratio increases to a value
26 Since the RC and the SPA provide similar results, we restrict all graphical illustrations to p-values
obtained from the RC.
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Table 2.3: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules in the Basic Set under the
Sharpe Ratio Criterion
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.027 0.981 0.027 0.917 0.628
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.014 0.867 0.014 0.685 0.316
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.088 0.933 0.088 0.914 0.750
This table presents the performance of the best market-timing rule under the Sharpe ratio criterion. For each period, the
table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal p-values. SPA-c refers
to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA p-value. The nominal
p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing rule only, without
correcting for data-snooping biases.
of 0.35 after including 35 models, which decreases the RC p-value to 0.73. Including
an additional 300 rules—among them several models that remarkably underperform the
benchmark—leads to a sharp increase in the RC p-value to 0.96. Over the next 1,200
models, the maximum performance statistic does not change and the RC p-value rises
only slightly. At around model 1,500, we find an improvement in the maximum perfor-
mance statistic, associated with a drop in the RC p-value. Over the remaining rules, the
maximum Sharpe ratio improves only slightly to roughly 0.46. Since the improvement is
small as the set of rules becomes larger, we observe that the RC p-value increases gradu-
ally to a highly insignificant terminal value of 0.98, displaying the effects of data snooping.
In summary, considering simple market-timing rules, each of which is based on one
indicator only, we find that some of them, when considered in isolation, produce superior
performance relative to a buy-and-hold strategy. This finding is consistent with the results
of the market-timing literature. However, once we account for dependencies across rules—
that is, once we cease to ignore the fact that the best rules are drawn from a large set of
market-timing rules—we no longer observe that superiority.
2.6 Results for Complex Market-Timing Rules
So far, our set of market-timing rules has included only simple rules, each of which relies
on the information from a single indicator only. In practice, investment decisions are
likely to be based on a broader information set and thus on complex trading strategies
that incorporate information from various indicators. We therefore add to our basic set
of simple rules two groups of complex trading strategies: learning rules and voting rules.
As before, all rules rely only on historically available information and may therefore be
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implemented in practice. For all complex strategies, we consider, as in previous sections,
holding cash as the exit position when the rule indicates selling the index.
Under a learning rule, an investor, at certain times, determines the best-performing
rule among all simple trading rules over the last e days, the evaluation period, and then
follows the signal of this particular rule. The performance of each simple rule is evaluated
based on two measures: the sum of daily returns and the average (daily) log return, both
over the preceding e days. In addition to the evaluation period e, we consider a review
span r, which determines how often the evaluation process for the best-performing rule
is conducted and a possible switching is initiated. This leaves us with a total of 1,482
learning rules.
Voting rules are defined as follows: Each simple rule in our universe has one vote,
either to invest in the index (pro index) or to exit the market (contra index), according
to that rule’s switching signal. The signal for a voting rule is based on the ratio of pro
index and contra index votes. Traders sell the index if b percent of all votes signal exiting
the market, and vice versa. As with the learning rules, we implement a review span r,
for a total of 494 voting rules. Parameterizations for all complex timing rules are given
in Appendix B.3.
As with the basic set of simple rules, we first identify the best market-timing rules
among all the rules in the extended set. In Table 2.4, Panel A, we report their mean returns
and number of trades for all sample periods and, for comparison, the mean return of the
benchmark. Panel B presents the Sharpe ratios of the best rules and of the benchmark, as
well as the number of trades triggered by the best market-timing rules. We find that for
each period the same rules are selected as best-performers under both performance criteria.
Interestingly, for all periods, learning rules turn out to perform best in the extended set
of rules. Hence, the maximum performance for all periods is higher than in the previous
exercise, in which we considered only simple rules. We find the largest increase in the
maximum performance for the first subperiod with a rise of the mean return from 14.59%
(for the best rule in the set of simple rules) to 24.24%, which equals an outperfomance
over the benchmark of more than 15% per annum. This remarkable excess return of
the best-performing rule relative to the benchmark gives rise to the conjecture that this
outperformance may be statistically significant, even after data-snooping adjustment.
Since the number of trades of the best learning rules are even higher than for the best
rules from the set of simple rules, the robustness check on the impact of transaction costs
in Section 2.7.3 is even more valuable.
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Table 2.5: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules in the Extended Set under the
Mean Return Criterion
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.044 0.686 0.044 0.652 0.347
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.052 0.050
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.006 0.376 0.006 0.369 0.186
This table presents the performance of the best market-timing rule under the mean return criterion. For each period, the
table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal p-values. SPA-c refers
to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA p-value. The nominal
p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing rule only, without
correcting for data-snooping biases.
2.6.1 Test Results under the Mean Return Criterion
In order to assess the outperformance of the best-performing rule over a buy-and-hold
strategy, we run the RC and the SPA for the extended set of market-timing rules, which
includes complex strategies as well as simple rules. Table 2.5 presents nominal p-values
and data-snooping adjusted RC and SPA p-values for each period based on the mean
return criterion. As before, SPA-c denotes the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA
and SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA p-value. Not surprisingly, due to
the outperformance of the best rules over the benchmark, nominal p-values are signifi-
cant at the 5% level (at least) for all periods. However, data-snooping corrected RC and
SPA p-values are no longer significant at any conventional significance levels for the full
sample and the second subperiod. That is, the best-performing rules, which showed sig-
nificant outperformance over the benchmark when considered in isolation, no longer beat
the buy-and-hold strategy once we correct for dependencies across all rules. Interestingly,
according to the data-snooping adjusted RC and SPA p-values, the null hypothesis that
market timing does not produce superior returns can still be rejected at the 10% level for
the first subperiod. This result supports our previous conjecture that the best rule for
the subperiod from 1981 to 1995 may still significantly beat the benchmark, even after
data-snooping correction.
In Figure 2.4, we plot the evolution of the maximum mean return and the RC p-value
across all rules from the extended set for the first subperiod (1981-1994), in which we
found statistically significant outperformance of the best rule even after we corrected for
data-snooping biases. The RC p-value terminates at 0.05, indicating that, even after
adjustment for data snooping is made, the optimal rule does indeed contain valuable eco-
nomic information. The graph of the maximum mean return for this subperiod shows
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that, after including only 67 models, the maximum performance statistic increases to
9.41% and thus above the return of the buy-and-hold strategy. Including roughly 1,400
additional rules increases the maximum performance statistic to 12.23% without rendering
the RC p-value significant. Since from this point onwards the improvement of the maxi-
mum performance is small and the effective span of market-timing rules becomes larger,
the p-value increases gradually to a value of 0.58 after around 6,100 models, displaying
the effects of data snooping. Adding additional rules gradually increases the maximum
mean return to approximately 25% after 6,793 models are inspected and causes a decline
in the RC p-value to a significant terminal value of 0.05. This is even more interesting,
given that only very few rules show remarkably high average returns, while the majority
clearly underperform the benchmark. The performance of the best rule is apparently so
strong that, even after data-snooping correction, it leads to a significant RC p-value.
2.6.2 Test Results under the Sharpe Ratio Criterion
Table 2.6 presents the test results for the best-performing rule, drawn from the extended
set, under the Sharpe ratio (SR) criterion. We report the nominal p-values as well as the
data-snooping adjusted RC and SPA p-values for all sample periods and denote the con-
sistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA with SPA-c and the lower bound of the consistent
SPA p-value with SPA-l. The results are very similar to those under the mean return
criterion. Nominal p-values are zero or close to zero for all sample periods, suggesting
that the best-performing rules significantly outperform a buy-and-hold strategy at the 1%
level when data-snooping biases are ignored. As indicated by insignificant RC and SPA
p-values for the full sample and the second subperiod, the best rules for these periods
no longer significantly beat a buy-and-hold strategy when adjustment for data snooping
is made. However, due to the remarkable outperformance of the best rule (SR = 1.72)
over the benchmark (SR = 0.12) in the first subperiod, RC and SPA p-values remain
significant at the 10% level, even after correcting for data snooping.
Figure 2.5 plots, for the first subperiod (1981-1994), the evolution of the maximum
Sharpe ratio and the RC p-value across all rules from the extended set. As before, we
present the graph for this subperiod since even data-snooping adjustments do not ren-
der the outperformance of the best-performing rule insignificant. Including about 130
models increases the maximum SR above the SR of the benchmark and leads to a de-
cline in the RC p-value to slightly less than 0.80. From there onwards until model 6,792,
the maximum performance statistic only improves a little and the RC p-value fluctuates
but never becomes significant. Including the best performing market-timing rule (model
6,793) leads to a tremendous drop in the RC p-value from 0.87 to a significant value of
0.05. After model 6,793 the majority of rules underperform the buy-and-hold strategy, as
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Table 2.6: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules in the Extended Set under the
Sharpe Ratio Criterion
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.005 0.793 0.005 0.535 0.177
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.053 0.020
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.195 0.055
This table presents the performance of the best market-timing rule under the Sharpe ratio criterion. For each period, the
table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal p-values. SPA-c refers
to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA p-value. The nominal
p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing rule only, without
correcting for data-snooping biases.
under the mean return criterion, and very few rules show an SR significantly above that
of the benchmark. However, the outperformance of the best-performing rule is strong
enough to lead to a significant terminal RC p-value.
Overall, the results for the extended set of rules are very similar to those for the
basic set. When no adjustment for data snooping is made, certain rules significantly
outperform a buy-and-hold strategy. In general, however, data-snooping adjustments
render the superior performance of the best rules insignificant. Only for the first subperiod
(1981-1994) does the outperformance of the best-performing rule remains significant after
we correct for data-snooping biases.
2.7 Robustness Checks and Modifications
We perform a series of robustness checks for both the basic and the extended sets of rules.
Since the results under the two performance criteria are very similar in previous sections,
we restrict all robustness checks to experiments based on the mean return criterion.
2.7.1 Out-of-Sample Analysis
Out-of-sample (OOS) testing is a way of eliminating the effects of data-snooping (see,
e.g., Lo and MacKinlay (1990)) and, at the same time, it allows to investigate further the
power of the testing procedures used in our experiments. As a first robustness check, we
therefore conduct an OOS analysis to check whether the performance of the best in-sample
market-timing rule holds OOS. In particular, we use the first subperiod (1981-1994) as
the in-sample period and reserve the years from 1995 to 2007 as the OOS period. The
best-performing rule in the extended set selected in the first subperiod (a learning rule
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with a one-day evaluation period and a five-day review span) performs poorly in the OOS
period with a return of only 0.11%, making formal testing redundant. The best-performer,
identified as of the end of 1994, apparently does not carry on the signifcant performance
in the OOS period.
These results are in line with our earlier findings that, after data-snooping correction,
there are no rules that significantly outperform a buy-and-hold strategy in the period
from 1995 to 2007 (subperiod II), and therefore alleviate concerns regarding the power of
the tests used in our study.
2.7.2 Impact of Relaxing the Short-Selling Constraint
In our second robustness check, we investigate the performance of market-timing rules
when the short-selling constraint is relaxed. Thus far, we assumed that an investor re-
ceiving sell signals exits the market and switches to cash. However, instead of holding
cash after selling the index, investors may want to short sell the index in order to gain
from falling prices. Short selling the index has been facilitated by the emergence of basket
securities, such as index futures and exchange-traded funds replicating indices, as they
allow for inexpensive index tracking and for a potential short selling of the index. Conse-
quently, short selling the index might realistically be considered by investors in practice
and might change the results found in previous sections. On the one hand, if predictions
from the indicators are correct—if market downturns are predicted successfully—short
selling the index when exiting the market will yield superior returns relative to holding
cash. The performance of market-timing rules would thus be higher than in previous
sections and the test results of the superior performance of the best market-timing rules
might become more significant. On the other hand, if market-timing strategies fail, in-
vestors who short sell the index instead of holding cash when indicators signal to exit the
market will face higher losses. Test results of the superior performance of market-timing
rules would consequently tend to be less significant.
In order to determine whether being short the index during predicted market down-
turns improves on the maximum return for the set of market-timing rules and thus on
the significance of superior performance, we run the RC and the SPA while changing the
values of the timing function in equation (2.2) to 1 for “invest in the stock market” and
−1 for “short sell the index.” Table 2.7 reports nominal p-values as well as RC and SPA
p-values for the basic set of rules (Panel A) and the extended set of rules (Panel B). Nom-
inal p-values in Panel A indicate that, considered in isolation, the best-performing simple
rules outperform the benchmark at the 5% significance level in the full sample and in the
first subperiod and at the 10% level in the second subperiod. After correcting for data
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Table 2.7: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules When Relaxing the Short-Selling
Constraint
Panel A Basic Set of Rules
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.033 0.698 0.033 0.675 0.461
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.037 0.176 0.037 0.163 0.114
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.089 0.779 0.089 0.784 0.629
Panel B Extended Set of Rules
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.038 0.677 0.038 0.645 0.338
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.063
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.060 0.896 0.060 0.895 0.775
This table presents, for each sample period, the performance of the best market-timing rule under the mean return criterion
when relaxing the short-selling constraint. Panel A includes the results when only simple trading rules are considered,
whereas the results in Panel B are based on the extended universe of rules, including complex market-timing strategies.
For each period, the table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal
p-values. SPA-c refers to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA
p-value. The nominal p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing
rule only, without correcting for data-snooping biases.
snooping, the outperformance of the best market-timing rule is not significant in any of
the periods, as indicated by high RC and SPA p-values. Furthermore, we find that, while
nominal p-values are very similar to those in Section 2.5.1, Table 2.2, where holding cash
was used as the exit strategy, data-snooping corrected p-values show a relatively larger
change. For both the first and second subperiods the RC and SPA-c p-values decrease,
while for the full sample these p-values increase.
For the extended set of market-timing rules, we find that, in general, nominal p-values
and data-snooping adjusted p-values change only slightly relative to the results in Section
2.6.1, Table 2.5. Only for the second subperiod do the RC and SPA-c p-values increase
substantially. The significance of the results, however, remains the same; nominal p-values
for the full sample and for both subperiods are low and significant. High data-snooping
corrected p-values for the full sample and the second subperiod indicate that the outper-
formance of the best market-timing rule is not statistically significant after data-snooping
adjustments are made. As in Section 2.6.1, RC and SPA p-values for the first subperiod
are significant; correcting for data snooping does not render the outperformance of the
best rule over the buy-and-hold strategy insignificant.
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In summary, we find that, for both the basic set and the extended set of rules, allow-
ing for short selling the index does not qualitatively change the test results obtained in
previous sections.
2.7.3 Impact of Transaction Costs
Thus far, we have not considered the effects of transaction costs on the profitability of
market-timing rules and thus on our test results. The impact might indeed be signifi-
cant, particularly because various market-timing rules involve frequent switching between
the index and cash. As a result of frequent trading, the outperformance of timing rules
relative to the benchmark is lower. Furthermore, it may happen that rules with a lower
trading frequency turn out to be the best performers once transaction costs are taken into
account. Therefore, we perform the same exercises as before, but incorporate transaction
costs in our analysis. Since a historical series for transaction costs is not available, and
since the amount of those costs would vary among different types of investors, we follow
Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) and use transaction costs equal to 50 basis point per
one-way trade.27
Table 2.8 presents the test results for the performance of the best market-timing rule
in both the basic set of rules (Panel A) and the extended set of rules (Panel B) when
considering transaction costs of 50 basis points per one-way trade. Not surprisingly, for
both sets of rules, all p-values are higher in the presence of transaction costs. For the set
of simple rules, nominal p-values indicate that the outperformance of the best rule, when
considered in isolation, is generally significant, even when transaction costs are included.
However, as in the case without transaction costs, the null hypothesis of no superior per-
formance of the best rule cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels for any
period, once data-snooping adjustments are made.
For the extended set of rules, the test results are quite similar to those without trans-
action costs. Nominal p-values are significant for the full sample and for both subperiods.
However, data-snooping corrected p-values for the full sample and the second subperiod
are insignificant. For the first subperiod (1981-1994), the null hypothesis of no superior
performance of the best rule is rejected at the 10% level.
Thus, including transaction costs does not lead to any qualitative change in the results
for either the basic set of rules or the extended set of rules.
27 We have also tried transaction costs of 20 basis points per one-way trade, taking into account that
transaction costs might have been lower during our sample period. The results are very similar and
the conclusions remain the same.
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Table 2.8: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules When Including Transaction
Costs
Panel A Basic Set of Rules
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.038 0.937 0.038 0.749 0.472
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.087 0.939 0.087 0.843 0.608
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.128 0.968 0.128 0.918 0.696
Panel B Extended Set of Rules
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.028 0.932 0.028 0.914 0.701
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.057 0.055
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.024 0.619 0.024 0.511 0.332
This table presents, for each sample period, the performance of the best market-timing rule under the mean return criterion
when including one-way transaction costs equal to 50 basis points. Panel A includes the results when only simple trading
rules are considered, whereas the results in Panel B are based on the extended universe of rules, including complex market-
timing strategies. For each period, the table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the
corresponding nominal p-values. SPA-c refers to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound
of the consistent SPA p-value. The nominal p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to
the best market-timing rule only, without correcting for data-snooping biases.
2.7.4 Sensitivity to Changes in the Smoothing Parameter
In this section, we examine whether our test results are sensitive to the choice of the
smoothing parameter q. The Politis and Romano (1994) bootstrap relies on the param-
eter q to determine the length of the blocks (1/q) resampled from the observed data. A
smaller parameter value of q corresponds to a longer block length and is appropriate for
data with more dependence, and vice versa.
Thus far, we have chosen a smoothing parameter of 0.5 in all experiments. We now
consider parameter values of 0.5, 0.1, and 0.01, corresponding to block lengths of 2, 10, and
100. Table 2.9 provides RC and SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal p-
values for all sample periods and for the three different values of the smoothing parameter.
In order to conserve space, we present the results of this robustness check only for the
basic set of rules.28 It can be seen that, for all subperiods, the nominal p-values deviate
marginally for different choices of q, the maximum deviation amounting to 0.05 for the
second subperiod and a change in the smoothing parameter from q = 0.5 to q = 0.01. The
only qualitative change is found for precisely that subperiod, where the nominal p-value
turns insignificant. Similarly, the data-snooping adjusted RC and SPA-c p-values for all
28 We also performed this robustness check for the extended set of rules. The results are similar and
the conclusions remain the same.
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Table 2.9: Performance of the Best Market-Timing Rules for Various Smoothing Param-
eters q.
Panel A Smoothing Parameter q = 0.5
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.030 0.598 0.030 0.569 0.361
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.035 0.275 0.035 0.257 0.169
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.073 0.885 0.073 0.884 0.742
Panel B Smoothing Parameter q = 0.1
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.026 0.558 0.026 0.539 0.309
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.058 0.254 0.058 0.235 0.131
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.076 0.879 0.076 0.872 0.717
Panel C Smoothing Parameter q = 0.01
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.047 0.518 0.047 0.494 0.319
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.044 0.168 0.044 0.154 0.072
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.122 0.857 0.122 0.828 0.609
This table presents, for each sample period, the performance of the best market-timing rule under the mean return criterion
for alternative smoothing parameters q. The test results are based on the basic set of simple trading rules. For each
parameter value, the table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal
p-values. SPA-c refers to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA
p-value. The nominal p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing
rule only, without correcting for data-snooping biases.
periods fluctuate marginally. The highest deviation is found for the RC p-value in the
first subperiod. With a change in the smoothing parameter from q = 0.5 to q = 0.01,
the RC p-value decreases from 0.275 to 0.168. In none of the specifications do we find
a qualitative change in the data-snooping adjusted p-values. Overall, we find that our
results are robust, not sensitive, to the choice of the smoothing parameter q.
2.7.5 Risk Premia Tests
The benchmark used in all previous experiments is a buy-and-hold strategy. This ap-
proach allows us to investigate which market-timing rules/indicators are able to signif-
icantly outperform the market when correcting for data-snooping biases. Employing a
proxy for the risk-free interest rate as the benchmark, instead of a buy-and-hold strategy,
(and keeping everything else the same), we are able to answer the question whether any
(and/or which) rules/indicators carry a significantly positive risk premium, and how these
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Table 2.10: Risk Premia Tests
Panel A Basic Set of Rules
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.025 0.310 0.025 0.307 0.260
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.034 0.465 0.034 0.455 0.335
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.014 0.290 0.014 0.290 0.264
Panel B Extended Set of Rules
Reality Check SPA
Sample nom. p-value RC p-value nom. p-value SPA-c SPA-l
Full Sample (1981 - 2007) 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.196 0.160
Subperiod I (1981 - 1994) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subperiod II (1995 - 2007) 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.042 0.043
This table presents, for each sample period, the performance of the best market-timing rule under the mean return criterion
when using the risk-free rate as the benchmark. Panel A includes the results when only simple trading rules are considered,
whereas the results in Panel B are based on the extended universe of rules, including complex market-timing strategies.
For each period, the table shows the “Reality Check” (RC) and the SPA p-values along with the corresponding nominal
p-values. SPA-c refers to the consistent p-value of Hansen (2005)’s SPA; SPA-l is the lower bound of the consistent SPA
p-value. The nominal p-values are obtained by applying the RC and the SPA testing procedures to the best market-timing
rule only, without correcting for data-snooping biases.
risk premia evolve over time—a slightly different, but equally interesting question. In the
case of significant time-varying risk premia, the profitability of market-timing rules is not
necessarily an indication against market efficiency—that is, profits from timing strategies
are simply the compensation for (time-varying) risk in an efficient market.
We therefore change the benchmark return in equation (2.2) from the market return to
the Federal funds rate as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate and re-run the RC and SPA
tests. The results are presented in Table 2.10, Panel A (basic set) and Panel B (extended
set). We observe marginal changes in the nominal p-values and relatively larger drops in
data-snooping adjusted p-values for both the basic and the extended sets. Qualitatively,
though, the results remain mostly unchanged. The only qualitative change is found for the
second subperiod, with significant RC and SPA p-value indicating a significant premium
of the best rule over the risk-free rate.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the profitability of market-timing rules drawn from a comprehensive
universe of rules, while accounting for the potential effects of data snooping. Examining
a very large set of rules on the same data set bears the risk of biased statistical inference
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due to data snooping. That is, potential superior performance of some rules over a bench-
mark may not be due to any genuine merit in the model (rule), but rather to pure chance.
We address this concern by applying appropriate techniques to correct for data-snooping
biases. Precisely, we use White (2000)’s “Reality Check” (RC) and Hansen (2005)’s test
for superior predictive ability (SPA) in order to quantify such data-snooping biases and to
investigate the superior performance of the best market-timing rule over a buy-and-hold
strategy, while accounting for dependencies across all rules.
First, we perform the tests for a basic set of simple rules, each of which is based on
a single indicator only, and find that, when considered in isolation, the best-performing
rule beats a buy-and-hold strategy over the full sample period from 1981 to 2007 and
over both subperiods. Applying the RC and SPA tests to adjust for the effects of data
snooping, we do not find superior performance of the best market-timing rule over the
benchmark in any period. These results emphasize the importance of using appropriate
methods to correct for data-snooping biases. Second, we extend the set of market-timing
rules to include complex strategies which are based on information from several indicators.
As before, we find significant superior performance of the best rules when dependencies
across rules are ignored. But when considered in the context of the full universe of rules,
the best-performing rules do not significantly outperform the benchmark in either the
full sample or the subperiod from 1995 to 2007. Interestingly, the outperformance of the
best rule in the subperiod from 1981 to 1994 remains significant even after data-snooping
adjustment is made. Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks and find that our
results are not qualitatively changed by accounting for transaction costs, allowing for
short selling the index, or changing the smoothing parameter which determines the block
length of the bootstrap used in our tests.
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Chapter 3
Market Reaction to Corporate News
and the Influence of the Financial
Crisis
3.1 Introduction
On January 9, 2007, Apple Inc. issued a press release, headlined “Apple Reinvents the
Phone with iPhone,” which stated:
“iPhone ... ushers in an era of software power and sophistication never before
seen in a mobile device, which completely redefines what users can do on their
mobile phones.”
It also contained a quote from Apple’s CEO, Steve Jobs, stating that “...iPhone is a
revolutionary and magical product that is literally five years ahead of any other mobile
phone,” and went on to describe its features. On the day of the announcement, the stock
trading volume increased more than four-fold and remained almost as high on the follow-
ing day before dropping by half the day after. The stock price also rose, and in the period
from the day before to five days after the announcement Apple’s stock earned a cumu-
lative return of 9.31% in excess of the market. Moreover, the stock became much more
volatile—in the 10 days following the press release, its idiosyncratic volatility increased
by 28% relative to that in the 10 days before the announcement.
The strong market reaction to the press release and its glowing but carefully chosen
wording illustrate just how important corporate news announcements are for stock prices.
Corporate press releases became significantly more common following both the October
2000 adoption of the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and the July 2002 adop-
tion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which mandate that publicly traded companies
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disclose all private information that may have an impact on a firm’s market value and
report changes in their “financial conditions or operations” in a timely fashion and si-
multaneously to all market participants. In particular, Reg FD states: “With advances
in information technology, most notably the internet, information can be communicated
to shareholders directly and in real time, without the intervention of an intermediary.”1
Reg FD further suggests that communicating information via press releases should be the
preferable way to achieve timeliness and non-exclusivity.
Corporate press releases reach investors almost instantaneously via services such as
PR Newswire, BusinessWire, GlobeNewswire, Marketwire, and the like. Firms typically
sign up for an account with one of the newswire services, and issue all of their press re-
leases through that service. Typically, a basic account is free but a fee is charged for each
press release. Newswire services then post press releases on their own websites and also
distribute them, typically free of charge, to local and global media outlets, trade mag-
azines, and financial internet sites. Often, firms must pay more for wider distribution.
Newswire services compete on price, the breadth of their distribution network, and the
quality of customer service.
We form our dataset of corporate press releases issued between April 2006 and August
2009 by combining observations of official corporate press releases from all major newswire
services. We believe that our dataset contains nearly all press releases that were issued
in this time period. We then manually classify these press releases into several major
news categories and their subcategories based on their content. For example, Apple’s
press release mentioned earlier is classified under the major category Products & Services
and subcategory New Product. After removing the press release categories for which we
have no priors with respect to the expected market impact (such as announcements about
establishing new awards, participation in new employee and industry initiatives, and the
like) and eliminating infrequent news categories with fewer than 30 press releases, we are
left with a total of nine major news categories, further subdivided into 52 subcategories.
We analyze how various types of corporate announcements affect stock returns, liquidity,
and volatility, with the magnitude of these impacts revealing the relative news-worthiness
of the news.
The importance of firm-level news should not be assessed solely by its immediate im-
pact on the stock price but also by its effect on the informational environment of the firm.
It is not realistic to expect that the market will always be able to quickly quantify the im-
pact of news on the firm value. In particular, when it comes to managerial decisions, the
view that market participants should be able to evaluate them fully and instantaneously
1 The entire document can be found at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
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fails to recognize the value of managerial expertise and private information, as it implicitly
presumes that investors could have made these decisions themselves.2 Therefore, some
time may pass before the market comes to an agreement on the resulting firm valuation.
During the period in which the impact of the news on the firm value is being assessed,
the informational asymmetries between the better- and worse-informed investors will be
high. Consequently, immediately following the release of difficult-to-interpret news, stock
liquidity (measured as the price impact of trade) should drop in order to compensate the
market maker for the potential advantages of the better-informed investors. At the same
time, the priors on the old valuation model will weaken, and each additional signal will
have a relatively large impact on the stock price; as a result, idiosyncratic volatility will
increase. To sum up, while routine and easy-to-interpret news will likely have a large
immediate impact on the stock price and little impact on the subsequent informational
environment of the firm (measured by liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility), non-routine
and difficult-to-interpret news may have little immediate effect on the stock price but will
greatly diminish subsequent liquidity and increase idiosyncratic volatility.
This paper contributes to the corporate event-study literature in five respects. First,
we consistently apply the same event-study design to all types of corporate news (rather
than focusing on one type of event at a time, as was done in prior literature) in order to
evaluate in a systematic manner the various events’ relative importance to the market.
Second, owing to the breadth of our dataset, we are able to include types of corporate
news events that have not been (extensively) studied before. Third, even for the news cat-
egories which have received considerable attention in the past, we investigate whether the
documented regularities still hold in this more recent and significantly broader dataset.
Fourth, we investigate the patterns of changes in stock volatility and liquidity following
different types of news, which has not been consistently done in earlier papers. Fifth, we
study how the market reaction to different types of news changed during the period of
the financial crisis, which was characterized by a widespread difficulty in obtaining credit,
low market prices, bankruptcy concerns, and a generally high perception of uncertainty.
The impact of financial news has been extensively studied in prior literature. We con-
firm that several documented regularities still exist in the most recent data. For example,
announcements of better-than-expected financial results are accompanied by positive ab-
normal returns, whereas disappointing financial results and earnings restatements are
accompanied by negative abnormal returns. Announcements of financial decisions, such
as dividend payments, share repurchases, and forward stock splits lead to positive price
reactions, while announcements of secondary debt and equity offerings lead to negative
price reactions. Finally, news announcing mergers, acquisitions, and spinoffs all elicit a
2 We appreciate this insight of Jack Treynor.
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strong positive price response.
Moreover, we find that announcements of other corporate events and strategic plans
are just as important as financial news. Such announcements were not mandatory in the
past and became much more prevalent as a result of Reg FD, since it requires that firms
disclose all news that could be deemed “material” for stock prices.3 For example, we show
that stock prices react strongly to news about customer losses and customer acquisitions.
Such seemingly uninformative announcements as reaching a sales milestone or winning a
company award are accompanied by significantly positive returns. The underlying reason
might be a temporary or a permanent increase in investor attention (Merton (1987)).4
The market reacts negatively to unfavorable legal news, management terminations, and
announcements about FDA rejections and product defects. News releases about new
products, patent awards, exiting unsuccessful ventures, new partnerships formed, legal
settlements, management additions, FDA approvals, and successful research outcomes
are all accompanied by significantly positive abnormal returns.
Ranking the news categories by the magnitude of the price response within seven
trading days around the announcement date, the five categories that illicit the most
positive market response are: (1) positive pre-announcements of financial results, (2)
announcements of share buybacks, (3) announcements of FDA approvals, (4) spinoff
announcements, and (5) announcements of pharmaceutical approvals in the European
Union, although the last category is only statistically significant when using a one-sided
test. The five news categories that illicit the most negative market reactions are: (1)
negative pre-announcements of financial results, (2) FDA rejections, (3) announcements
of customer losses, (4) announcements of poor financial performance, and (5) product
defect announcements. It is worth noting that negative price responses tend to be larger
in magnitude than positive ones.
Stocks’ idiosyncratic volatility tends to increase following most types of news an-
nouncements, an indicator that investors become more sensitive to additional information
coming to the market after the original news (potentially including interpretations by var-
ious market experts) and continue updating their valuation priors. Stocks’ liquidity tends
to decrease following most news announcements, indicating that in the post-announcement
period the informational advantage of firm insiders is perceived as becoming more valu-
3 We were told by staff at the SEC that the language of the regulation and the definition of the types
of news that need to be disclosed are intentionally left vague in order to prevent firms from gaming
the system. Hence, firms may disclose a wider range of news than what is considered “material” by
investors.
4 That newswire services compete on the breadth of their network is a testament to the importance
of investor attention for firm valuations.
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able. It is not surprising to observe a considerable overlap between the two measures—the
informational advantage of firm insiders should be stronger when investors’ priors about
the correct valuation model are weak. Investigating all measures simultaneously allows
us to identify important news that are easy for the market to process—they lead to large
immediate prices reactions but small subsequent increase in liquidity and idiosyncratic
volatility. Examples are press releases about customer losses, share buybacks, and the
closing down of unprofitable subsidiaries. On the other hand, some news are very dif-
ficult to interpret, the immediate price reaction is low in absolute value, and liquidity
greatly decreases and idiosyncratic volatility greatly increases in the subsequent 10 days.
Examples are press releases about SEC investigations, the intent to acquire another firm,
non-compliance with stock exchange requirements, and reverse stock splits. Yet other
news, lead to both large immediate price reactions and high subsequent informational
uncertainty. Examples of such press releases are financial pre-announcements (both pos-
itive and negative), financial restatements, FDA rejections, and announcements of good
research outcomes.
We furthermore split our time series into two subsamples—before and during the pe-
riod of the financial crisis. We assume that the financial crisis, which originated in the
sub-prime mortgage crisis, ceased to be viewed as a problem affecting only sub-prime
mortgage originators and started being perceived as a global predicament on March 17,
2008. This is the Monday that followed the weekend during which troubled Bear Stearns,
having incurred considerable losses on its hedge funds with exposure to the sub-prime
mortgage market, signed a merger agreement with JP Morgan Chase. This date splits
our sample at about 23.5 months of data assigned to the pre-crisis period, and 16.5
months to the period following the start of the crisis. Investigating the price reactions to
various news categories in the pre-crisis and in-crisis periods, we find that, on average,
announcement-driven volatility increases became larger during the more uncertain crisis
period. Similarly, the post-announcement decreases in liquidity also grew larger. This
implies that investor valuation priors were generally weaker during the crisis, and, hence,
corporate news announcements triggered larger revisions in the priors. However, the most
intriguing result is that price reactions to certain types of news have changed. Given that
the crisis was characterized by a difficulty in obtaining credit and generally low stock val-
uations, announcements of secondary equity offerings ceased to be perceived as a negative
signal of the firm’s equity being overpriced. Also, abnormal returns around announce-
ments of share buybacks became significantly more positive. News potentially signaling
larger and more stable future cash flows (such as announcements of US and European
drug approvals, new product launches, acquisitions of new customers and partners, and
good financial results) lead to higher contemporaneous returns than in the period before
the crisis. Additionally, news of corporate reorganization and changes in the management
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team were viewed in a significantly more positive light.
This paper studies price reactions to news originating from the primary news source,
i.e., corporations themselves. Another strand of literature that has recently gained mo-
mentum has focused on the importance of news media and the internet in disseminating
new information to the market. These papers typically try to assess whether new infor-
mation has a positive or a negative content based on the presence of positive or negative
words in news stories or chat board messages and investigate whether thus quantified
news stories can predict future returns (e.g., Chan (2003), Antweiler and Frank (2004),
and Das and Chen (2007) for internet message boards; Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock, Saar-
Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) for general news stories; and Engelberg (2008) for news
stories that accompany earnings announcements). Moreover, Tetlock (2009) investigates
the effect of being in the news on the stock’s order flow and the informational environ-
ment, as well as the resulting return patterns. Unlike these papers, we work exclusively
with information originating directly from firms. Moreover, besides simply classifying
news into positive or negative categories, we also hand-classify the content of the news.
(In the future, this classification can be automated via keyword searches.) We investigate
which types of corporate announcements are deemed important and also unanticipated
by the market such that they move prices at the time of the announcement and force
revisions in the valuation priors. The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to these
questions in a rather descriptive manner since the natural first step in studying corporate
press releases—and the main focus of this paper—is to classify press releases into news
categories and investigate their relative importance to the market. Questions about the
factors that influence the speed of price discovery at the firm level for the various types
of news are beyond the scope of this paper and are left to future research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section
3.3 explains the test methodology and shows the results of the basic hypotheses. It also
presents additional empirical hypotheses and results for the crisis period. Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Disclosure Regulations and Data
3.2.1 New Requirement for More Complete and Timely Infor-
mation Disclosure
Prior to the adoption of Reg FD, corporations were required to disclose important ma-
terial information using the SEC’s Form 8-K. Yet, these forms were allowed to be filed
with the delay of four business days after occurrence of the event (page 2 of Form 8-K),
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and probably reached investors with a further delay. In that time, some of the market
participants (notably, analysts and investment funds, could have benefited from selective
information disclosure, and this knowledge would have already been partially reflected in
stock prices at the time of the official disclosure).
The goal of the Regulation Fair Disclosure, implemented in October 2000, was to
address the analyst scandal caused by firms’ selective information disclosure to a subset
of analysts in return for favorable stock recommendations. Reg FD states that firms
must disclose all relevant information, favorable or unfavorable, to everyone at once and
without delay. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted in July 2002 in response to a series
of accounting scandals, and, among other objectives, aimed to improve the quality of
financial information disclosure. The SEC responded by adding the new Section 13(1)
to the Exchange Act that obligates public companies to disclose “on a rapid and current
basis” nonpublic information “concerning material changes in the financial condition or
operations.”
Before the increased information disclosure requirements, press releases were a popular
method of communicating information, but they likely predominately conveyed favorable
news. Reg FD states explicitly that firms have to disclose all relevant information in order
to eliminate the informational advantages of firm insiders. The SEC does not specifically
list the types of news that have to be reported, for the fear that firms may try to game the
system, but intentionally leaves the description vague, stating only that the information
that must be disclosed should be “material” and “nonpublic” and such that “there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” (page 9).
The advances in information technology and, specifically, the internet are singled out
as the technological innovations that allow firms to disclose information to shareholders
“directly and in real time, without the intervention of an intermediary” (page 3). The
SEC further suggests that issuing a press release should be the first step in conveying new
information to investors (page 15).
Our dataset of corporate press releases provides an improvement over a similar study
that could have been conducted using Form 8-K reports. First, as discussed earlier, these
forms reached the market with a significant delay and may have been already, at least
partially, incorporated in stock prices. Second, the set of news that firms would disclose
under Reg FD and SOX was wider than those that they have been required to report in
Form 8-K. In the year 2000, the SEC estimated that the number of firm disclosures will
increase by 70,000 relative to what it was before with the passage of Reg FD.5 Finally,
5 The document can be found on http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42259.htm.
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after the passage of the regulations, the SEC reduced the Form 8-K reporting requirement
as part of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Our dataset contains more than 90% of all
publicly traded firms. Hence, it appears that most firms comply with Reg FD and SOX
by disclosing new information via press releases that appear on various newswire services.
3.2.2 Ad-Hoc Disclosures and Brief Literature Review: The
Case of Germany
The German equivalent to Reg FD is section 15 of the German Securities Trading Law
(§ 15 WpHG). Analogously to Reg FD, the German regulation requires that (publicly
traded) companies report instantaneously any news that is deemed to affect their stock
prices and that is not yet known to the public.6 In most cases, companies mandate
the dissemination of ad-hoc news to the “Deutschen Gesellschaft fu¨r Ad-hoc-Publizita¨t”
(DGAP). In particular, DGAP provides, on behalf of the companies, both regulators and
stock exchanges with the corporate announcement and, as also required by code, dis-
tributes the news announcements to news agencies or other news service providers.7 Even
though the procedure of making ad-hoc announcements publicly available in Germany is
very similar to that in the US, there are certain differences with regard to what type of
news companies may release. While in the US firms may release all news that are deemed
to be of interest to investors—i.e., also news that are not required to be published under
prevailing regulations—companies in Germany are prohibited to publish any news other
than these mandated by § 15 WpHG.
Beginning with the pioneering study of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) on the
market reaction to stock splits, numerous event studies have investigated the impact of
various corporate events on stock prices and the firm informational environment. Many
of these event studies are based on information that is released by firms in their annual
reports or other regularly disclosed information. Probably the most prominent event stud-
ies are on the announcement effects of dividends and earnings. Studies for the German
market show significant stock price effects, for instance, following dividend announce-
ments (e.g., Amihud and Murgia (1997) and Gerke, Oerke, and Sentner (1997)), earnings
announcements (e.g., Coenenberg and Henes (1995)), stock splits (e.g., Wulff (2002)), as
well as mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Gerke, Garz, and Oerke (1995)).
The adoption of the ad-hoc disclosure requirement has led to an increase in the num-
ber of news releases and facilitated research on the impact of corporate announcements.
In particular, more comprehensive studies are now possible due to a larger breadth of the
6 More details on § 15 “Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes” (WpHG) can be found on the web page of the
German Department of Justice (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/wphg/_15.html).
7 In more than 90% of the cases, the distribution is made through newswire services; see Ro¨der (2000).
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types of news that are released, as well as due to the availability of exact time stamps for
the news releases, which, in turn, allows high-frequency examinations of the process of
price discovery. The early literature on the announcement effects of ad-hoc disclosures in
the German stock market comprises of empirical studies by Oerke (1999), Ro¨der (1999),
Ro¨der (2000), and Nowak (2001), among others. Generally, the results suggest that ad-
hoc announcements have a significant impact on firms’ stock prices. Ro¨der (2000) finds
that the announcement effect of corporate news differs for large and small companies, with
stronger stock price reactions of small-cap firms. The author, furthermore, shows that
positive announcements lead to stronger market reactions than negative news.8 However,
most of the early literature, such as Oerke (1999), Ro¨der (1999), and Ro¨der (2000), suf-
fers from methodological weaknesses, as discussed, for instance, by Kaserer and Nowak
(2001) and Gu¨ttler (2005). Specifically, the methodology used in those studies may lead
to significant results, even in instances where price movements are random and not caused
by unexpected news (see Kaserer and Nowak (2001)).
While most of the above literature focuses on daily stock price reactions, more recent
studies investigate intra-day effects of ad-hoc announcements. For instance, Muntermann
and Gu¨ttler (2007), who study intra-day stock price reactions to corporate news releases,
provide evidence that stock prices, generally, adjust to news within 30 minutes after the
announcement is made. Several studies assess the intra-day effects of ad-hoc disclosures
on stock trading volumes (e.g., Ro¨der (2002) and Muntermann and Gu¨ttler (2007)). The
latter show that abnormal trading volume caused by news announcements continues for
an extended period of time.
3.2.3 Our Dataset
Our dataset comprises all corporate press releases issued by over 6,500 companies which
are traded on NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX from April 2006 to August 2009. Corporate
press releases are issued via newswire services which further disseminate the information
via their web interfaces and their news distribution networks. The distribution networks
include local and global media outlets (newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations),
trade magazines, internet sites (such as yahoo and google), financial news services (such
as Bloomberg, Dow Jones/Factiva, Thomson Reuters), some of which, especially those
with limited space capacities, then further decide whether or not to feature the press
releases in their news stories. Newswire companies do not charge members of their news
distribution networks but charge the firms that issues press releases.9 Though there may
be a tendency to release bad news to smaller networks, this practice is discouraged by
8 For an overview of the results from the early studies see Nowak (2001).
9 As an example, BusinessWire does not charge an annual fee for maintaining an account with them
but charges for each press release based on its length and the width of the agreed upon distribution
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regulators.
Our dataset is consolidated from all major newswire services, such as PR Newswire,
BusinessWire, GlobeNewswire, MarketWire, and others. PR Newswire contains 50%-60%
of all publicly traded firms, BusinessWire about 30%, and GlobeNewswire and Marketwire
are the next in terms of coverage, and the rest contains significantly fewer firms. Our cover-
age improves over time; in 2006, 75.94% of all publicly traded firms appear in our dataset,
in 2007 coverage increases to 91.00%, in 2008 to 97.23%, and in 2009 it changes to 96.67%
of the publicly traded firms. The firms that are missing tend to be smaller than the firms
that are present in the dataset. Over the entire sample period, the mean (median) market
capitalization of the firms present in our dataset is equal to $2,596 ($321) million, while
the mean (median) market capitalization of the firms absent from the dataset is equal to
$1,307 ($228) million.10
Among all postings, official corporate press releases can be identified by the news
“source” printed at the bottom of the report. We include only those news releases is-
sued by corporations themselves rather than by news agencies. The press releases are
then manually classified into various news categories based on their informational con-
tent. These manual classifications can be automated in the future based on word searches.
Our objective in defining news categories was to achieve the best tradeoff between the
precision of each category and its frequency of occurrence.
Perhaps as a result of the vagueness of the SEC’s information release requirements,
firms tend to err on the side of disclosing too much information. Additionally, firms may
prefer to release immaterial news in order to attract the attention of potential investors.
For the sake of brevity, we remove news categories for which we have no priors regard-
ing their impact on the firm value; we, therefore, discard press releases announcing the
firm’s participation in charity events and environmental initiatives, establishing industry
awards and competitions, making statements regarding labor strikes, describing new em-
ployee and industry initiatives, making known changes in internal policies, announcing
participation in various corporate surveys (such surveys assessing the diversity of the la-
bor force, security assessments, etc.), publicizing forthcoming speaking engagements of
their executives, announcing participation in news campaigns, and so on. We also discard
categories with fewer than 30 observations. This leaves us with 271,867 corporate press
releases, which are split into nine major news categories each of which is further subdi-
network. Fees start at $210 for the first 400 words and additional charges are added for photos and
graphics.
10 The firms that do not appear in our dataset probably file only 8-K reports with the SEC instead
(these reports are meant to “announce major events that shareholders should know about”—see the
description at http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm).
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vided into 52 subcategories as described in Table 3.1. Besides providing the number of
news announcements in each category, Table 3.1 also gives brief category descriptions.11
Examples of press releases for each news category are provided in Appendix C.1.
The largest category, Customers & Partners, contains 54,552 observations and in-
cludes announcements about customer losses or wins, new partnerships formed, and var-
ious company milestones.12 The second largest category, Financial, comprises of 54,054
announcements and contains announcements of earnings, dividends, accounting restate-
ments, stock splits, secondary debt and equity offerings, as well as share buybacks. Next,
with a total of 50,194 observations, comes the category Products & Services; it includes
announcements about FDA and European drug approvals, new products, updates and
upgrades to the existing products and services, patent awards, product approvals, as well
as research project outcomes. After that, with a total of 48,625 observations, comes
the self-explanatory category Meetings & Events, and then with 31,404 observations, the
category Management; it describes various changes in the management team. The cat-
egory Awards, which includes announcements of company and product awards, follows
with 13,574 observations. Corporate Strategy & Performance comes next with 10,039
observations and includes announcements about decisions to expand or scale back firm
operations, credit news, and trends in performance and profitability.13,14 The category
M&A includes news on mergers, acquisitions, spinoffs, and IPO filings and contains 6,213
observations. Finally, with only 3,212 observations, Legal is the smallest category, and
contains announcements of (class action) lawsuits, SEC investigations initiated against
the firm, and settlements of ongoing lawsuits.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics on the monthly press release activity across
firms (the table only includes the press releases that we kept for the analysis). Panel A
11 Throughout the paper, we use the terms (corporate) press release, news event, and news announce-
ment interchangeably.
12 The subcategory Reaching a Milestone could have been also assigned to the major category Corporate
Strategy & Performance, but it frequently describes milestones reached in sales to customers or
anniversaries of customer and partner relationships, thus signifying enduring business ties.
13 Subcategories Profitability-Declining and Profitability-Improving are related to the subcategories
describing strong and weak financial results under the major category Financial, but instead of
focusing on current earnings, these announcements rather provide the big-picture assessments of
patterns and trends in firm sales, revenues, and profitability.
14 The subcategory Exchange Noncompliance announces when a firm has received a notice of noncom-
pliance from its stock exchange. These notices often follow periods of bad performance (for example,
when the bid price stays below the exchange-set minimum for a pre-specified number of consecutive
days, or when the total value of publicly held shares falls below an exchange-specified minimum).
Alternatively, they can be triggered by delays in providing exchange-mandated information releases
(such as annual and quarterly reports and disclosures about the firm’s corporate governance). This
category could have been potentially included under the major category Legal, however, since non-
compliance is frequently set off by poor performance we have included it under the major category
Corporate Strategy & Performance.
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Table 3.1: Press Release Categories
Category Subcategory Obs. Description
1. Awards Company Award 10,903 Company is rewarded for achievements
(13,574) Product Award 2,671 Company receives award for one of its products
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 152 Financing difficulties or debt downgrades
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 976 Success in securing new credit or debt upgrades
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 479 Receipt of notice of non-compliance/potential delisting
(10,039) Infrastructure - Downsizing 54 Company decides to close facilities or exit certain markets
Infrastructure - Expansion 6,640 Company decides to expand its business or opens new facilities
Profitability - Declining 283 Declining performance, e.g., decrease in sales
Profitability - Improving 1,455 Improving performance, e.g., increase in sales or revenue growth
3. Customers & Customer Loss 67 Losing an existing customer
Partners Customer Win 27,954 Acquiring new business from a new or a pre-existing customer
(54,552) New Partnership 25,598 Signing a new strategic agreement with another firm
Reaching a Milestone 933 Reaching a sales milestone or an anniversary
4. Financial Dividend 24,576 Declaration of dividend distribution
(54,054) Financial Results - Strong 15,352 Strong financial results, e.g. high earnings
Financial Results - Weak 503 Weak financial results, e.g. low earnings
Pre-Announcement - Negative 401 Negative expectations for financial results
Pre-Announcement - Positive 689 Positive expectations for financial results
Restatement 365 Revision of fiscal results or restatement of company’s outlook
Secondary Offering: Debt 3,754 Announcement of debt offering/issuance
Secondary Offering: Equity 4,093 Announcement of stock offering/issuance
Share Buyback 3,834 Repurchase of shares
Stock Split - Forward 311 Announcement of forward stock split
Stock Split - Reverse 176 Announcement of reverse stock split
5. Legal Class Action 649 Class action lawsuit filed against company
(3,212) Legal Problems 156 A new lawsuit filed against company; appeal dropped
SEC Investigation 168 Announcement of initiation or outcome of SEC investigation
Settlement 2,239 Settlement of litigation against company
6. M&A Acquisition 77 Plan to acquire another firm
(6,213) IPO 59 Filing for Initial Public Offering, e.g. of subsidiary, with SEC
Merger 1,785 Plan to merge with another firm
Spinoff 4,292 Sale of subsidiary or a line of business
7. Management Addition 20,560 Recruitment or election of new management members
(31,404) Compensation 66 Statements on compensation of management and employees
Promotion 6,617 Promotion of management members
Reorganization 1,068 Organizational change or change in the board/management
Retirement 1,276 Retirement of members of management or the board
Termination 1,817 Resignation/departure of management members
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 3,235 Company hosts or sponsors industry event
Events Industry Events 42,485 Presentation or participation in industry event
(48,625) Investor Meeting 2,905 Presentation or participation in investor conference or meeting
9. Products & FDA Approval 1,912 Approval of a product in the US by the FDA
Services FDA Investigation 767 Start of FDA investigation
(50,194) FDA Rejection 47 Rejection of product by the FDA
New Product 36,482 Launch of new service or introduction of new product
Patent Award 992 Company receives new patent for product
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 325 Approval of a pharmaceutical product in Europe
Product Approval 1,951 Authorization or certification of new business or product
Product Defect 198 Issuance of a warning regarding a product or recall of a product
Research Failure 149 Failure of a research effort
Research Success 2,103 Successful completion of a research effort
Updates & Upgrades 5,268 Improvement or update of product/service
Total 271,867
This table presents a description of the corporate press release data. Press releases are classified into 9 major news categories
which in turn are divided into several subcategories. The number of press releases in each major category (in parenthesis) and
in each subcategory are provided, as well as a brief description of each subcategory. The time period is April 2006 - August
2009.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics on Monthly Press Release Activity
Panel A: Sample Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs.
1.24 1.00 0.28 271,867
Panel B: Sample Statistics by Size Quintile
NYSE-Based quintiles Sample-Based Quintiles
Size Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs.
1 (small) 0.62 0.66 0.17 18,733 1.13 1.12 0.30 45,123
2 0.75 0.77 0.17 30,514 1.18 1.21 0.25 48,330
3 0.94 0.95 0.21 40,068 1.21 1.25 0.28 52,229
4 1.21 1.24 0.26 55,017 1.30 1.36 0.31 56,500
5 (large) 2.55 2.62 0.65 127,535 1.56 1.64 0.38 69,685
This table presents descriptive statistics for monthly press release activity across firms. Panel A shows the statistics
for the entire sample and Panel B shows the statistics by size quintiles. The size quintiles in Panel B are formed every
month based on NYSE size breakpoints (left-hand side) and based on sample-based size breakpoints, such each size
quintile contains a roughly equal numbers of stocks (right-hand side). The time period is from April 2006 to August
2009.
reports the statistics for the entire sample and shows that the average (median) number
of press releases per firm is 1.24 (1.00) per month. Panel B presents the same statistics
arranged by firm size—the left-hand side of the panel for NYSE-based size quintiles, and
the right-hand side for sample-based size quintiles, both formed every month, such that
each sample-based quintile contains roughly the same number of stocks. Not surprisingly,
the number of press releases tends to increase with firm size. In particular, the mean (me-
dian) number of monthly news announcements increases from 0.62 (0.66) for the smallest
NYSE-based size quintile (it is 1.13 (1.12) for the smallest sample-based size quintile) to
2.55 (2.62) for the largest NYSE-based quintile (it is 1.56 (1.64) for the largest sample-
based quintile).
Finally, return, volume and stock price data are obtained from the CRSP daily files.
The dollar trading volume needed for the construction of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure in Section 3.3.2.2 is computed as the product of the daily trading volume (number
of shares traded) and the end-of-day stock price.
3.3 Test Results
In this section, we investigate the impact of various types of news on stock prices, volatil-
ity and liquidity. News that the market deems most material for the firm value but that
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are also relatively easy to interpret and difficult to anticipate will be accompanied by
large immediate price reactions. Yet, some of the news will have a greater tendency to be
leaked out by customers, suppliers, and other entities involved with the firm, and, thus,
price reactions in response to the announcement will be muted; however, there will be
a price drift prior to the official announcement. Those news that are less common and
have unclear ramifications for the firm value will probably not lead to an immediate price
reaction, yet stock liquidity will drop to compensate for the potential informational ad-
vantage of firm insiders. Moreover, such news announcements will increase the demand for
follow-up information and analysis and, therefore, result in higher idiosyncratic volatility.
High volatility and low liquidity will persist until a sufficient amount of new information
is released and market participants converge on the new equilibrium valuation.
3.3.1 News’ Impact on Stock Returns
3.3.1.1 Event Study Methodology
To assess the immediate impact of news releases on stock prices, we follow the common
event study methodology. For each firm i, the abnormal return on day t, ARit, is specified
as:
ARit = Rit − E(Rit|Xt), (3.1)
where Rit and E(Rit|Xt) are the actual and expected returns, respectively, for day t, and
Xt is the conditioning information for the predictive model. Assuming that returns can
be described by the market model, the abnormal return is defined as:
ARit = Rit − αˆi − βˆiRmt, (3.2)
where Rit and Rmt are the day-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, which
we proxy with the CRSP value-weighted index. The coefficients αˆi and βˆi are the OLS
estimates from the regression of firm i’s daily returns on market returns over the 200 days
prior to the event window.
The event window extends from one day before to five days after the day of the press
release (as is common in event studies, we start the window one day before the actual
announcement day in case the news has leaked to the market just before the actual press
release). We keep the event window relatively short because (a) we are interested in the
immediate impact of news on stock prices and (b) we want to minimize the chance that
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another press release is issued by the firm within this window. Thus, we compute the
average daily abnormal return for each firm i issuing a press release on day t as:15
CARit =
1
7
t+5∑
τ=t−1
ARiτ . (3.3)
Next, we calculate the average CAR (CAR) for each news category across all press
release observations and test whether it is different from zero (H0 : CAR 6= 0). In order to
not understate the standard errors for statistical inference, we correct for possible corre-
lation between individual CARs estimated over overlapping event windows by clustering
errors by the week in which the press release was issued.
3.3.1.2 Event Study Results
Figure 3.1 plots individual CAR observations for each news category. The distributions
appear to be right-skewed, but given the sufficient number of observations, according to
the Central Limit Theorem, the sample means should come from the normal distribution.
As mentioned earlier, to ensure normality of the distribution of the means, we discard
samples with fewer than 30 observations. As an additional check, for the samples with
fewer than 100 observations, we also conduct non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
to check whether sample median CARs are different from zero. In our tests of whether
abnormal returns are different in the before- and in-crisis periods, we also employ the
two-sample rank-sum tests of whether the two subsamples have the same median when-
ever either subsample contains fewer than 100 observations (in addition to the parametric
tests). The outcomes of the nonparametric tests are mentioned in the text whenever they
are sufficiently different from the t-test-based results reported in the tables.
Average CARs for all news categories are plotted in Figure 3.2. The figure shows that
the news categories that lead to the most negative price reactions are Pre-Anouncement-
Negative, FDA Rejection, Customer Loss, Financial Results - Weak, and Product De-
fect. The news categories that result in the most positive immediate returns are Pre-
Annuoncement - Positive, Share Buyback, FDA Approval, Spinoff, and Pharmaceutical
Approval - EU. Table 3.3 presents results of the formal test for whether the price reaction
following different categories of news announcements is different from zero. The table re-
ports the average CAR and the p-value of the two-sided t-test of the mean being different
from zero. The results confirm previously reported regularities, especially when it comes
to financial news, which have been extensively studied in prior literature.
15 Henceforth, for convenience we will refer to the average daily abnormal return as the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) despite the fact that it is in fact averaged over the seven days (from t − 1
to t+ 5).
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Table 3.3: Test Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Category Subcategory CAR p-value
1. Awards Company Award 0.045% 0.000
Product Award 0.027% 0.282
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 0.024% 0.901
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 0.060% 0.419
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 0.167% 0.382
Infrastructure - Downsizing 0.309% 0.008
Infrastructure - Expansion 0.016% 0.310
Profitability - Declining -0.051% 0.762
Profitability - Improving 0.113% 0.006
3. Customers & Customer Loss -0.628% 0.002
Partners Customer Win 0.114% 0.000
New Partnership 0.096% 0.000
Reaching a Milestone 0.201% 0.000
4. Financial Dividend 0.073% 0.000
Financial Results - Strong 0.193% 0.000
Financial Results - Weak -0.617% 0.000
Pre-Announcement - Negative -1.697% 0.000
Pre-Announcement - Positive 0.776% 0.000
Restatement -0.275% 0.065
Secondary Offering: Debt -0.176% 0.000
Secondary Offering: Equity -0.083% 0.013
Share Buyback 0.425% 0.000
Stock Split - Forward 0.291% 0.001
Stock Split - Reverse -0.181% 0.407
5. Legal Class Action -0.070% 0.260
Legal Problems -0.263% 0.042
SEC Investigation 0.263% 0.233
Settlement 0.238% 0.000
6. M&A Acquisition 0.121% 0.000
IPO 0.160% 0.107
Merger 0.124% 0.073
Spinoff 0.385% 0.000
7. Management Addition 0.051% 0.000
Compensation 0.188% 0.497
Promotion 0.005% 0.789
Reorganization 0.033% 0.615
Retirement -0.031% 0.460
Termination -0.209% 0.000
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 0.000% 1.000
Events Industry Events 0.029% 0.000
Investor Meeting 0.073% 0.041
9. Products & FDA Approval 0.419% 0.000
Services FDA Investigation -0.025% 0.828
FDA Rejection -1.482% 0.005
New Product 0.031% 0.000
Patent Award 0.225% 0.002
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 0.322% 0.102
Product Approval 0.075% 0.033
Product Defect -0.563% 0.000
Research Failure -0.068% 0.628
Research Success 0.272% 0.000
Updates & Upgrades 0.024% 0.250
This table presents the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative
abnormal return is equal to zero. For each subcategory, the table shows the sample mean
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and the p-value of the t-test.
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Figure 3.1: Boxplot of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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Dividend 
New Partnership
Customer Win
Customer Loss
Profitability − Improving
Profitability − Declining
Reaching a Milestone
Infrastructure − Expansion
Infrastructure − Downsizing
Exchange Noncompliance
Credit News − Pos.
Credit News − Neg.
Product Award
Company Award
For each news category, cumulative abnormal returns associated with each press release, computed
relative to the market model, are plotted as circles. Circles with black dots in the middle represent the
sample means.
3.3.1.2.1 Financial News Under the assumption of informational asymmetries be-
tween managers and investors, managerial financial decisions can be viewed as signals of
managers’ private information—i.e., whether the firm is under- or over-valued, or, relat-
edly, whether its future earnings will be high or low, and whether its projects are good
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Figure 3.2: Means of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns
The figure plots the means of cumulative abnormal returns, computed relative to the market model, for
each news category.
or bad.16 In another strand of literature, Jensen (1993) argues that managers are likely
16 See, for example, the models of Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984), and Miller and Rock (1985),
as well as discussions in chapters 13-17 of Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006).
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to waste cash and therefore, decisions to pay out the excess cash should be treated as a
good sign; he calls the managerial tendency to waste cash the “free-cash-flow problem.”
Dividends signal both the availability of cash and the willingness to pay this cash
out instead of wasting it; as a result, dividend announcements (and especially, dividend
initiations or increases) are typically accompanied by positive returns (e.g., Asquith and
Mullins (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), and Yoon and Starks (1995)). In our sample,
we do not distinguish whether the announced dividends constitute an increase or a mere
upcoming payment, but confirm that the market reaction to dividend announcements is
significantly positive, with an average CAR equal to 0.073% and significant at the 1%
level.17
Share repurchases are another way to distribute excess cash back to investors, and
announcements of share repurchases are typically accompanied by positive market reac-
tions (e.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990)). In our
sample, the average CAR associated with share repurchase announcements is 0.425% and
significant at the 1% level.
Likewise, secondary equity offerings (SEO) signal that the stock might be overpriced
or that the firm is running out of cash, and equity prices were shown to fall upon SEO
announcements (e.g., Smith (1986) and Corwin (2003)). In our sample, the average CAR
around SEO announcements is -0.083% and significant at the 5% level.
The issuance of debt might also be interpreted as a signal that the firm is overvalued
and/or short of cash. However, the evidence on whether stock prices fall upon announce-
ments of debt issuances is mixed. Smith (1986) documents a negative price reaction
associated with announcements of convertible bond issuances but finds no price reac-
tion associated with announcements of straight debt issuances (the latter result is also
confirmed by Shyam-Sunder (1991)). However, Akhigbe, Easterwood, and Pettit (1997),
show that prices react negatively to announcements of new straight debt issuances when
they are motivated by the need to raise funds due to an unexpected cash shortfall.18 We
do not separate announced debt issuances into straight and convertible debt, but nonethe-
less find a significantly negative price reaction: The average CAR is equal to -0.176% and
17 Since the reported CAR numbers represent the average excess return earned per day, this number
should be multiplied by seven to obtain the cumulative excess return earned over the seven-day
period around the announcement.
18 Although the authors do not study separately price reactions to straight and convertible debt is-
suances, most observations in their sample, or 90% of the 399 total announcements studied in the
paper, are for straight debt.
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significant at the 1% level.
Press releases announcing forward stock splits were previously shown to be accompa-
nied by positive price reactions, consistent with signaling models (e.g., Ikenberry, Rankine,
and Stice (1996); see also Yildizhan (2009) for a literature survey). Our results are con-
sistent with the previous findings: The average CAR is equal to 0.291% and significant
at the 1% level.
Negative news about corporate performance (such as lower-than-expected earnings
and profits) result in negative price reactions. Disappointing financial results, reported
within the subcategory Financial Results - Weak, lead to significantly negative CARs,
while strong financial results, reported within the subcategory Financial Results - Strong,
lead to significantly positive CARs (these findings are consistent with the previously doc-
umented results that prices react strongly to positive and negative earnings surprises; e.g.,
Ball and Kothari (1991), Stice (1991), Kothari (2001), and Vega (2006)). Often, finan-
cial results (especially weak ones) are pre-announced, and, not surprisingly, the market
reaction to positive and negative earnings pre-announcements is larger in magnitude than
the reaction to scheduled earnings announcements. Indeed, the average CAR associated
with a positive pre-announcement is 0.776% and thus higher than the abnormal return
of 0.193% in reaction to a positive scheduled announcement; the average CAR associated
with a negative pre-announcement is the lowest in our sample and equal to -1.697%, while
the average CAR associated with a scheduled announcement of weak financial results is
equal to -0.617% and thus less negative (all numbers are significant at the 1% level).
Finally, restatements, which are usually caused by either genuine accounting errors
or deliberate earnings manipulation, are usually accompanied by negative price reactions,
unless the accounting errors are to the firms’ disadvantage (e.g., Callen, Livnat, and Segal
(2006)). In our sample, the average CAR associated with restatements is equal to -0.275%
and significant at the 10% level.
3.3.1.2.2 Other News Categories Among the less-frequently analyzed news cate-
gories, we show that news that potentially signal higher and more stable future cash flows,
such as announcements about product and drug approvals, new products, new patents,
successful research outcomes, the acquisition of new customers and partners, as well as
press releases describing improvements in firm performance, are accompanied by positive
price reactions.
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Previous research (e.g., Bloom and Reenen (2002)) has documented that new patents
lead to improved performance and higher market valuations. Furthermore, Austin (1993)
showed that patent announcements are generally associated with positive abnormal re-
turns, though a large variation in returns exists depending on the type of the patent (i.e.,
whether the patent is of a “broad” or a “narrow” scope, whether or not it is for a “key”
product that is more likely to be produced or not, and so on). We do not separate patents
into different patents categories, but show that, on average, the market reacts positively
to patent award announcements; the average CAR is equal to 0.225% and significant at
the 1% level. Likewise, the reaction to announcements about the successful completion
of research projects leads to a market reaction of similar magnitude—the average CAR is
equal to 0.272% and also significant at the 1% level.
The positive market reaction to announcements of a joint partnership that we observe
has been also documented by McConnell and Nantell (1985) using a sample of 210 firms
involved in 136 joint ventures and by Woolridge and Snow (1990) using 197 joint venture
announcements. Our documented reactions to new product announcements are also con-
sistent with Woolridge and Snow (1990), who show this effect using a sample of 241 such
announcements.
Not surprisingly, news categories signaling lower future cash flows (e.g., Customer Loss,
FDA Rejection, and Product Defect) are accompanied by significantly negative price re-
actions (consistent with earlier literature; e.g., Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Barber and
Darrough (1996), Alexander (1999), and Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson III, and Krishnan
(2006)).19 Since both of the subcategories Customer Loss and FDA Rejection have fewer
than 100 observations, we have also applied the nonparametric rank-sum test to both
samples to check whether the median CARs are different from zero. The respective p-
values are 0.000 and 0.002 indicating that the market reaction for the median firm is also
significantly negative for both news categories.
The reaction to spinoff announcements can be expected to be positive, as spinoffs
signal that corporations refocus the attention on their core business (e.g., Cusatis, Miles,
and Woolridge (1993), Desai and Jain (1999), and Chemmanur and Yan (2004), among
others). Yet, examining 78 voluntary corporate spinoffs that were completed between
1972 and 1987, Seward and Walsh (1996) do not find that spinoff announcements are ac-
companied by positive abnormal returns. However, in our more comprehensive and more
recent dataset, we document a significant positive reaction to spinoff announcements: The
19 Interestingly, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) find that for product recalls, the penalty in terms of
negative stock returns even exceeds the direct costs associated with the recall.
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average CAR is equal to 0.385% and significant at the 1% level.
When it comes to mergers and acquisitions, merged firms have been shown to be worth
more together than apart due to synergies and economies of scale. The average CAR as-
sociated with merger announcements is indeed significantly positive in our sample (it is
equal to 0.124% and significant at the 10% level). As for acquisitions, it has been shown
that targets capture most of the value gains, and the price of acquirers, on average, de-
clines; this decline is most pronounced for stock mergers and for large acquirers (Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)). We have not
subdivided the Acquisition category into cash- and stock-financed acquisitions. Targets
are not prevalent in our dataset, perhaps because they are most often private firms. We
have, therefore, kept only the acquisition announcements made by acquirers. The results
show that the average CAR earned by acquirers in our sample is equal to 0.121%, signifi-
cant at the 1% level. The nonparametric p-value is close to the one reported in the table
and equal to 0.037.
Turning to corporate investment decisions, a study by Woolridge and Snow (1990)
shows that the market tends to react positively to corporate investment announcements.
We, however, document no significant reaction to such announcements (Infrastructure -
Expansion). However, we do find that the market reacts positively to corporate decisions
to shut down unprofitable operations (Infrastructure - Downsizing), consistent with the
free-cash-flow concern of Jensen (1993). The average CAR associated with announce-
ments in this category is equal to 0.309% and significant at the 1% level. When the
non-parametric rank-sum test is used, the significance level drops to 5% (and the p-value
is now equal to 0.015).
Announcements of negative legal issues, such as stockholder or patent infringement
lawsuits lead to negative price reactions and announcements of legal settlements to positive
price reactions, confirming the earlier findings of Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1994), Biz-
jak and Coles (1995), Romano and Bhagat (2001), Griffin, Grundfest, and Perino (2004),
and Raghu, Woo, Mohan, and Rao (2008), among others. Interestingly, announcements
of class action lawsuits lead to negative but insignificant price reactions.
As for announcements of changes in the management team, management additions
are interpreted as good news, and management terminations (voluntary and involuntary
combined), as bad news. These findings contribute to previous literature on stock price
reactions following managerial turnover, such as Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Weisbach
(1988), Bonnier and Bruner (1989), and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001).
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Finally, consistent with the Merton (1987) hypothesis that attention increases the in-
vestor base and decreases the cost of capital, the types of news that put firms in the
limelight, even when they, arguably, provide no new information to the market, such
as announcements in the categories Company Awards, Reaching a Milestone, Industry
Events, and Investor Meetings, all lead to significantly positive CARs. This point is not
lost on newswire services, which compete on the size of their press release distribution
network.
3.3.1.2.3 Longer Event Windows Figure 3.3 plots cumulative abnormal returns,
calculated over the period from 21 trading days before to 21 days after the news an-
nouncement (t−21, t+21), which is approximately equal to a calendar month before and
after the announcement. The objective is to trace a possible pre-announcement reaction
due to information leakage, as well as patterns of future return drifts or reversals. The
plot shows that most press releases convey relevant information affecting firm valuations,
as cumulative return plots start to fan out on the announcement day (t = 0). Moreover,
most of the price reactions appear to be permanent as prices typically do not revert back
for up to one month after the announcement. The reaction to bad news is typically larger
in magnitude than the reaction to good news. Moreover, it appears that the reaction
to bad news has a higher tendency to start before the actual announcement date, likely
because of pre-announcement rumors. The lowest blue line in the plot corresponds to the
announcement in the category FDA Rejection. The line indicates that stocks, on aver-
age, start to experience negative abnormal returns before the announcement day, and the
negative reaction continues beyond day 5 after the announcement, the day on which our
previous event window stops. The total abnormal return for FDA Rejection is estimated
to be -10.4% during our event window, but when calculated over the longer window (t−21,
t + 21), it is equal to roughly -15%. The next-lowest line, which is yellow, corresponds
to the category Pre-Anouncements - Negative, and the third-lowest, which is red, to the
category Legal - Class Action.20 The most positive line, which is also red, corresponds
to the category Pre-Announcement - Positive, the light-pink line below it, to FDA Ap-
proval, the purple line, to Stock Split - Forward, and the dark-pink line below it, to Spinoff.
Individual cumulative abnormal return plots for the eight most negative CAR cate-
gories of Table 3.3 are presented in Figure 3.4, arranged in increasing order of the CARs.
In these figures, the cumulative abnormal returns are also plotted over the longer window
(t − 21, t + 21). (Note that some of the plots are more volatile because they are based
on fewer event observations.) The reaction to Pre-Anouncement - Positive is very quick,
20 Notice that the average CAR associated with this category calculated over the window (t-1, t+5) is
not significantly negative—the majority of the market reaction occurs before the official announce-
ment.
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prices seem to incorporate all new information on the day of the announcement. As for
the category Share Buyback, the news announcement is preceded by negative returns,
lending support to the explanation that firms tend to buy their equity when it becomes
undervalued, thus sending a positive signal to the market. This graph is consistent with
previously documented evidence (e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) and Comment
and Jarrell (1991)). The positive price reaction does not stop within our event window
and continues until the end of the following month. For the FDA Approval category,
prices start to go up even before the official announcement and adjust very quickly when
the official announcement is made. In case of Spinoff announcements, there is small drift
before and after the press release day. When it comes to Pharmaceutical Approval EU
announcements, about half of the positive return in response to the announcement is
later reversed. The reaction to Infrastructure - Downsizing is positive but slow: the total
CAR calculated over the period (t − 21, t + 21) is equal to almost 3%, while the CAR
over our previously used shorter estimation window of (t − 1, t + 5) is only 1.9%. Stock
Split - Forward, not surprisingly, follows a period of positive returns and is accompanied
by a significantly positive return upon the announcement. However, the return reversal
over the following month more than erases the announcement return. Finally, Research
Success announcements tend to be preceded by a positive return drift, and none of the
announcement-day price gains are reversed in the following month.
Figure 3.5 plots cumulative abnormal returns calculated over the window (t−21, t+21)
for the eight news categories with the most negative price reactions in Table 3.3. The
figure shows that Pre-Anouncement - Negative is typically preceded by a negative return
drift. As mentioned earlier, FDA Rejection announcements are preceded and also followed
by a negative drift. News in the category Customer Loss are preceded by positive returns,
although this plot, based on only 67 observations, may not be very representative. The
negative news of Financial Results - Weak and Product Defect take several days to be
fully incorporated into prices, and the negative price reaction is partially reversed later
in the month. The negative reaction to Restatement announcements is also somewhat
reversed. As for announcements of Legal Problems, the negative drift lasts until day 6,
and over half of the negative price reaction is later reversed. Finally, news of Management
→ Termination are preceded by negative abnormal returns, and also about half of the
negative abnormal returns in response to the announcement is later reversed.
3.3.2 News’ Impact on the Informational Environment
In addition to having an impact on stock prices, corporate press releases may affect the
stocks’ informational environment. The literature on firm disclosure has traditionally
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Figure 3.4: Plots of the Cumulative Abnormal Return for Positive News Categories
Pre-Announcement - Positive
FDA Approval
Pharm. Approval EU
Stock Split - Forward
Share Buyback
Spinoff
Infrastructure - Downsizing
Research Success
For the categories with the most positive CARs, the figure plots the cumulative abnormal return over
the period from 21 days before to 21 after the press release date. Abnormal returns are computed as
the residuals of the market model.
assumed that corporate news announcements should reduce the level of informational
asymmetry.21 However, when the new information is difficult to interpret, investors’ val-
21 However, Harris and Raviv (1993) show that when agents use different valuation models and interpret
new information differently, information arrivals will lead to an increased investor disagreement
regarding the firm valuation.
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Figure 3.5: Plots of the Cumulative Abnormal Return for Negative News Categories
Pre-Announcement - Negative
Customer Loss
Product Defect
Legal Problems
FDA Rejection
Financial Results - Weak
Restatement
Termination
For the categories with the most negative CARs, the figure plots the cumulative abnormal return over
the period from 21 days before to 21 days after the press release date. Abnormal returns are computed
as the residuals of the market model.
uation priors will be weakened, and the informational environment will become more
uncertain. As a result, the stock price sensitivity to new information will rise, resulting
in increased idiosyncratic volatility levels. At the same time, the potential informational
advantage of firm insiders will become more valuable, and liquidity will decrease.
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Idiosyncratic volatility measures how much prices respond to firm-specific news.22 If
the valuation priors are weakened as a result of a news announcement, the appetite for new
information and for follow-up announcements will increase; prices will react strongly to
this new information, as a greater degree of updating on the news is taking place. There-
fore, news releases that increase valuation uncertainty will lead to volatility increases and
news releases that decrease valuation uncertainty to volatility decreases.
Liquidity measures how much a unit of trade moves prices. Everything else equal, when
traders are perceived to possess little private information about the firm value, prices will
not respond strongly and permanently to trades, but trades would have rather a transi-
tory impact on prices. When concerns about informational asymmetries are high, prices
will move more in the direction of the trade and stock liquidity will be lower. We employ
the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, which can be calculated from daily return and
volume data, and produces a good approximation for the level of stocks’ illiquidity. If
a news announcement is difficult to interpret, concerns might arise that some investors,
perhaps the firm insiders, are better adept at processing this information, and, as a con-
sequence, the stock’s liquidity will decrease. If, on the other hand, the new information
release removes the informational advantage of the better-informed traders, then liquidity
should increase. We measure idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity in the 10-day windows
before and after news announcements (skipping the three days around the announcement
(t − 1, t + 1) and then check whether these measures increase or decrease as a result of
the news release.
3.3.2.1 Changes in Volatility
For each corporate press release, we calculate the ratio of the idiosyncratic volatility
after the announcement to the idiosyncratic volatility before the announcement and test
the null hypothesis that the average ratio (across firms) is equal to one using a t-test,
with standard errors, as before, clustered by the week of the announcement to adjust for
possible cross-sectional correlations in idiosyncratic volatility changes. We again check
our results with nonparametric tests whenever the number of observations in a sample
is lower than 100. Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the
residuals of the market model (equation (3.2)), estimated over 200 days prior to the start
of the estimation window for idiosyncratic volatility. The null hypothesis is stated as:
22 Throughout the paper, we will use the terms “volatility” and “idiosyncratic volatility’ interchange-
ably but will always mean the latter.
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H0 : Volapost − Volapre = 0, or equivalently,
Volapost/Volapre = 1,
where Volapost and Volapre are the post- and pre-anouncement idiosyncratic volatility mea-
sures, respectively.
Only few prior studies have investigated changes in idiosyncratic volatility following
firm events, which is somewhat surprising since the consequences of event-induced volatil-
ity should be a matter of concern for several reasons. Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg
(2005), pages 1779-1780, write:
“...increased volatility could alter the firm’s investment policy going forward
via an increased cost of capital or by a reduction in the attractiveness of the
firm’s equity as a medium for acquisitions or compensation. Increased volatil-
ity also could affect the various agency relationships in the firm, exacerbating
conflicts between stockholders and bondholders and hindering resolution of
stockholder-management problems...”
Among the few studies that have investigated this question, Kliger and Sarig (2000)
find that when Moody’s announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings, the volatilities
implied by prices of options on high-rated issuers’ shares decline (rise). Clayton, Hartzell,
and Rosenberg (2005) find that CEO departures, especially the forced ones, which in the
authors’ view create “higher uncertainty over the firm’s strategic direction and manage-
ment’s ability to run the firm” (page 2), lead to significant increases in stock volatility.
Besides, event-induced changes in volatility are found for announcements of stock splits
by Ohlson and Penman (1985), Dubofsky (1991), and Koski (1998).
Table 3.4 presents the mean ratios of post- to pre-event volatilities for each news cat-
egory. The p-values for the null hypothesis that the mean ratio is equal to one are listed
in the rightmost column. It can be seen that idiosyncratic volatility increases following
all types of news announcements, however, the percentage volatility increases are the
largest for negative financial pre-announcements (76.6%), SEC investigation announce-
ments (61.6%), press releases describing management compensation issues (53.2%), as
well as announcements of reverse stock splits (51.7%) and FDA rejections (51.4%). These
types of news appear to significantly weaken investors’ valuation priors and, therefore,
lead to higher price sensitivity to new information.23
23 We have checked that the non-parametric rank-sum tests for changes in volatility produce qualita-
tively similar results for the news categories with fewer than 100 observations.
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Table 3.4: Test Results for a Change in Volatility
Category Subcategory Variance Ratio p-value
1. Awards Company Award 1.220 0.000
Product Award 1.246 0.000
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 1.262 0.000
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 1.165 0.000
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 1.182 0.000
Infrastructure - Downsizing 1.267 0.027
Infrastructure - Expansion 1.201 0.000
Profitability - Declining 1.298 0.000
Profitability - Improving 1.208 0.000
3. Customers & Customer Loss 1.188 0.079
Partners Customer Win 1.223 0.000
New Partnership 1.229 0.000
Reaching a Milestone 1.200 0.000
4. Financial Dividend 1.244 0.000
Financial Results - Strong 1.413 0.000
Financial Results - Weak 1.391 0.000
Pre-Announcement - Negative 1.766 0.000
Pre-Announcement - Positive 1.379 0.000
Restatement 1.418 0.000
Secondary Offering: Debt 1.114 0.000
Secondary Offering: Equity 1.108 0.000
Share Buyback 1.178 0.000
Stock Split - Forward 1.294 0.000
Stock Split - Reverse 1.517 0.000
5. Legal Class Action 1.090 0.006
Legal Problems 1.204 0.000
SEC Investigation 1.616 0.000
Settlement 1.241 0.000
6. M&A Acquisition 1.236 0.000
IPO 1.229 0.009
Merger 1.275 0.000
Spinoff 1.253 0.000
7. Management Addition 1.229 0.000
Compensation 1.532 0.037
Promotion 1.227 0.000
Reorganization 1.218 0.000
Retirement 1.208 0.000
Termination 1.274 0.000
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 1.218 0.000
Events Industry Events 1.196 0.000
Investor Meeting 1.206 0.000
9. Products & FDA Approval 1.281 0.000
Services FDA Investigation 1.313 0.000
FDA Rejection 1.514 0.002
New Product 1.218 0.000
Patent Award 1.226 0.000
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 1.185 0.000
Product Approval 1.209 0.000
Product Defect 1.264 0.000
Research Failure 1.067 0.159
Research Success 1.316 0.000
Updates & Upgrades 1.226 0.000
This table presents the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the return volatilities
before and after a press release are equal. Specifically, the ratio of post- to pre-announcement
idiosyncratic volatility is tested for being different from one. For each subcategory, the table
shows the sample mean of the ratio and the p-value of the t-test.
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3.3.2.2 Change in Liquidity
We use the Amihud (2002) measure of a stock’s illiquidity, defined as the ratio of the
absolute daily stock return to its dollar trading volume.24 The ratio reflects the absolute
daily price response per dollar of trading volume and is computed as:
Illiqi,t =
|Ri,t|
Volumei,t
, (3.4)
where Ri,t is the return and Volumei,t is the dollar trading volume for stock i on day t.
In order to test for changes in (il-)liquidity across firms, we employ a similar proce-
dure to the one we used to test for changes in idiosyncratic volatility. In particular, we
calculate the ratio of a stock’s average illiquidity measure, computed over 10 days after
the announcement to the average illiquidity measure computed over 10 days before the
announcement (as before, skipping the three days surrounding the announcement day).
We then average this ratio across events and cluster the standard errors by the week of
the announcement to adjust for possible cross-correlations in the ratios computed in over-
lapping event windows. We test the null hypothesis that the post- and pre-event liquidity
levels are equal using a standard t-test. The null hypothesis is formalized as follows:
H0 : Illiqpost − Illiqpre = 0, or equivalently,
Illiqpost/Illiqpre = 1,
where Illiqpre and Illiqpost denote Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures before and after a
news announcement, respectively.
Most of the prior studies on liquidity changes around corporate events have focused
on the impact of announcements of share repurchases (e.g., Singh, Zaman, and Krishna-
murti (1994) and Ginglinger and Hamon (2007)), secondary equity offerings (e.g., Kothare
(1997)), and index additions and deletions (e.g., Hegde and McDermott (2006)). Our re-
sults, reported in Table 3.5, are consistent with these studies. They show that stocks
tend to become significantly more illiquid following most types of news announcements.
The changes in liquidity are insignificant only for the announcements of strong financial
results, positive earnings pre-announcements, press releases on managerial compensation
and retirement, research failures, and various lawsuits. The announcements that lead to
the largest decreases in liquidity are about investor meetings, reverse stock splits, negative
earnings pre-announcements, FDA rejections, SEC investigations, and earnings restate-
24 We chose this particular measure due to its simplicity, the minimal data requirements, and the
previously-documented accuracy in measuring illiquidity when compared to the measures obtained
from high-frequency trade-by-trade data.
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ments. Not surprisingly, there is a considerable overlap with the news categories that
result in the largest idiosyncratic volatility increases. The news that significantly raise
the levels of informational uncertainty also considerably increase the benefits of private
information.
3.3.3 The Impact of the Financial Crisis
The recent financial crisis has been called the worst crisis since the Great Depression. It
originated in the collapse of the housing bubble. The after-effects of the bubble’s collapse
and scope of its impact on the rest of the economy emerged only gradually. In the pe-
riod from 2006 to 2007, the effect of the collapsing bubble was felt by home construction
and real estate lending companies, many of which reported significant losses and filed for
bankruptcy. Over time, hedge funds and investment banks with exposure to mortgage-
backed securities began reporting investment losses as well. We argue that the crisis
turned global—affecting all sectors of the U.S. economy, as well as foreign markets—after
the first investment bank, Bear Stearns, fell and had to be sold in a fire-sale to JP Mor-
gan Chase on March 16, 2008, in order to avoid filing for bankruptcy. This major bank
failure immediately raised the profile of the crisis, amid concerns about contagion, to an
economy-wide phenomenon. Eventually, shortages of credit that used to be supplied by
hedge funds and investment banks affected all sectors of the economy. It is possible to
argue that the crisis really started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which did not
happen until September 17, 2008. One could also make a convincing case that the crisis
started earlier, when major mortgage lending companies had failed. While it is impossi-
ble to pinpoint the precise start date of the crisis, choosing any date between the third
quarter of 2007 when the effects of the collapsing real estate market started to be widely
felt and the fall of Lehman Brothers will likely not significantly change the outcome of
our analysis. Here, we assume that the market became aware that the U.S. economy
had entered the crisis period on Monday, March 17, 2008, the first trading day after the
fire-sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan was finalized.
The financial crisis was characterized by a shortage of credit, falling consumer demand,
and widespread legal scandals. In this environment, it is natural to expect that certain
types of corporate news would be perceived differently by the market. For example, news
about plans to raise additional capital would be viewed less negatively because it was be-
lieved that additional capital was truly needed due to (1) the freezing of the credit markets
and (2) the perception that equity was likely underpriced rather than overpriced. Any
good news about future cash flows would be perceived much more positively. Likewise,
negative news about future cash flows might be perceived significantly more negatively
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Table 3.5: Test Results for a Change in the Amihud Illiquidity Measure
Category Subcategory Amihud Ratio p-value
1. Awards Company Award 1.144 0.000
Product Award 1.151 0.000
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 1.206 0.001
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 1.114 0.000
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 1.120 0.000
Infrastructure - Downsizing 1.197 0.018
Infrastructure - Expansion 1.138 0.000
Profitability - Declining 1.217 0.000
Profitability - Improving 1.161 0.000
3. Customers & Customer Loss 1.128 0.200
Partners Customer Win 1.162 0.000
New Partnership 1.177 0.000
Reaching a Milestone 1.145 0.000
4. Financial Dividend 1.164 0.000
Financial Results - Strong 1.093 0.606
Financial Results - Weak 1.202 0.000
Pre-Announcement - Negative 1.459 0.000
Pre-Announcement - Positive 1.043 0.892
Restatement 1.309 0.000
Secondary Offering: Debt 1.064 0.000
Secondary Offering: Equity 1.083 0.000
Share Buyback 1.165 0.000
Stock Split - Forward 1.176 0.054
Stock Split - Reverse 1.696 0.000
5. Legal Class Action 1.030 0.314
Legal Problems 1.075 0.386
SEC Investigation 1.387 0.000
Settlement 1.193 0.000
6. M&A Acquisition 1.157 0.000
IPO 1.261 0.007
Merger 1.225 0.000
Spinoff 1.187 0.000
7. Management Addition 1.160 0.000
Compensation 1.095 0.368
Promotion 1.179 0.000
Reorganization 1.176 0.000
Retirement 0.158 0.414
Termination 1.171 0.000
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 1.148 0.000
Events Industry Events 1.169 0.000
Investor Meeting 2.106 0.080
9. Products & FDA Approval 1.180 0.000
Services FDA Investigation 1.214 0.000
FDA Rejection 1.393 0.007
New Product 1.147 0.000
Patent Award 1.160 0.000
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 1.164 0.034
Product Approval 1.151 0.000
Product Defect 1.166 0.001
Research Failure 1.035 0.357
Research Success 1.232 0.000
Updates & Upgrades 1.109 0.035
This table presents the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the Amihud illiquidity
measures before and after a press release are equal. Specifically, the ratio of post- to pre-
announcement Amihud illiquidity measure is tested for being different from one. For each
subcategory, the table shows the sample mean of the ratio and the p-value of the t-test.
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due to potential bankruptcy concerns. Moreover, the crisis period was associated with
a highly uncertain informational environment. Therefore, investor priors on firm values
were likely already very diffuse. Hence, it is not clear whether news announcements during
the crisis period generally resulted in higher or lower changes in liquidity and idiosyncratic
volatility than during the pre-crisis period. In the following, we formally check whether
the market response to corporate news has significantly changed during the financial crisis
period.
Before turning to the test results, it is informative to establish to what extent the con-
tent of corporate press releases changed during the period of the financial crisis compared
to the pre-crisis period. Table 3.6 provides the numbers of observations for each news
category and the frequencies of their occurrence in the dataset for the two subperiods.25
We observe some interesting changes in the distribution of corporate announcements. Not
surprisingly, the frequency of announcements in the categories Financial Results - Weak
and Profitability - Declining doubled; the frequency of forward stock splits declined by
almost three-quarters, and the frequency of reverse stock splits more than doubled.26 IPO
activity significantly declined. During the crisis period, firms were more likely to raise
funds through debt rather than equity issuances. Finally, the frequency of news announc-
ing the launch of new products decreased by more than three percentage points, which is
the largest percentage decrease across news categories.
3.3.3.1 Test Results for Changes in CARs
Figure 3.6 provides a graphical illustration of the differences in the impact of news an-
nouncements on stock returns. For each subcategory, the figure plots the mean CAR
for the periods before the crisis (indicated by the dark bars) and after the start of the
crisis (indicated by the light bars). A quick look at the figure confirms that the market
reaction to news became, generally, more extreme during the crisis period. Additionally,
the plots of CAR variances in Figure 3.7 show that, with very few exceptions, the stan-
dard deviations of CARs in each subcategory increased during the crisis period relative
to the pre-crisis period, indicating that the market became more discriminating in inter-
preting news and that market participants were paying more attention to the content and
the circumstances of each specific announcement rather than relying on the rule-of-thumb.
25 Since the time period before the crisis is longer than that after the start of the crisis, it contains
more observations of press releases.
26 Reverse stock splits likely became more prevalent due to the need to comply with the minimum-price
requirements imposed by stock exchanges.
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Table 3.6: Frequency of Corporate Press Releases: Before and During the Crisis
Before Crisis During Crisis
Category Subcategory Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
1. Awards Company Award 6,222 3.724% 4,681 4.467%
Product Award 1,842 1.103% 829 0.791%
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 126 0.075% 26 0.025%
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 695 0.416% 281 0.268%
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 156 0.093% 323 0.308%
Infrastructure - Downsizing 47 0.028% 7 0.007%
Infrastructure - Expansion 4,711 2.820% 1,929 1.841%
Profitability - Declining 126 0.075% 157 0.150%
Profitability - Improving 906 0.542% 549 0.524%
3. Customers & Customer Loss 54 0.032% 13 0.012%
Partners Customer Win 16,805 10.059% 11,149 10.638%
New Partnership 16,557 9.910% 9,041 8.627%
Reaching a Milestone 685 0.410% 248 0.237%
4. Financial Dividend 12,283 7.352% 12,293 11.730%
Financial Results - Strong 9,994 5.982% 5,358 5.113%
Financial Results - Weak 191 0.114% 312 0.298%
Pre-Announcement - Negative 196 0.117% 205 0.196%
Pre-Announcement - Positive 438 0.262% 251 0.240%
Restatement 289 0.173% 76 0.073%
Secondary Offering: Debt 2,076 1.243% 1,678 1.601%
Secondary Offering: Equity 2,403 1.438% 1,690 1.613%
Share Buyback 2,446 1.464% 1,388 1.324%
Stock Split - Forward 269 0.161% 42 0.040%
Stock Split - Reverse 71 0.042% 105 0.100%
5. Legal Class Action 563 0.337% 86 0.082%
Legal Problems 73 0.044% 83 0.079%
SEC Investigation 115 0.069% 53 0.051%
Settlement 1,307 0.782% 932 0.889%
6. M&A Acquisition 49 0.029% 28 0.027%
IPO 57 0.034% 2 0.002%
Merger 1,034 0.619% 751 0.717%
Spinoff 2,733 1.636% 1,559 1.488%
7. Management Addition 12,461 7.459% 8,099 7.728%
Compensation 52 0.031% 14 0.013%
Promotion 4,266 2.553% 2,351 2.243%
Reorganization 773 0.463% 295 0.281%
Retirement 765 0.458% 511 0.488%
Termination 1,149 0.688% 668 0.637%
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 2,560 1.532% 675 0.644%
Events Industry Events 25,409 15.209% 17,076 16.294%
Investor Meeting 2,118 1.268% 787 0.751%
9. Products & FDA Approval 1,169 0.700% 743 0.709%
Services FDA Investigation 429 0.257% 338 0.323%
FDA Rejection 34 0.020% 13 0.012%
New Product 24,672 14.768% 11,810 11.269%
Patent Award 674 0.403% 318 0.303%
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 193 0.116% 132 0.126%
Product Approval 1,051 0.629% 900 0.859%
Product Defect 114 0.068% 84 0.080%
Research Failure 79 0.047% 70 0.067%
Research Success 1,253 0.750% 850 0.811%
Updates & Upgrades 2,328 1.393% 2,940 2.805%
Total 167,068 100% 104,799 100%
For the periods before and during the crisis, this table presents the number of corporate press
releases in each category, as well as each category’s percentage share in the total number of corporate
press releases.
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Figure 3.6: Means of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns Before and During the Financial
Crisis
For each news category, the means of the cumulative abnormal returns are plotted for the period before
(dark bars) and during the crisis (light bars).
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Figure 3.7: Standard Deviations of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns Before and During
the Financial Crisis
For each news category, the standard deviations of the cumulative abnormal returns are plotted for the
period before (dark bars) and during the crisis (light bars).
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Turning to the actual test results for differences in the market reaction to corporate
press releases between the periods before and during the crisis, we first describe the differ-
ences in the stock price response to corporate announcements. For each subcategory, the
mean of the CARs and the p-value of the corresponding t-test for the average CAR being
equal to zero for the respective sample periods are provided in Table 3.7. Furthermore,
the last column of the table presents, for each subcategory, the result of the t-test for the
null hypothesis that the mean CARs for the periods before and during the crisis are equal.
For the sake of brevity, we focus the description of the results on the most conspicuous
and significant findings with respect to a change in the market reaction to news from the
pre-crisis period to the period after the start of the crisis.27
It can be seen from the table that during the crisis, cash-flow stabilizing or, poten-
tially, cash-flow increasing news, such as the launch of a new product, an FDA approval,
a legal settlement, a new customer or partner, and a report of strong financial results are
accompanied by more positive price reactions than before the crisis. Furthermore, the
market places a significantly higher value on the positive signal of share buybacks during
the crisis period, resulting in an increase in the mean CAR from 0.350% before the crisis
to 0.560% during the crisis. (This increase is significant at the 1% level.) At the same
time, the negative market reaction to issuances of new debt and new equity becomes sig-
nificantly less negative (and in the case of SEOs, indistinguishable from zero). It appears
that the market is less concerned about the possibility that firms are overvalued and more
sympathetic to the view that firms do need capital in light of the prevailing credit crunch.
Turning to news on management changes, we find that announcements of reorganization
are no longer perceived negatively but rather positively (the average CAR before the cri-
sis is -0.133% and during the crisis it is equal to 0.471%, with both means significantly
different from zero at the 1% level, and the difference between the two is significant at the
1% level). Additionally, the reaction to other management changes, such as additions,
promotions, and retirements, that are likely to bring change to how the firm operates, are
met with significantly more positive price reactions. Finally, investigating the category
Products & Services, the announcements of drug approvals in the U.S. and Europe, new
product launches and updates to existing products and services are met with significantly
more positive price reactions.
27 We have compared the results of our t-tests for the difference in means with the two-sample rank-
sum tests for categories for which the number of observations in at least one of the sub-periods
is below 100. The results are generally very close. For example, for the category Restatement, the
non-parametric p-value is equal to 0.500, for Stock Split - Forward, it is equal to 0.039, for Stock Split
- Reverse, 0.005, for Class Action, 0.629, for Legal Problems, 0.438, for SEC Investigation, 0.000, for
Product Defect, 0.384, and for Research Failure, 0.412.
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Table 3.7: Test Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Before and During the Crisis
Before Crisis During Crisis Diff.
Category Subcategory CAR p-value CAR p-value p-value
1. Awards Company Award 0.031% 0.010 0.063% 0.006 0.106
Product Award -0.001% 0.979 0.090% 0.122 0.074
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 0.239% 0.231 -1.031% - -
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 0.043% 0.442 0.102% 0.588 0.381
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 0.118% 0.641 0.190% 0.499 0.093
Infrastructure - Downsizing 0.347% 0.008 0.059% - -
Infrastructure - Expansion -0.005% 0.706 0.069% 0.077 0.037
Profitability - Declining -0.321% 0.042 0.166% 0.568 0.070
Profitability - Improving 0.100% 0.005 0.134% 0.126 0.358
3. Customers & Customer Loss -0.538% 0.002 -1.001% - -
Partners Customer Win 0.084% 0.000 0.160% 0.000 0.000
New Partnership 0.060% 0.000 0.162% 0.000 0.000
Reaching a Milestone 0.146% 0.001 0.353% 0.003 0.050
4. Financial Dividend 0.066% 0.000 0.080% 0.000 0.205
Financial Results - Strong 0.150% 0.000 0.274% 0.000 0.001
Financial Results - Weak -0.559% 0.002 -0.653% 0.001 0.358
Pre-Announcement - Negative -1.724% 0.000 -1.672% 0.000 0.435
Pre-Announcement - Positive 0.692% 0.000 0.922% 0.000 0.109
Restatement -0.273% 0.084 -0.279% 0.433 0.494
Secondary Offering: Debt -0.228% 0.000 -0.112% 0.068 0.050
Secondary Offering: Equity -0.162% 0.000 0.029% 0.673 0.005
Share Buyback 0.350% 0.000 0.560% 0.000 0.000
Stock Split - Forward 0.368% 0.000 -0.206% 0.565 0.057
Stock Split - Reverse -0.814% 0.010 0.250% 0.418 0.007
5. Legal Class Action -0.094% 0.177 0.085% 0.596 0.152
Legal Problems -0.198% 0.156 -0.320% 0.129 0.314
SEC Investigation 0.338% 0.146 0.102% 0.831 0.327
Settlement 0.145% 0.010 0.370% 0.000 0.007
6. M&A Acquisition 0.088% 0.000 0.190% 0.000 0.009
IPO 0.205% 0.035 -1.139% - -
Merger 0.098% 0.080 0.159% 0.270 0.346
Spinoff 0.166% 0.000 0.770% 0.000 0.000
7. Management Addition 0.010% 0.352 0.115% 0.000 0.000
Compensation 0.350% 0.126 -0.412% - -
Promotion -0.016% 0.325 0.044% 0.304 0.095
Reorganization -0.133% 0.007 0.471% 0.006 0.000
Retirement -0.092% 0.020 0.061% 0.480 0.053
Termination -0.228% 0.000 -0.176% 0.088 0.324
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event -0.016% 0.447 0.062% 0.309 0.112
Events Industry Events 0.007% 0.376 0.063% 0.000 0.000
Investor Meeting 0.056% 0.075 0.117% 0.174 0.255
9. Products & FDA Approval 0.274% 0.000 0.648% 0.002 0.045
Services FDA Investigation 0.036% 0.801 -0.103% 0.584 0.278
FDA Rejection -1.675% 0.015 -0.976% - -
New Product 0.012% 0.063 0.069% 0.000 0.000
Patent Award 0.217% 0.005 0.243% 0.103 0.439
Pharmaceutical Approval EU -0.032% 0.779 0.843% 0.061 0.029
Product Approval 0.077% 0.045 0.073% 0.249 0.480
Product Defect -0.450% 0.000 -0.714% 0.004 0.166
Research Failure -0.049% 0.668 -0.089% 0.745 0.446
Research Success 0.231% 0.002 0.332% 0.019 0.264
Updates & Upgrades -0.030% 0.186 0.067% 0.069 0.012
For the periods before and during the financial crisis, the table presents the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the
mean cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero in each of the subperiods. For each subcategory, the table shows the
sample mean cumulative abnormal return for the two subperiods, as well as the p-value of the t-tests of the null hypotheses.
The last column presents the results of the test of the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the
periods before and during the crisis are equal. Dashes indicate that at least one of the two groups (before or during) has
fewer than 30 observations.
105
3.3.3.2 Test Results for Changes in Volatility and Liquidity
This section describes the test results for differences in event-induced changes in stocks’
volatility and liquidity. For the periods before and during the crisis, Table 3.8 presents,
for each subcategory, the average ratio of post-to pre-event volatility. In addition, the ta-
ble includes p-values of the t-tests for event-induced changes in volatility for both periods
before and during the crisis, and the test results for the null hypothesis that these changes
are the same for both periods. Similarly, Table 3.9 presents the results for event-induced
changes in liquidity.28 In Table 3.8, volatility ratios greater than one in conjunction with
significant p-values for almost all news categories confirm that post-event volatility in-
creases are significant for both sub-periods. Comparing the magnitudes of increases in
idiosyncratic volatility, we find that during the crisis period, post-event volatility tends
to experience significantly larger increases, relative to the before-crisis period, for news
about changes in profitability and forward stock splits, FDA approvals and investigations,
announcements of success in research endeavors, as well as announcements of all types
of M&A activity. This implies that these types of news led to larger post-announcement
valuation uncertainty during the crisis period. Yet, some types of press releases are found
to create significantly smaller increases in volatility during the crisis period. Examples
are announcements of both positive and negative financial results, as well as news on SEC
investigations, and announcements of legal problems. Having become more prevalent at
the time of the crisis, these types of news likely have grown easier for the market to in-
terpret.
The results for event-induced changes in liquidity (Table 3.9) are similar to those for
changes in volatility. For both the pre-crisis period and the period after the start of the
crisis, corporate press releases, generally, lead to decreases in liquidity, and these decreases
tend to be significantly larger during the crisis period, indicating higher post-event in-
formational asymmetry in the second sub-period. Larger drops in post-announcement
volatility decreases for the in-crisis period stand out for FDA approvals, new product
announcements, updates and upgrades, successful research outcomes, merger announce-
ments, managerial promotions, expansion of the infrastructure, and many financial news
categories. As in the case of differential effects on post-event volatility, liquidity decreased
significantly less during the crisis, relative to the pre-crisis period, for announcements of
legal problems and weak financial results.
28 As before, we also conduct non-parametric tests of the differences in volatility and liquidity ratios
between the before- and the in-crisis periods for the news categories with fewer than 100 observations
in either period. The results are qualitatively similar.
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Table 3.8: Test Results for a Change in Volatility: Before and During the Crisis
Before Crisis During Crisis Diff.
Category Subcategory Vola Ratio p-value Vola Ratio p-value p-value
1. Awards Company Award 1.211 0.000 1.234 0.000 0.101
Product Award 1.247 0.000 1.244 0.000 0.465
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 1.217 0.001 1.523 - -
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 1.152 0.000 1.205 0.000 0.159
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 1.175 0.000 1.204 0.236 0.019
Infrastructure - Downsizing 1.269 0.042 1.242 - -
Infrastructure - Expansion 1.190 0.000 1.232 0.000 0.027
Profitability - Declining 1.207 0.001 1.385 0.000 0.050
Profitability - Improving 1.171 0.000 1.278 0.000 0.011
3. Customers & Customer Loss 1.219 0.099 1.036 - -
Partners Customer Win 1.225 0.000 1.219 0.000 0.257
New Partnership 1.228 0.000 1.233 0.000 0.313
Reaching a Milestone 1.199 0.000 1.205 0.000 0.446
4. Financial Dividend 1.253 0.000 1.233 0.000 0.041
Financial Results - Strong 1.481 0.000 1.267 0.000 0.000
Financial Results - Weak 1.503 0.000 1.305 0.000 0.015
Pre-Announcement - Negative 1.916 0.000 1.612 0.000 0.026
Pre-Announcement - Positive 1.412 0.000 1.313 0.000 0.091
Restatement 1.450 0.000 1.270 0.007 0.066
Secondary Offering: Debt 1.094 0.000 1.155 0.000 0.006
Secondary Offering: Equity 1.120 0.000 1.080 0.000 0.038
Share Buyback 1.166 0.000 1.202 0.000 0.083
Stock Split - Forward 1.248 0.000 1.605 0.006 0.047
Stock Split - Reverse 1.483 0.000 1.547 0.000 0.343
5. Legal Class Action 1.082 0.033 1.160 0.025 0.167
Legal Problems 1.283 0.003 1.087 0.137 0.036
SEC Investigation 1.657 0.002 1.492 0.009 0.275
Settlement 1.248 0.000 1.229 0.000 0.301
6. M&A Acquisition 1.229 0.000 1.252 0.000 0.083
IPO 1.220 0.013 1.442 - -
Merger 1.188 0.000 1.452 0.000 0.000
Spinoff 1.235 0.000 1.292 0.000 0.029
7. Management Addition 1.225 0.000 1.236 0.000 0.197
Compensation 1.673 0.050 1.009 - -
Promotion 1.220 0.000 1.240 0.000 0.169
Reorganization 1.210 0.000 1.243 0.000 0.278
Retirement 1.232 0.000 1.166 0.000 0.062
Termination 1.309 0.000 1.197 0.000 0.008
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 1.224 0.000 1.189 0.000 0.140
Events Industry Events 1.178 0.000 1.228 0.000 0.000
Investor Meeting 1.173 0.000 1.307 0.000 0.000
9. Products & FDA Approval 1.242 0.000 1.358 0.000 0.058
Services FDA Investigation 1.270 0.000 1.393 0.000 0.073
FDA Rejection 1.678 0.003 1.050 - -
New Product 1.215 0.000 1.227 0.000 0.106
Patent Award 1.217 0.000 1.251 0.000 0.266
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 1.193 0.001 1.170 0.017 0.402
Product Approval 1.195 0.000 1.229 0.000 0.176
Product Defect 1.269 0.001 1.256 0.013 0.461
Research Failure 1.058 0.367 1.079 0.268 0.410
Research Success 1.270 0.000 1.400 0.000 0.011
Updates & Upgrades 1.223 0.000 1.229 0.000 0.385
For the periods before and during the financial crisis, the table presents the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the
return volatilities before and after a press release are equal. Specifically, the ratio of post- to pre-announcement volatility
is tested for being different from one. For each subcategory, the table shows the sample mean of the ratio, as well as the
p-value of the t-test for the two subperiods. Furthermore, the table presents the test results of null hypothesis that the
volatility ratios for the periods before and during the crisis are equal. Dashes indicate that at least one of the two groups
(before and during) has fewer than 30 observations.
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Table 3.9: Test Results for a Change in the Amihud Illiquidity Measure: Before and
During the Crisis
Before Crisis During Crisis Diff.
Category Subcategory Amihud Ratio p-value Amihud Ratio p-value p-value
1. Awards Company Award 1.144 0.000 1.143 0.000 0.480
Product Award 1.159 0.000 1.132 0.000 0.200
2. Corporate Credit News - Negative 1.171 0.002 1.404 - -
Strategy & Credit News - Positive 1.118 0.000 1.102 0.044 0.385
Performance Exchange Noncompliance 1.109 0.000 1.156 0.020 0.247
Infrastructure - Downsizing 1.198 0.027 1.180 - -
Infrastructure - Expansion 1.120 0.000 1.190 0.000 0.003
Profitability - Declining 1.195 0.009 1.239 0.010 0.353
Profitability - Improving 1.141 0.000 1.199 0.000 0.104
3. Customers & Customer Loss 1.133 0.261 1.103 - -
Partners Customer Win 1.161 0.000 1.164 0.000 0.355
New Partnership 1.164 0.000 1.208 0.000 0.157
Reaching a Milestone 1.120 0.000 1.234 0.000 0.006
4. Financial Dividend 1.194 0.000 1.127 0.001 0.066
Financial Results - Strong 1.045 0.872 1.195 0.000 0.295
Financial Results - Weak 1.286 0.001 1.140 0.019 0.073
Pre-Announcement - Negative 1.588 0.000 1.327 0.000 0.006
Pre-Announcement - Positive 1.254 0.000 0.618 0.652 0.226
Restatement 1.338 0.000 1.175 0.021 0.041
Secondary Offering: Debt 1.054 0.000 1.085 0.001 0.147
Secondary Offering: Equity 1.083 0.000 1.084 0.000 0.471
Share Buyback 1.158 0.000 1.178 0.000 0.331
Stock Split - Forward 1.131 0.221 1.481 0.007 0.040
Stock Split - Reverse 1.423 0.001 1.935 0.001 0.043
5. Legal Class Action 1.038 0.130 0.955 0.668 0.220
Legal Problems 1.263 0.004 0.798 0.197 0.005
SEC Investigation 1.430 0.000 1.256 0.064 0.165
Settlement 1.194 0.000 1.191 0.000 0.476
6. M&A Acquisition 1.124 0.001 1.237 0.019 0.145
IPO 1.263 0.009 1.197 - -
Merger 1.163 0.000 1.351 0.000 0.000
Spinoff 1.179 0.000 1.204 0.000 0.196
7. Management Addition 1.171 0.000 1.140 0.000 0.115
Compensation 1.064 0.612 1.209 - -
Promotion 1.165 0.000 1.210 0.000 0.093
Reorganization 1.171 0.000 1.194 0.000 0.328
Retirement 1.060 0.437 -1.436 0.354 0.171
Termination 1.183 0.000 1.145 0.002 0.277
8. Meetings & Company-Sponsored Event 1.130 0.000 1.231 0.000 0.048
Events Industry Events 1.151 0.000 1.201 0.000 0.041
Investor Meeting 2.363 0.140 1.323 0.000 0.131
9. Products & FDA Approval 1.156 0.000 1.228 0.000 0.066
Services FDA Investigation 1.191 0.000 1.256 0.000 0.192
FDA Rejection 1.547 0.005 0.957 - -
New Product 1.153 0.000 1.132 0.000 0.092
Patent Award 1.162 0.000 1.154 0.000 0.438
Pharmaceutical Approval EU 1.130 0.013 1.232 0.200 0.294
Product Approval 1.157 0.000 1.142 0.000 0.299
Product Defect 1.128 0.019 1.232 0.015 0.168
Research Failure 1.015 0.742 1.061 0.352 0.283
Research Success 1.196 0.000 1.299 0.000 0.044
Updates & Upgrades 1.033 0.728 1.182 0.000 0.063
For the periods before and during the financial crisis, the table presents the test results of the null hypothesis that the
Amihud illiquidity measures before and after a press release are equal. Specifically, the ratio of post- to pre-announcement
Amihud illiquidity measures is tested for being different from one. For each subcategory, the table shows the sample mean
of the ratio, as well as the p-value of the t-test for each subperiod. Furthermore, the table presents the test results of the
null hypothesis that the Amihud ratios for the periods before and during the crisis are equal. Dashes indicate that at least
one of the two groups (before and during) has fewer than 30 observations.
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3.4 Conclusion
For this paper we have collected a comprehensive dataset of corporate press releases,
which, since the increase in information release requirements, includes all corporate news
that are deemed to be material for stock prices. Using this unique dataset, we further
classified press releases into various categories and investigated the impact of the different
types of news on stock prices and the informational environment. We then subdivided our
time series into the sub-periods before and during the financial crisis. Not surprisingly, we
found that announcements about secondary equity offerings were viewed less negatively
and positive cash flow news were perceived significantly more positively by the market.
In future work, we plan to further the scope of our analysis by conducting more in-depth
investigations into the process of price discovery and uncovering factors that influence the
speed of price discovery across firms and industries.
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Appendices
A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Calculation of Realized Variances
We use realized variance (RV) as an estimate of integrated variance (IV). Assume that
the efficient log-price process can be described by the stochastic differential equation
dp∗(t) = µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dw(t), (5)
where µ(t) and σ(t) are smooth time-varying functions and w is a standard Brownian
motion. We further assume that µ and σ are independent of w. Following the notation
in Hansen and Lunde (2005b), we let integer values of t refer to trading day closing times
and use trading days as the unit of time. Therefore, the close-to-close return on day t is
defined as the difference between two log prices, i.e., rt ≡ p(t)− p(t− 1). Unfortunately,
the efficient price process cannot be observed and we, therefore, describe the observed
price process as the efficient price process plus microstructure noise:
p∗(t) ≡ p(t) + ε(t). (6)
Integrated variance over the time interval [a, b], IV[a,b], is defined as
IV[a,b] ≡
b∫
a
σ2(t)dt. (7)
Integrated variance is usually estimated with realized variance from intraday tick data.
We follow Hansen and Lunde (2005b) and denote times at which prices are observed by
a = t0 < t1 < ... < tm = b. We define a partition of [a, b], Ξ ≡ {t0, .., tm}. The RV
sampled from this partition is thus given by
RVΞ[a,b] ≡
m∑
i=1
(p(ti)− p(ti−1))2, (8)
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where p(ti)− p(ti−1) represents intra-day returns. Note that RVΞ[a,b] is specific to the par-
tition.
As RVΞ[a,b] incorporates only prices that occurred during the trading day, it ignores
information that arrives when the market is closed. Therefore, we employ the scaling
estimator of Hansen and Lunde (2005a) and Hansen and Lunde (2005b). The scaling
estimator incorporates the overnight return by scaling the RV by λ, which is given by
λ =
∑n
t=1(rt − r¯)2∑n
t=1 RV
Ξ
[a,b]
. (9)
Thus, our estimator of RVt is defined as
RVt = λRV
Ξ
[a,b]. (10)
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data Description
Table B1 summarizes the data used in our experiment covering the period from January
1, 1980 to December 31, 2007. The format of the table is name and code, as used in the
source databases (Thomson Datastream and Bloomberg), as well as a brief description of
each time series.
Table B1: Summary of Applied Time Series
Name Code Description
S&P 500 Composite S&PCOMP Index Price
S&P 500 E/P S&PCOMP(PE) Earnings-to-Price Ratio - S&P 500
S&P 500 DY S&PCOMP(DY) Dividend Yield - S&P 500
S&P 500 B/M N/A Book-to-Market Ratio - S&P 500
Fed Funds Rate FRFEDFD US Federal Funds Rate (Effective) (% Per Annum)
Discount Rate USFDTRG US Federal Funds Target Rate (% Per Annum)
AAA Bond Y70461 Moody’s US AAA Corporate Bond (% Per Annum)
BAA Bond Y70462 Moody’s US BAA Corporate Bond (% Per Annum)
3-Mo. T-Bill FRTBW3M U.S.Treasury Bills, 2nd Market, 3-Mo.(% Per Annum)
6-Mo. T-Bill FRTBW6M U.S.Treasury Bills, 2nd Market, 6-Mo.(% Per Annum)
1-Yr. T-Bond S02556 U.S.Treasury Const. Maturities 1-Yr. (% Per Annum)
2-Yr. T-Bond S02557 U.S.Treasury Const. Maturities 2-Yr. (% Per Annum)
5-Yr. T-Bond S02559 U.S.Treasury Const. Maturities 5-Yr. (% Per Annum)
10-Yr. T-Bond S02561 U.S.Treasury Const. Maturities 10-Yr. (% Per Annum)
30-Yr. T-Bond S02562 U.S.Treasury Const. Maturities 30-Yr. (% Per Annum)
CBOE Put/Call Ratio PCUSSPXR Index CBOE Put/Call Ratio
CBOE VIX T59165 Implied Volatility Index for S&P 500 Index Options
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B.2 Parameterization for Simple Rules
Table B2 presents parameter values/thresholds x for each indicator used in our exper-
iment. As described in the text, the moving averages over 5, 10, 20, and 60 days and
the 80th/20th, 90th/10th, and 95th/5th percentiles over the preceding 250 days are used as
(standard) threshold values. For indicators that trigger selling the index when reaching
high values, the 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles are used. The 5th, 10th, and 20th percentiles
are used for indicators that trigger switching to cash by reaching low values. In Table
B2, we list only the additional threshold values x specific for each rule. We use the nota-
tion x = [lowest value : i : highest value] to indicate that threshold values increase from
lowest value to highest value in increments of i. For each indicator, we consider holding a
certain position for a period of c days (waiting period), during which all other signals are
ignored. Alternatively, a time-delay filter is implemented, which requires that a buy/sell
signal has to remain valid for d days before a transaction is made. In our experiment, we
consider parameter values c = [1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30] and d = [1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30].
Table B2: Parameter Values for Simple Rules
Indicator Threshold Values
Financial Ratios [0.02 : 0.01 : 0.12] for E/P
[1 : 0.25 : 3] for DY
[1 : 0.05 : 1.75] for B/M
Short-Term Interest Rates [8 : 0.25 : 15]
Long-Term Interest Rates [8 : 0.25 : 15]
Maturity Spread [−3 : 0.25 : 1]
Expected Inflation [0 : 0.25 : 1.5]
Credit Spread [2 : 0.1 : 4]
Put/Call Ratio [1 : 0.25 : 5]
Implied Volatility [15 : 1 : 45]
Bond-Equity Yield Ratio [1 : 0.05 : 1.8] for E/P and 3-Mo. T-Bill
[1.5 : 0.05 : 2.4] for E/P and 10-Yr. T-Bond
[2.5 : 0.25 : 5.5] for DY and 3-Mo. T-Bill
[3 : 0.25 : 6] for DY and 10-Yr. T-Bond
Dividend Payout Ratio [0.35 : 0.015 : 0.5]
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B.3 Parameterization for Complex Rules
Learning Rules
The following parameter values for the evaluation period e and the review span r of the
learning rules are used:
e = [1 : 5 : 120, 130 : 10 : 250]29 and
r = [1 : 5 : 120, 130 : 10 : 250].
Voting Rules
The following parameter values for the review span r and the proportion interval b of the
voting rules are used:
r = [1 : 5 : 120, 130 : 10 : 250] and
b = [0.2 : 0.05 : 0.8].
29 We use this notation to indicate that parameter values increase from 1 day to 120 days in increments
of 5 days and from 130 days to 250 days in increments of 10 days. The same notation is used
analogously for parameter values for the evaluation period and the proportion interval.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Representative Press Release Headlines
Here we provide some examples of typical press release headlines within each news cate-
gory. More than one example is given for some categories to achieve higher representa-
tiveness.
1. Awards
(a) Company Award
Dell Inc. (DELL) 26-04-2006 12:00:05 Dell Receives Top U.S. Government Award
for Workplace Diversity Efforts
Constellation Engy (CEG) 31-03-2006 9:44:40 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Ranks Highest in the East Region With Business Customers According to the 2006
J.D. Power and Associates Electric Utility Business Customer Satisfaction Study
(b) Product Award
Oracle Corp. (ORCL) 07-06-2006 8:02:20 Oracle’s Siebel Universal Customer Master
Wins ‘Gold Award’ for Master Data Management in Bloor Research Study
Xerox Corp. (XRX) 13-06-2006 6:00:01 Xerox Imaging and Repository Operations
Earn ISO/IEC 27001 Accreditation for Security
2. Corporate Strategy and Profitability
(a) Credit News - Negative
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (ACS) 20-03-2007 15:49:27 Fitch Places Affiliated
Computer Services on Rating Watch Negative on LBO Offer
(b) Credit News - Positive
Gasco Energy Inc. (GSX) 30-03-2006 16:15:27 Gasco Energy Secures Revolving Line
of Credit
Autonation Inc. (AN) 03-04-2006 8:47:50 AutoNation, Inc. Receives Lender Com-
mitments for $600 Million Term Loan
(c) Exchange Noncompliance
Circuit City Stores, Inc. (CCTYQ) 30-10-2008 16:05:00 Circuit City Stores, Inc.
Receives Notification from NYSE about Non-Compliance with a Continued Listing
Standard
(d) Infrastructure - Downsizing
Furniture Brands International, Inc. (FBN) 05-02-2006 16:46:01 Thomasville Furni-
ture Industries Announces Closing of Case Goods Manufacturing Facility
PT Centris MultiPersada Pratama Tbk (CMPP) 05-03-2006 9:46:01 Champps En-
tertainment Announces Closure of Underperforming Restaurants
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Arapaho Capital Corp. (AHO) 07-06-2006 17:13:53 Ahold intends to divest 46 Tops
stores in Northeast Ohio
(e) Infrastructure - Expansion
Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ) 25-04-2006 8:57:07 Verizon Wireless Expands Its
Network in Rensselaer County
Centerra Gold Inc. (CG) 29-03-2006 8:30:02 Centerra Gold Continues to Expand
Kumtor SB Zone and Adds 1 Million Ounces of Reserves at the Gatsuurt Project
(f) Profitability - Declining
Williams-Sonoma, Inc. (WSM) 08-01-2009 06:00:03 Williams-Sonoma, Inc. An-
nounces a 22.6% Decrease in 2008 Holiday Revenues
(g) Profitability - Improving
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (ANF) 12-22-2008 9:30:25 Continues to Grow in Product
Offerings, Customer Base and Profitability
3. Customers and Partnerships
(a) Customer Loss
America Service Group Inc. (ASGR) 21-08-2006 18:30:25 America Service Group to
Terminate Contract with Florida Department of Corrections
(b) Customer Win
Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. (ESIO) 25-04-2006 21:22:01 ESI Receives Follow-on
Multi-System Order from Hynix Semiconductor Inc. for Its Model 9830 Semicon-
ductor Link Processing System; 9830 Order Furthers ESI’s Momentum in the Asia
Market
The Boeing Company (BA) 25-04-2006 5:00:33 Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprise
Orders 10 More Boeing 737s
(c) New Partnership
Independence Holding Company (IHC) 25-07-2006 16:21:44 Independence Holding
Company Announces New Relationship with Carolina Benefit Administrators to
Market and Administer Group and Individual Major Medical
Dolby Laboratories, Inc. (DLB) 31-07-2006 8:00:51 Dolby Announces Deal With
Infitec GmbH to Provide 3-D Technology for Dolby Digital Cinema; New technology
to Provide High-Quality and Flexible Digital 3-D Solution
(d) Reaching a Milestone
Cyberonics, Inc. (CYBX) 05-01-2006 16:01:44 Cyberonics Announces 1,100th Pa-
tient Treated With VNS Therapy(tm) for Treatment-Resistant Depression (TRD)
Since FDA Approval
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4. Financial
(a) Dividend
NSC Groupe SA (NSC) 25-04-2006 9:41:49 Norfolk Southern Declares Quarterly
Dividend
Holly Energy Partners, L.P. (HEP) 25-04-2006 6:45:29 Holly Energy Partners De-
clares Distribution; Increases Quarterly Distribution From $0.625 to $0.64 Per Unit
(b) Financial Results - Strong
Kennametal Inc. (KMT) 26-04-2006 7:30:39 Kennametal Reports Strong Third
Quarter
(c) Financial Results - Weak
Silicon Motion Technology Corp. (SIMO) 27-04-2006 17:00:43 Silicon Motion Tech-
nology Corporation Announces First Quarter Results for the Period Ended March 31,
2006: Market Conditions Contribute to Sequential Weakness but Growth Expected
to Pick Up in Q2
(d) Pre-Announcement - Negative
Keynote Systems, Inc. (KEYN) 04-03-2006 7:30:02 Keynote’s Preliminary Second
Quarter 2006 Revenue Below Expectations
(e) Pre-Announcement - Positive
OM Group, Inc. (OMG) 25-04-2006 7:01:50 OM Group Increases Outlook for 2006
First Quarter Earnings Per Share
(f) Restatement
Richardson Electronics, Ltd. (RELL) 04-04-2006 19:00:27 Richardson Electronics,
Ltd. to Restate its Financial Statements
(g) Secondary Offering: Debt
Dean Foods Company (DF) 05-10-2006 6:30:27 Dean Foods Announces Launch of
$300 Million Senior Notes Public Offering
(h) Secondary Offering: Equity
Kimco Realty Corporation (KIM) 30-03-2006 8:01:40 Kimco Announces Offering of
10 Million Shares of Common Stock
(i) Share Buyback
AO Smith Corp. (AOS) 02-20-2007 11:00:00 A. O. Smith Announces Stock Repur-
chase Program
(j) Stock Split - Forward
Cascade Financial Corporation (CASB) 25-04-2006 20:00:10 Cascade Financial Cor-
poration Declares 5-for-4 Stock Split
(k) Stock Split - Reverse
Idera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IDRA) 22-06-2006 9:00:12 Idera Pharmaceuticals to
Effect a Reverse Stock Split
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5. Legal
(a) Class Action
Pixelplus Co., Ltd. (PXPL) Shareholder Class Action Filed Against Pixelplus Co.,
Ltd. by the Law Firm of Schiffrin &amp; Barroway, LLP
(b) Legal Problems
LifePoint Hospitals, Inc. (LPNT) 17-04-2006 14:07:01 Dissident Stockholder Files
Suit against LifePoint Hospitals, Inc.
(c) SEC Investigation
One Liberty Properties, Inc. (OLP) 21-06-2006 16:30:01 One Liberty Properties
Receives Notification of Formal Investigation from the SEC
(d) Settlement
Freddie Mac (FRE) 18-04-2006 15:53:42 Freddie Mac Settles With Federal Election
Commission
6. M&A
(a) Acquisition
Plains Exploration & Production Company (PXP) 24-04-2006 7:58:41 PXP An-
nounces Agreement to Acquire Stone Energy and Elimination of 2007 and 2008
Crude Oil Collars
(b) IPO
Stoneridge, Inc. (SRI) 23-10-2007 16:47:00 Stoneridge, Inc. Announces Brazilian
Joint Venture IPO Filing
(c) Merger
Gerdau Ameristeel Corporation (GNA) 28-04-2006 16:14:05 Sheffield Steel Announces
53% Shareholder Agreement of Merger With Gerdau
(d) Spinoff
Level 3 Communications, Inc. (LVLT) 20-07-2006 16:19:01 Level 3 Signs Agreement
to Sell Software Spectrum Subsidiary for $287 Million
7. Management
(a) Addition
Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. (GTK) 25-04-2006 9:03:26 Lottery In-
dustry Veteran Connie Laverty Joins GTECH as Senior Vice President and Chief
Marketing Officer
(b) Compensation
Duke Energy Corporation (DUK) 04-06-2006 16:05:31 Duke Energy Releases Details
of CEO Compensation Package
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(c) Promotion
EMCOR Group, Inc. (EME) 04-03-2006 10:32:01 Mark A. Pompa to Succeed Leicle
E. Chesser as Chief Financial Officer of EMCOR Group; Mr. Chesser to become
Vice Chairman of EMCOR Group, to retire at the end of 2006
(d) Reorganization
PepsiAmericas, Inc. (PAS) 15-05-2006 17:01:05 airforce(R) Nutrisoda(R) Announces
New Management Team
(e) Retirement
Safeguard Scientifics, Inc. (SFE) 24-05-2006 11:37:01 Safeguard Scientifics An-
nounces Retirement of Directors Anthony L. Craig and Robert Ripp
(f) Termination
Energy Partners, Ltd. (EPL) 19-04-2006 18:07:01 EPL Announces Departure of
David Looney as Chief Financial Officer
8. Meetings and Events
(a) Company Sponsored
Arrow Electronics, Inc. (ARW) 26-04-2006 17:16:01 Arrow Electronics Works with
Technology Suppliers to Facilitate 2006 Open Architecture Seminars
(b) Industry Event
Aspect Medical Systems, Inc. (ASPM) 25-04-2006 9:45:01 Aspect Medical to Web-
cast Presentation at Deutsche Bank 31st Annual Health Care Conference on May 2,
2006
(c) Investor Meeting
N S Group Inc. (NSS) 16-06-2006 9:26:01 NS Group to Present at the NIRI Regional
Investor Conference in Cincinnati, Ohio; Presentation June 20th
9. Products and Services
(a) FDA Approval
General Electric Company (GE) 20-04-2006 9:00:07 U.S. FDA Approves GE Health-
care’s Next-Generation Digital Mammography System for Improved Breast Care
(b) FDA Investigation
Pharmacyclics, Inc. (PCYC) 05-09-2006 7:30:56 Pharmacyclics to Submit New
Drug Application for Xcytrin(R) for Treatment of Lung Cancer Patients With Brain
Metastases
(c) FDA Rejection
Cephalon, Inc. (CEPH) 08-09-2006 17:02:18 Cephalon Receives Non-Approvable
Letter on SPARLON(TM)
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(d) New Product
Nokia Corporation (NOK) 25-04-2006 5:44:57 Digitally Divine Nokia N73 - the Ul-
timate Challenge to the Digital Camera
(e) Patent Award
Assurant, Inc. (AIZ) 28-06-2006 12:50:04 Assurant Awarded Patents for Call Pro-
cessing System
(f) Pharmaceutical Approval EU
Biogen Idec Inc. (BIIB) 29-06-2006 2:30:21 TYSABRI(R) Receives Approval in Eu-
ropean Union for the Treatment of Relapsing Remitting Forms of Multiple Sclerosis
(g) Product Approval
Broadridge Financial Solutions Inc. (BR) 11-10-2008 9:26:51 Broadridge Financial
Solutions Receives ISO 27001 Certification for Information Security Management
Systems
(h) Product Defect
Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) 31-03-2006 17:08:26 Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics Issues
a Voluntary Product Recall for VITROS(R) Immunodiagnostic Products Signal
Reagent
(i) Research Failure
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. (BMY) 18-05-2006 14:00:30 Bristol-Myers Squibb An-
nounces Discontinuation of Development of Muraglitazar, an Investigational Oral
Treatment for Type 2 Diabetes
(j) Research Success
Somaxon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (SOMX) 04-10-2006 6:01:04 Somaxon Pharmaceu-
ticals Announces Positive Phase 3 Results with SILENOR(TM) for the Treatment
of Adults with Chronic Insomnia
(k) Updates & Upgrades
Sony Corporation (SNE) 06-01-2006 13:00:28 Sony Strengthens BRAVIA Flat-Panel
LCD Line With Full HD Models and 1080p Inputs
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